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ABSTRACT
The Gulf Cooperation Council was established in May
1981 by the heads of state of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. At the time,
Western observers declared security to be the prime
consideration of its founders, yet security is not
mentioned in the Council's foundation charter. This
emphasizes the intention to promote "close coordination in
all spheres, especially the economic and social" between
the member states; throughout the charter the terms
"coordination",	 "integration",	 " cooperation",	 "closer
relations" and "ties" repeatedly recur. In consequence, as
the Council began to make its existence felt in the
international community, its activity raised the question
as to whether this demonstrated the development of
integration as understood in the West notwithstanding
references in the preamble to the charter to concepts of
Islamic and Arab unity which predate Western theories of
integration.
Accordingly, this study looks at the Gulf Cooperation
Council in the light of theories of integration initially
elaborated in the light of Western experience in order to
establish whether the Council in fact constitutes a fresh
attempt to promote Arab unity. It concludes that analysis
of its achievements establishes the Council as a cautious
and pragmatic instrument to the achievement of Arab unity
while at the same time reflecting favourably on Western
theories of integration based on the concept of the
security community.
1Chapter One
INTRODUCTION: THEORIES OF INTEGRATION
The study of international relations in the twenty
years following the second world war was distinguished by a
debate, sometimes acrimonious, between two schools of
thought: those who might be best entitled the political
realists, and those who might very loosely be described as
the integrationists. The assumptions of the political
realists as applied to international relations may be said
to be based on the notion that states and nation-states are
the only consequential actors in international relations,
and therefore the study of international relations should
be focused upon the motives and behaviour of states or
nation-states or their representatives. It is admitted that
other actors exist, but they are consequential only as
agents or instruments of states. International relations
result from foreign policies directed towards enhancing
national security, defined in terms of military might, and
territorial and ideological domain. Other goals are pursued
by international actors, but these are "low politics" and
hence command little priority in foreign policy, and are of
little consequence to international relations.
Against this could be arrayed the findings of several
of the contributors to the growth in integration studies in
the 1950's and 60's. These acted or argued on the
assumption that states and nation-states are not the only
consequential actors in international relations. Indeed,
2some outcomes in international relations can be understood
only in terms of the motives and behaviour of international
public organizations and bureaucracies, formal and ad hoc
coalitions of officials, trans-nationally grouped, trans-
nationally organized, non-governmental associations, multi-
national business enterprises, 	 international social
classes, and other actors traditionally deemed
inconsequential. From this it follows that international
relations result from foreign policies directed towards
enhancing national welfare in terms of per capita income,
employment, and general well-being; the importance which
governments attach to such goals, and the domestic
penalties or rewards surrounding their attainment or
sacrifice render their pursuit "high politics"; and within
the international system such politics entail integration.
At its most basic, the concept of integration can be
defined as the movement of parts into a whole, or the
creation of inter-dependence between the parts. In the
political sphere, those who rejected the views of the
political realist school used the term to denote a
relationship of community or strong cohesiveness amongst
peoples, and they argued that integration could not only
establish the geo-political boundaries of the nation state,
but it could also transcend them. They accepted that the
historical record was uneven, but insisted that it
nonetheless showed integration at the regional as well as
the national level. Great Britain, for example, was the
outcome of the integration of the peoples of Scotland,
England and Wales some centuries before the integration of
3the peoples of Italy and Germany. At the regional level,
they pointed to the integration of the original thirteen
colonies of North America in a federal structure which was
so successful in North America that federalism as a theory
for the regional integration of Europe was not only
advocated in the inter-war years, but found its proponents
at the end of the second world war also)- Federalism is
based on the belief that the surest way to establish
political community is by formal political processes
culminating in a formal constitution. Such constitutions
permit separate states to retain their autonomy, while
uniting them in such external political activities as
defence and foreign policy, and such internal activities as
law and commerce. Proponents of federalism argue that the
establishment of common institutions reflect and promote
the growth of a sense of community. They concern themselves
with the elaboration of written constitutions, the
different forms of representative institutions, and the
divisions of power between federal and national agencies.
Despite its vitality as a political theory and its
demonstrable success in the United States of America,
federalism failed to establish itself as an alternative to
traditional political structures in the years following the
second world war when Europe was reconstructed very much
along the lines of pre-World War II Europe. The
disappointment of those who advocated a federal united
states of Europe on the model of the United States led to a
novel approach on the part of those who advocated a new
1 Vide Streit, Clarence, Union Now, London: Cape, 1948.
4political structure, one deliberately designed to obviate a
recurrence of the warfare which twice in twenty-five years
had ravaged the old continent. Given the appalling economic
state of Europe following the second world war, which
necessitated - at least as far as Western Europe was
concerned - the Marshall plan to prevent Western Europe
from falling into economic and political chaos, there
emerged those who advocated the need for functional
cooperation at the economic level, initially on a limited
scale, but gradually extending so as to bring about
economic unification and the formulation for broader
political integration. Amongst the ranks of the theorists
of integration, the most elaborate proponent of what became
known as functionalism was David Mitrany who dismissed
federalism on the grounds that it would not overcome the
forces of nationalism and ideology which had been largely
responsible for the outbreak of the second world war and
indeed of the first world war. Arguing that states would
not surrender sovereignty to a federal authority, he
asserted that they would transfer authority for specific
purposes when they were convinced that the state itself
could no longer satisfy the needs and desires of their
citizens. According to Mitrany, trade, transport, science
and technology would pass into the care of international
organizations on a global rather than a regional basis so
as to avoid world peace being jeopardized by competition
between regions. A functional union, functional
integration, would bring about a community of nations with
5a vested interest in the maintenance of peace and a
burgeoning aspiration for political agreement.2
Mitrany put forward his views in 1943, and his views
reflected his concern for the future for world peace, when
the then world war was concluded. Later advocates of
functionalism were more practically inspired; indeed they
had an example of practical functional integration on a
more parochial scale in the European Coal and Steel
Community, established by treaty in 1951. As analyzed by
Ernst Haas, the experiment seemed to indicate that
functionalism was rooted in economics; he went on to deduce
that step-by-step economic integration would ultimately
bring about the establishment of a new supra-national
political authority in Europe, however limited the
intentions of governments had been at the outset. Economic
self-interest would be the motive force for regional
integration and the progression from a politically-inspired
common market to an economic union, and finally to a
political union, would be automatic.3
Functionalism was thus seen as a process; integration
theory, as it developed, was directed primarily towards
explaining political unification amongst states. While the
exact meaning of political unification differed from one
theoretical school to another, most imagined the end-
product to be an entity similar to a modern nation-state,
or a multi-national federation. This being the case, the
2 Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System, London: Oxford
University Press for the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1943.
3 Haas, Enrst B., The Uniting of Europe, Stanford
University Press, 1958 (1st edition).
6main questions of integration theory were: within what
environment, under what conditions, and by what process
does a new trans-national political unit peacefully emerge
from two or more initially separate and different ones?
Mitrany argued that traditional political structures,
notably the nation-state, were less and less able to
satisfy the needs of their own populations. It followed
that new structures to satisfy those needs were required
and that such structures would reduce the role of the state
and of government. A host of technical bodies would deal
with such problems as social welfare, education, transport,
and economic production. These organizations would be
integrated and the government of men would become the
administration of needs. Integration would thus be the
transition from an international society composed of
territorially based sovereign states, to a global society,
whose main actors would be defined by function, actors
which had to be global, because any functional integration
at less than the global level would permit the possibility
of conflict which human welfare demanded be avoided. It
thus followed that integration would bring about the
gradual removal of the state system and it would be brought
about by the attitude of elites engaged in functional
activities and by the attitudes they diffused through
society by education and their control of the mass media.
The views of Haas and his followers were in some
senses more parochial and the modifications they suggested
to grander theories of integration led to their being given
the title "neo-functionalists". For Haas, political 
7integration was not so much the result of pressures arising
from functional needs, but the result of the inter-action
of political forces - interest groups, parties, governments
- as well as international organizations, which seek to
utilize such pressures in their own interests. According to
Haas, political integration was
"the process whereby political actors in several
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift
their loyalties, expectations, and political
activities towards a new centre, whose institutions
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing
national states. The end result of a process of
political integration is a new political community
super-imposed over the existing ones."
The process rested on functionalism, but Haas asserted that
functionalism rested on economic self-interest and that
such self-interest was more important than political
commitment. According to Haas incremental decision-making
was more effective than the construction of elaborate grand
designs. The key assumption was that in modern democratic
industrial society, particularly that of Western Europe,
there was no longer a distinctly political function
separate from economics or welfare, and once crucial
functions, notably economic, were given to a supra-national
body, the inter-dependence of economic processes would
produce pressures for the granting of further supra-
national power, in order to meet successfully the tasks
engendered by the initial shift of power. Thus within
Western Europe, agreements involving limited economic
sectors, such as coal and steel, increased both trade and
common problems; a supra-national bureaucracy would be
4 Ibid, p. 17.
Bdeveloped to deal with them, and the increasing number of
economic activities affected by this growing supra-national
jurisdiction with the development of pressure groups,
organized across national boundaries in order to be able to
influence policy decisions now being taken by supra-
national institutions, would increase pressure to
integrate. Organized groups, particularly in industry and
agriculture, would orient themselves towards the community
institutions in order to advance their own interests. Over
time such institutions would be given further power and
attract political loyalty; thus the outcome would be what
the federalist wanted, but what the federalists wanted
brought about by the socio-economic pressures on states.
The new functionalist theory of integration developed
out of the post-war experience of Western Europe; Haas
himself cautioned against applying the European model to
less developed areas of the world because of substantial
differences in key social and economic structures. He did,
however, argue that the lessons of the European experience
could be utilized outside Europe if functional equivalents
could be identified for such requisites as national
bureaucracies, pragmatic interest groups, parliamentary-
type government, and a supra-national technocracy. As
things turned out, however, the European experience itself
was to prove less positive than Haas had forecast and
seemed not to be leading towards the political integration
which had been the common object of the various theorists.
The European Common Market, the different Latin American
and African customs unions, and various other regional
9adventures in fact turned out not to be examples of
political unification, so that using them to generate
theories about political unification proved impossible. Ten
years after the publication of his original study, The
Uniting of Europe, Haas himself acknowledged that the
process of economic integration did not lead automatically
to political integration. Indeed, he asserted that
integration and disintegration exist as two rival social
processes simultaneously at work; it was erroneous to
assume the permanent superiority of incremental economic
decisions over crucial political choices and to find an
almost absolute determinism in the European social and
economic structures. 5 The neo-functionalists had not
sufficiently reckoned with the nationalism of political
actors, nor had they reckoned with their positive anti-
functionalism. An outstanding opponent of functionalism,
and a determined protagonist for the value of nationalism,
was President de Gaulle, who took office in 1958 and who
deliberately sought to prevent the emergence of the sort of
integrated political community which had previously by the
neo-functionalists been held to be an automatic consequence
of earlier economic integration. Neo-functionalist theory
had argued that integration was bound to spill over from
the economic to the political sphere; experience indicated
that while spill-over does take place, leading to the
modification of national policies in industry, trade, and
agriculture, politics still prevails in the fundamental
5 Haas, Enrst B., The Uniting of Europe, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1968 (2nd edition), pp xxii-xxiii.
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area of foreign, defence and monetary policy. Accordingly,
"high politics" will persist as long as states continue to
compete for power and prestige; from this viewpoint the
conditions for the emergence of the European Community were
to be found in the temporary decline of nationalism coupled
with varying degrees of weakness experienced by West
European states as a consequence of the second world war.
Students of international integration realized what
was occurring and to the extent that they were working
inductively from contemporary cases they agreed that they
were not studying political unification, but they then fell
into intellectual disarray trying to define exactly what
they were studying. Their controversy came to be called the
"dependent variable" problem in integration theory; if no
end-product of the process afoot in Europe and elsewhere
could be defined, how could it be possible to explain
transformation towards or away from it? Empirically, how
could one measure progress towards an unspecified, perhaps
unknowable, end? This dependent variable problem was
sufficiently serious to bring productive efforts at
formulating a theory of political unification to a halt in
the early 1970's. To be sure, since that time the study of
the politics of common markets and regional associations
has continued, but most analysts are currently more
concerned with practical policy issues in regional
cooperation than with theoretical generalizations about
unification. 6
 To understand why this is so, one must
6 E.g. Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William and Webb, Carole
(eds.), Policy-Making in the European Communities,
London and New York, Wiley, 1977.
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distinguish between integration theory, or theories, as
represented by the generalizations of federalists,
functionalists, and neo-functionalists about international
political unification, and integration studies, as
represented by the concerns, questions, observations and
findings of all those scholars, including integration
theorists, who undertook to discover in the broadest sense
what was happening within customs unions, common markets,
and other regional associations. Clearly, not all who
studied regional cooperation were prompted to do so out of
interest in political unification, and many of those who
began by seeking insights into unification found in their
case-study materials wealths of new and interesting
information about cognate occurrences in subject areas
variously described as international administration, trans-
national and trans-governmental relations, international
political economy, and so on. Each of these diversions into
cognate areas produced a literature and several led to new
bodies of theory. Together they came to constitute
integration studies. Whereas the common interest among
those working at integration theory was to explain
political unification, the common interest among those in
integration studies came to centre more comprehensively in
explaining collaborative behaviour at the international
level.
It is the contention of the writer that no more
interesting a focus for integration study could be found
than the Gulf Cooperation Council, established in May 1981.
To quote its Secretary-General:
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"When the Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council was
signed ... that signing of the Charter was accompanied
by the adoption by the heads of state of a working
paper that laid down the basis for economic
integration. There was also a concluding political
declaration that defined the foreign policy of the
Gulf Cooperation Council. The most salient points of
the economic and the political declarations were the
emphasis on the integration in all economic fields and
on convergence in foreign policy. Immediately
thereafter the draft unifying economic agreement was
initialed ... it will change the face of the Gulf by
transforming it from separate markets and parochial
concerns to a large single common market, in which the
Gulf nationals can move freely, with full freedom of
ownership of properties, and with all the privileges
accorde4 to the nationals of the receiving member
state."'
Given that the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation
Council was speaking only ten months after the formation of
the GCC, such optimism may seem remarkable. This said,
while the circumstances which led to the evolution of the
European Community were not replicated in the circumstances
which led to the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
its formation seems to reflect favourably on some of the
ideas advanced by theorists of integration. The most
pertinent of these in relation to the Gulf Cooperation
Council is Karl Deutsch, whose most direct statements
concerning international integration are set forth in
Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, a study
written in collaboration with colleagues at Princeton
between 1952 and 1956. In this work Deutsch offers an
inventory of concepts relevant to the analysis of
international relations among countries and peaceful change
7 Abdulla Y. Bishara, 14th January 1982, Bahrain. In The
First Five Years of the GCC: An Experiment in
Unification (1981-1986), Secretariat-General, Riyadh,
1987. (Henceforth referred to as The First Five
Years).
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in international relations. Integration, Deutsch specifies,
is to be distinguished from amalgamation. The former has to
do with the formation of communities and the latter with
the establishment of organizations, associations or
political institutions. Communities are groups of people
who share attributes in common, who display mutual
responsiveness, confidence and esteem, and who self-
consciously self-identify. A minimum condition of community
is a shared expectation among members that their conflicts
will be peacefully resolved; this minimum community is
called a security community.
According to Deutsch, international communities may be
either amalgamated or pluralistic. If amalgamated, the
community would look very much like a federation or nation-
state, with institutions of central government regulating
the internal or external relations of an integrated
population. By contrast, the pluralistic international
community is a population integrated into at least a
security community, but politically fragmented into two or
more sovereign states. And it needs to be stressed that for
Deutsch both integration and amalgamation are quantitative 
concepts; both can be measured with regard to degree or
intensity, and Deutsch took up the theoretical challenge of
establishing the measurement of these degrees of
integration and amalgamation. In the event, the
quantitative conceptualisation of amalgamation and
integration never reached fruition in either Deutsch's own
work or that of his students, because the measurement that
would permit accurate assessment of degrees of amalgamation
14
and integration could not be devised. Deutsch sought
amongst other methods to establish flows of communications
between populations and groups on the assumption that such
transactions could be measured and reflected perceptions of
the actors being members of a community. Utilizing flows of
communications to index attitudes and attitudinal change
within and between populations is questionable, however,
because questions remain about the connection between
communication and attitudes. Amalgamation similarly defies
precise quantification, partly because it has no precise
definition. Deutsch defined it as
"the formal merger of two or more independent units
into a larger unit, with some type of common
government after amalgamation."°
But what does formal merger mean in an operational sense,
and how does one know it when one sees it? Most historical
cases intuitively suggest that formal merger tends to take
place in a piecemeal fashion, one institution or one
institutionalized task at a time. But empirically it
remains extremely difficult to determine whether there is
more of it or less of it in evidence in particular cases at
particular times.
Recognition of the difficulty of quantification,
however, need not detract from the value of the concept of
the security community; examining the amalgamated security
community and the forces that produce and maintain it is
tantamount to examining international political
unification. In Political Community and the North Atlantic
8 Deutsch, Karl W., Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1957, p. 6.
15
Area the principle empirical focus of the investigation of
the amalgamated security community was the Western Europe
of the Six. Deutsch and his students and colleagues sought
to ascertain the existence of a security community among
the peoples of the Six, to establish the degree of
political amalgamation in evidence, and to project both
integration and amalgamation into the future in order to
draw conclusions about European unification.
Apart from their intrinsic importance as attempts to
understand better the course of European unification, these
exercises were also a test of a developmental model of
political unification, devised by Deutsch and initially
contained in his work on nationalism. 9
 In this model,
international political unification, or the coming into
being of amalgamated security communities, is a phenomenon
similar to the coming into being of nation-states. What one
would observe at the international level as political
unification occurs is comparable to what one would observe
at the national level when nation-states are born. First,
functional linkages develop between separate communities;
ties in trade, migration, mutual services, or military
collaboration, prompted by necessity or profit, generate
flows of transactions between communities and enmesh people
in trans-community communication networks. Under
appropriate conditions of high volume, expanding substance,
and continuing reward over extended periods of time, such
interactions generate social psychological processes that
9 Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication,
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press; New York: Wiley, 1953.
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lead to the assimilation of peoples and hence to their
integration into larger communities. Once such community
formation has taken place the desire of members and the
efforts of the elites may be directed towards
institutionalizing, preserving and protecting the
community's integrity and distinctiveness and regulating
internal social relations. Such desires acted upon lead to
political amalgamation through the establishment of
institutions of government. In overview then, the model
posits that political unification - national or
international - consists in moving first from communities
to community and then from community to state. Integration
therefore precedes amalgamation; sentimental change
precedes institutional change; social change precedes
political change.
For all its intuitive promise, however, Deutsch's
developmental model of the unification process has some
serious shortcomings. For one thing, the conditions under
which people in newly-integrated communities will or will
not initiate drives for political amalgamation are never
specified; therefore one cannot predict future
amalgamations from evidence of present integration, except
possibly in terms of probability statements that tend to be
so imprecise as to approximate refined guessing. The
relationship between integration and amalgamation is
certainly not causal, otherwise the pluralistic community
could never exist, but there is a contingency linkage
between the two which is never exactly specified in either
Deutsch's work or that of his students. Political dynamics
17
are similarly missing from Deutsch's model, and this too
seriously affects its explanatory and predictive power. His
formulation makes statements about people's attitudes and
sentiments, individually and in the aggregate, and also
makes statements about governments' policies. What remains
undisclosed is how, when and why changes at the social
psychological level are converted into changes at the
governmental level. Whose change of mind affects whose
change of behaviour, how, when and why? In effect, there
are no social or political structures or processes in
Deutsch's integration models - no groups or classes (except
elites and masses, and even these are seldom differentiated
analytically), no decision-makers, no decisions, very
little voluntaristic behaviour, and no politics. These
omissions generated considerable confusion amongst the neo-
functionalists in the 1950's and 60's. Their dismay was
well-founded, because without a social and political
content, the Deutsch model requires inferential leaps of
considerable magnitude.
Not only have questions been raised about the
relationship between integration and amalgamation in
Deutsch's formulations, but time has also exposed problems
in the assumed relationship between communication and
integration. Recent European experience, for example,
suggests that international communications may flow in
great volume between and among virtually all strata of
population over prolonged periods of time, with perceived
rewards to communicators, and yet register minimal effects
on people's identifications, symbolic references, and the
18
like. Communication, in short, does not seem to be creating
an international community among Western Europeans, at
least beyond minimal definition. The apparent hiatus in
political unification in Western Europe, however, need not
detract attention and interest in Deutsch's consideration
of the security community. While his examination of the
amalgamated security community led him into integration
theory, his identification of the pluralistic security
community points in the direction of much broader concerns.
Until the 1980's at least, Western European states and
peoples could be said to comprise neither a politically
amalgamated international community, nor a traditional
unintegrated international state system. What Western
Europe had come to resemble most closely was a pluralistic
security community - a cluster of non-warring peoples and
an arena of peaceful conflict resolution amongst
governments, but not a political unit, and certainly not a
supra-national state. In recent years, the bulk of research
in the field of integration studies has concerned the
nature and problems of the pluralistic security community.
Varied as such approaches have been, it is possible to
identify generally accepted factors or conditions held to
promote the development of pluralistic security
communities. Despite the disdain of Mitrany for the
activities of the state, the political factor is recognized
as being of great importance. It may be economic,
technological or cultural pressures which bring about
political change, but the change has to be initiated by, or
accepted by, or indeed opposed by the state, or rather by
19
those who act in the name of the state; these elites are
the potent decision-makers within the state and accordingly
can affect processes of integration by creating or impeding
or supporting public will. Indeed, the emphasis on the
elite as a dynamic force seems to be borne out when the
experience of the European Community is examined. The
political elites shape demand and support, or denial and
rejection, of policies; they influence the general public
through their utilization of the media of communication.
This general acceptance of the importance of the political
factor in no way contradicts the importance of economic and
social pressures. Economic and social welfare
considerations may well induce political elites to accept
the need for economic and social functions to be carried
out by institutions larger than those of the individual
state. A high degree of integration thus rests on a high
degree of contacts between the elites of the states
concerned and the intensity of communication and the
mobility of individuals and groups within the community.
It has also been recognized that political integration
may be the result of external influence such as apparent
political, military or economic threat. The desire for
security is therefore a powerful stimulant to integration.
To these must be added geographical factors because they
lead to an intense volume of contacts; this said, proximity
will only ensure contact between peoples when they share
the same cultural heritage, cultural traits, values,
religious beliefs, or traditions. Similarity of linguistic
and ethnic background ensures a degree of cultural
20
homogeneity which promotes the opportunity for integration
between separate political units.
Given that cultural homogeneity is in fact one of the
features of the states composing the Gulf Cooperation
Council, this is therefore an appropriate point at which to
leave this discussion of integration theory and turn to
integration in practice, as illustrated in the emergence of
the Gulf Cooperation Council. What were the factors which
impelled the formation the Council? How does its history
bear upon the theories of integration themselves?
21
Chapter Two
THE FOUNDATION OF THE GCC
The circumstances surrounding the birth of the Gulf
Cooperation Council are arresting; the Iran-Iraq war was in
full spate and there was virulent Shi'ite propaganda
emanating from Iran directed at the traditional states of
the Gulf; indeed it was to be suggested that propaganda
gave way to direct subversion after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 and the enunciation of the Carter
doctrine in the State of the Union message of January 1980,
wherein the US President declared:
"Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by
any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States. It will be repelled by
use of any means necessary, including military force."
This unilateral assertion of super-power involvement in
Gulf security was highly unwelcome; writing a year later in
a highly respected annual volume of record, one commentator
declared that the Gulf Cooperation Council had been created
specifically to bring about the coordination of all
government policies of the member countries, with a view to
safeguarding security and stability in the Gulf.' The
linkage between instability in the Gulf and super-power
involvement was made explicit by the Secretary-General of
the Gulf Cooperation Council, Abdulla Bishara. Speaking to
1 Keesinqs Contemporary Archives,	 1981, p.	 30982.
(Henceforth referred to as Keesings.)
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the Bahraini Engineers' Society in January 1982, he
declared:
"The Gulf Cooperation Council came about in order to
satisfy the aspirations and expectations of the people
of the Gulf, who realise that the absence of a
collective decision implies Great Power rivalry with
adverse consequences to the national security of the
Gulf states. The people wanted unity so as to be able
to ward off the Great Powers' rivalry in spheres of
influence."
Three years later, Bishara was to give a more elaborate
explanation for the origin of the GCC., quoting changes in
the international economic situation, notably in the
control of the flow of oil from the companies to the oil-
producing states and what he described as:
"the Arabic changes or more frankly the Arabic
collapse and corrosion and the downfall of the one
Arabic security ... the Iraqi-Iranian war ... the
nature of the area and its political and economic
values ... [and] problpps of development and manpower
and foreign migration."'
On this occasion Bishara was speaking to a high-level
audience in Riyadh in the presence of Prince Saud Al-
Faisal; he was subsequently not to be well served by his
translator. What he was trying to convey, however, was that
the security of the Gulf was inextricably linked to the
security of all Arabs, and not just the inhabitants of the
Gulf region. In this respect he was recalling notions of
the essential unity of the Arab world which were already in
circulation at the time of the Arab revolt a generation
earlier. Elsewhere he had referred to the debt that the
founders of the GCC owed to early Syrian thinkers:
2 The First Five Years, p.11.
3 Secretariat-General, The Role of the GCC in the
realisation of Arab unity, Riyadh: Secretariat-
General, n.d., pp. 21-22. (Henceforth referred to as
The Role of the GCC.)
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"I state with a certain sense of nostalgia that we in
the Gulf owe a great deal to the Syrian thinkers of
the earlier twentieth century. In 1916, many wise
Syrian thinkers yearned for Arab unity. Their dream
was to obtain Arab unity regardless of the forces of
Arab regionalism or the demands of nationalism. To
them, the prescription for a prospective cure to the
Arab ailment was Arab unity."4
Amongst such was Sati Al-Husri who stressed common language
and a shared history as the main characteristics of the
Arab nation and who held that:
"unity in these two respects leads to unity of feeling
and inclinations, to the sharing of sufferings and
hope, and to the unity of culture, and all this makes
people aware that they are the members of one nation
to be distinguished from other nations."5
But Arab aspirations generated by the Arab awakening and
the Arab revolt against Turkish rule in 1916 were not
translated into a pan-Arabic political framework; the
artificial borders and political systems imposed by the
European powers highlighted the conflicting interests
amongst the emerging Arab political forces themselves. Thus
it was that the Arab world became divided and remains un-
unified. In consequence other scholars were led to the
conclusion that under prevailing circumstances unity could
be obtained only by federation:
"the only avenue open to the Arabs now, if they wish
to overcome the practical difficulties in the way of
unity, is a federal union. Federation may in the end
prove to be the best means for unity."
4 Abdulla Y. Bishara, "The GCC: Achievements and
Challenges", American-Arab Affairs, No. 7. Winter
1983/4, p. 40.
5 Al-Husri, Sati, Selected Writings, Part I, Beirut: Dar
al-Quds, n.d., p. 53.
6 Dirassat Arabiyya [Arab Studies], Beirut: Dar al-film
lil-malayin, 1957, quoted in Karpat, Kemal H. (ed.),
Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary
Middle East, New York: Praeger, 1982, pp. 232-233.
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Thus wrote Habil Amin Ferris, who proposed in 1957 the
establishment of a federation linking four geographical
areas of the Arab world: the "Fertile Crescent", consisting
of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, and Palestine; the Nile
valley - Egypt, Sudan and Libya; the Maghreb - Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia; and the Arabian peninsula. The notion
of the "fertile crescent" had been espoused by the Iraqi
Nuni As-Saud; along with the Hashemite monarch he was swept
aside in the July 1957 revolution and the idea itself
became little more than a romantic aspiration. Given this
background, however, the subsequent formation of the GCC is
therefore not to be viewed as an isolated reaction to
purely contemporary developments. In addition, commentators
stress the common cultural identity of the six GCC states,
a common cultural identity mentioned in the preamble to its
charter itself. The most outstanding feature is the
similarity in their systems of government, a similarity
which does not derogate, however, from the unique location
that the largest member, Saudi Arabia, holds in the Islamic
world by virtue of the position of Mecca and Medina, two of
the holiest places in Islam. This endows Saudi Arabia with
a preeminent role not only in GCC politics, but indeed in
the politics of the Arab world.
It was the 1968 announcement of the British withdrawal
from the Gulf which led to the first very limited
experiment in federation, the formation of the United Arab
Emirates in 1971. Durable as this has proved, precedents
for attempts to achieve a larger unification in the Arab
world were not promising. The United Arab Republic had been
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established in February 1958 by Egypt and Syria, the two
states which had cooperated during the 1956 Suez Canal
crisis. However, the dominance assumed by President Nasser,
and the instability of the Syrian government meant that the
UAR began to disintegrate within a year of its foundation.
A similar attempt at cooperation between Jordan and Iraq
collapsed when the Iraqi monarchy was deposed on 14 July
1958. In 1971, the Federation of Arab Republics was formed
by Egypt, Libya and Syria, but this weakened after the 1973
Arab-Israeli war. In September 1980, Libya and Syria
entered into a unitary state agreement which has, however,
initiated little beyond the already existing ties between
the two countries. At the end of the decade which saw the
formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan and North Yemen established in March 1989 the Arab
Cooperation Council, and in the same month the Council of
Ministers of the GCC welcomed the formation of the Arab
Maghreb Union, consisting of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco and Tunisia.
Impressive as this roll-call might appear, the number
of attempts to establish strong cooperative links between
separate Arab states raises doubts as to their viability.
The two enduring monuments to cooperation within the Arab
world have been the Arab League itself, established in May
1945, and the Arab Monetary Fund, established in April
1976. Neither of these are geo-political federations and it
has to be acknowledged that neither has had a particularly
unifying effect on their members, although they have played
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a practical role in coordinating economic aid to developing
Arab states.
This said, the mutually compatible systems of the
traditional Arab Gulf states themselves prompted
initiatives by their heads of state to suggest frameworks
for cooperation in the early 1970's. For example, Sheikh
Jabir Al-Saba, then prime minister and crown prince of
Kuwait, called in May 1976 for -
"the establishment of a Gulf union, with the object of
realising cooperation in all economic, political,
educational and informatj,onal spheres, to serve the
interests of the region."'
In November 1976, Sultan Qaboos called for the convening of
a conference of foreign ministers of the Arab Gulf states
with the aim of reaching a collective agreement concerning
the security of the Gulf, and also to define areas of
cooperation between the countries of the area. The
conference was held in Muscat at the end of November 1976;
the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran were present to
discuss the Omani suggestion that they should agree on a
regional security and defence policy. Sultan Qaboos, in a
speech which reflected Oman's recent experience of war in
the south and its vital strategic position in the north at
the Strait of Hormuz, called for closer cooperation between
the countries of the region. 8
 The Shah of Iran was also a
keen advocate of regional cooperation, but the rising
7 Gulf Information and Research Centre, The GCC, London:
n.p., 1983, p. 15.
8 The Way Forward: Cooperation and Unity in the Gulf,
Muscat: Ministry of Information, Sultanate of Oman,
1985, pp. 11-13. (Henceforth referred to as The Way
Forward.) 
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tension between Iran and Iraq at this time was one reason
why no concrete progress was made as a result of this
conference, at which no final communiqué or resolutions
were made public.
In December 1978, a year before the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and almost two years before the outbreak of
the Iran-Iraq war, the new Kuwaiti crown prince and prime
minister, Sheikh Saad Al-Saba visited Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman. After each visit a
communiqué was issued which indicated the continued desire
of the six Gulf states to achieve some kind of formal
cooperation. Thus:
Riyadh, 6 December 1978.
"After reviewing the prevalent situation in the Arab
peninsula and in the Gulf region, the two sides affirm
their belief that continuity of positive efforts to
strengthen all aspects of cooperation is a natural
duty. The two sides affirm their concern that the
region should remain a zone of peace and stability
removed from international struggles."
Manama, 9 December 1978.
"The critical circumstances in the region warrant
speedy action for realising the objective of Arab
unity which is dictated by the region's historical
bonds and the aspirations of its people for greater
progress and prosperity."
Doha, 12 December 1978.
"The two sides held an identical view on the critical
situation prevailing in the region and the need for
corrective and speedy action towards unity of its Arab
states, which is determined by the nature of their
historical relations and similarities, and also to
cope with the desire to achieve progress and welfare."
Abu Dhabi, 16 December 1978.
"Reviewing the prevailing situation in the Gulf, the
two sides agree on the need for a collective and
speedy move to realise unity of the Arab Gulf states,
emanating from their religious and natural linkage and
to achieve aspirations of their people for progress
and prosperity."
Finally,
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Muscat, 20 December 1978.
"The two parties after reviewing relations between the
Gulf states and the prevailing circumstances, agreed
on the need for the closest framework of their Islamic
concepts, historical relations and similarity of
affairs and in response to the aspirations of the
region's cvpple to realise greater progress and
stability."
These may be described as a regional response to particular
circumstances; in November 1980, however, the 11th Arab
Summit Conference was held at Amman in Jordan, and shortly
afterwards Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahayan, President of the UAE,
declared that the call for Gulf unity was still on the
agenda:
"the call for Gulf unity is not merely intended as a
declaration of unity reflected in the creation of a
single state and in one flag and a national anthem...
what is needed is the laying down of foundations of
unity relying on sounq political, cultural, social and
economic principles.")
To this, Sheikh Isa Al-Khalifa, Emir of Bahrain, said,
"Since this is the age of major powers and nations,
there is no place for small countries to survive on
their own, and should they try to do so they will
definitely experience more backwardness and pressures,
while the advanced nations will continue to enjoy more
progress and advancement. All this prompts us to
believe in the principles 9f cooperation based on good
faith and a clear vision.""
The President of the UAE and the Emir of Bahrain were
speaking in radically different circumstances to those
prevailing at the time of Sheikh Saad's tour; in January
1979 the pro-Western Shah of Iran had been forced to leave
the country by the Islamic revolution fomented by Ayatollah
Khomeini. The latter's Islamic messengers were already
9 Kuwaiti News Agency (KUNA), Special Dossier, Kuwait:
KUNA, 1984, p. 8.
10 The Way Forward, p. 13.
11 Ibid.
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active amongst the Shi'ite populations of the Gulf states,
and while many moderate Gulf state citizens had long been
chary of the Shah and initially welcomed the change of
regime in Teheran, feelings in the Gulf states soon changed
as Khomeini's violently anti-Western stance made it rapidly
clear that his targets would include what he saw as the
pro-Western oil states of the peninsula. At the end of the
year which saw the departure of the Shah, a full-scale
Soviet invasion took place in Afghanistan. More alarming
still, in September 1980 the Iran-Iraq conflict escalated
to become by far the closest and thus the most serious
threat to the stability and security of the six Gulf
states. Shi'ite groups inspired by Iran had already caused
unrest in the peninsula, but the bombing of Kuwaiti border
posts in December 1980 by Iran left the Gulf states in no
doubt that the conflict could spread to their territory,
and this at a time when they were actively supporting Iraq.
Meanwhile, while the United States was officially neutral,
a guided missile cruiser was despatched to the Gulf, and
the spectre of super-power penetration added to the
discomfiture of the Gulf heads of state.
This radically altered the regional security situation
and precipitated discussions concerning the foundation of a
regional cooperation organisation at the Islamic summit in
Ta'if in Saudi Arabia in January 1981. Saudi Arabia had not
only experienced uprisings amongst its Shi'ite population
in the Eastern province since the coming to power of the
Ayatollah, it had suffered in December 1979 the disastrous
occupation of the holy place of Mecca by a group of young
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Sunni critics of the Saudi rêgime. Bahrain had also
experienced unrest in its Shi'ite population (which was
actually the majority) and even Kuwait, which had been the
first Gulf state to send its foreign minister on a good-
will visit to Iran after the fall of the Shah, was forced
to expel Iranian religious leaders. Sheikh Jabir Al-Saba of
Kuwait had nailed his colours firmly to the mast in
insisting that Kuwait was opposed to all foreign
intervention in the Gulf no matter what its origin. He was
not, however, to be the only one to express his views. In
the spring of 1981, John Nott, then United Kingdom
Secretary of Defence, visited Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and declared that
Britain was ready to contribute to the rapid deployment
force that had earlier been sketched as a possible solution
to Gulf problems by President Carter. At a press conference
on 30 March 1981, Nott accepted that Gulf security was the
responsibility of the Gulf and insisted that the rapid
deployment force would only be used if the heads of the
Gulf states requested it. But while accepting that the Gulf
states were themselves politically stable, Nott declared,
"The Soviet threat is not going to go away, and unless
the Gulf countries show that they do not want to see
Soviet expansionism then it will happen. H12
The Gulf countries did not want to see Soviet expansionism;
equally they did not want to see any other form of
expansionism and for their own reasons. Speaking to an
American audience on the danger of superpower rivalry,
Bishara declared that US policy
12 Keesings 1981, P. 30982.
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"suffers from a congenital defect that separates the
Gulf from the main Arab concern with the conflict with
Israel. President Eisenhower set the fashion of
failure when he in 1958 issued his doctrine. The
vocation (sic) of that doctrine was to convince the
Arabs that international communism was more a threat
to the Arabs than Zionism. The doctrine failed.
President Carter, in the heat of the American dispute
with Iran, and with the Soviets in Afghanistan, came
out with his doctrine. The Soviets are a bigger danger
than Israel. It failed again and that will be the fate
of any doctrine that places more weight on the danger
of the ,Soviets than it does on the danger of
Israel."'
Nott was speaking in the aftermath of a meeting in early
February 1981 between the foreign ministers of the UAE,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia, where it had
been unanimously agreed that a Gulf Cooperation Council
should be established with the aim of fostering cooperation
and coordination amongst the member states and intended to
present an unified Gulf position on major political,
economic and social issues. The GCC charter was quickly
drawn up and the basic structure agreed upon. Three months
later, on May 25 1981, the six heads of state met in Abu
Dhabi, signed the charter and the GCC come into formal
existence. 14
 This said, Nott's intervention underlined
views presented at meetings of the foreign ministers of the
Gulf held before the GCC was formally established. While
the charter was being devised these ministers had before
them two working papers, one submitted by Kuwait and the
other by Oman. The Kuwaiti paper suggested the
administrative structure of the organisation and the broad
outline of the policies it might follow. In the event the
13 Abdulla Y. Bishara, 22 September 1982, Washington. In
The First Five Years, p. 24.
14 See Appendix A for the GCC Charter and Appendices B, C
and D for associated Rules of Procedure.
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Kuwaiti draft was accepted with only minor alterations and
became the blueprint on which the charter was based. The
Omani paper, on the other hand, insisted that the greatest
need in the Gulf at that time was the closest possible
military cooperation leading to the eventual objective of
full military integration in command, communications,
supply and strategy. This was an ambitious proposal, even
an extravagant one, but it was tinged with reality, in that
the Omani paper pointed out that the six GCC states, even
were they to be fully militarily integrated, were
inadequate to defend themselves against a substantial
external attack. Consequently, the Omani paper maintained
that the GCC should plan its combined military defence in
open cooperation with a major friendly power, whose
security perceptions were close if not identical with those
of the GCC The only friendly power that fitted this
prescription was the United States. The other countries,
however, considered the threat of local war to be more
pressing than an external attack and that the GCC might be
considered by Iran and Iraq to be too pro-Western and too
anti-Soviet in the event of the Omani suggestions being
carried out. Consequently the Omani proposals were
shelved. 15 The preoccupation of the Sultan Qaboos with
defence, however, may be deduced from an interview given to
a Gulf magazine in the same month as he signed the charter:
"the region is facing threats from all directions. The
U.S.S.R. is in Afghanistan, while South Yemen is a
Soviet military base in the full meaning of the word.
There are thousands of Cuban soldiers in Ethiopia. We
are the gateway to Arabia and the oil route. Any
15 The Economist, (London), 30th May 1981.
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aircraft in the Horn of Africa, Kabul or Tashkent is
capable of covering a distance of 450 miles to drop
mines in the Strait of Hormuz, closivg the Strait and
severing the West's economic artery."-°
The meeting of the members of the future Council in
the course of the Arab summit at Ta'if had reached an
understanding that the new organisation should not include
Iraq, this due in the main to two factors: the first
Baghdad's status as a belligerent; and secondly the fact
that Iraq did not share many of the political and social
characteristics that bound the Gulf states; indeed its
Ba'athist government was opposed to many of their most
cherished aspects. Following the Ta'if summit, the foreign
ministers of the six states met in Riyadh on 4 February,
formally declared their intention to establish an
international organisation amongst themselves and set the
stage for several meetings of an experts' committee to sort
out the substantive and procedural details of the emerging
entity. By 10 March the various instruments had been agreed
and the foreign ministers ruled that the first Gulf
Cooperation Council summit should be held in Abu Dhabi at
the end of May. The six heads of state signed the charter
and the Council came into being; its Secretary-General was
Abdulla Bishara, who had been Kuwaiti ambassador to Brazil
and Argentina and a representative of Kuwait at the United
Nations. At his first press conference he chose to stress
the economic power of the GCC states and the need for a
unified economic agreement to replace current bilateral
agreements between the separate members. Subsequently he
16 Al-Mustaqbal, May 1981.
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defined the uses to which the power of the Council would
be put:
"we have plans for everything that contribute to
forging the unity of the Gulf, and that is the
uniqueness of the GCC It is not the United Nations,
which is an organisation of sovereign member states,
nor the Arab League, which is an association of
states. We are ahead of that. We are a confederal
structure w44 the dynamics towards unity. We work on
that basis."1'
The basic objectives of the Gulf Cooperation Council are
set out in article 4 of the charter:
"(1) To effect coordination, integration and inter-
connection between member states in all fields in
order to achieve unity between them.
(2) Deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes
of cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in
various fields.
(3) Formulate similar regulations in various fields
including ....
a) economic and financial affairs
b) commerce, customs and communications
c) education and culture
d) social and health affairs
e) information and tourism
f) legislation and administrative affairs
(4) Stimulate scientific and technological progress in
the fields of industry, mineralogy, agriculture, water
and animal resources; the establishment of scientific
research centres; implementation of common projects
and encourage cooperation Iv the private sector for
the good of their peoples."I°
The first two of these objectives are deliberately general;
the latter two focus more on the practical means by which
overall unity between the member states may be enhanced. It
is this practical approach which distinguishes the GCC from
the many other Arab and non-Arab experiments in regional
cooperation. The charter and related documents are also
important for what they do not contain in terms of language
17 The First Five Years, p. 14.
18 Information Department, Secretariat General, Cooperation
Council for the Arab states of the Gulf, Riyadh, n.d.,
p.7.
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and concepts involving the objectives of the organisation.
No unified state was established; no joint government was
proposed; no comprehensive political union was formed; no
instant meshing of economic system was mandated; and no
surrender of sovereign prerogatives was forced. Rather a
system was inaugurated in which increasing cooperation
through practical integration could gradually lead to
higher levels of inter-state ties. Its structure was
simple; at the top a Supreme Council composed of the rulers
of the member states, to meet annually; a Council of
(Foreign) Ministers, to meet quarterly; and a Secretariat-
General. The Supreme Council could become a Commission for
the Settlement of Disputes, and each of the three bodies
was empowered to establish delegate agencies as necessary.
There is no explicit reference to an end-point in the
cooperation process described in the charter. In contrast
to the United Arab Republic and other similar experiences,
the member states have not defined the GCC process in terms
of specific political, economic or defence objectives. From
the standpoint of defined objectives, there is no
indication of what result the extensive cooperation of the
GCC is intended to produce.
Yet despite the lack of explicit and long-term
objectives, a number of implied channels of cooperation can
be deduced from the GCC framework. The most embracing and
significant objective elaborated in the charter and
elsewhere is the process of integration between the member
states. Such integration is designed not to be limited
solely to economic or regional political cooperation, but
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rather is intended to extend to all spheres of inter-state
activity; the other stated objectives of cooperation,
coordination and inter-connection must be regarded as the
means by which integration can be achieved. Thus the most
salient objective of the GCC programme is to achieve a
framework in which the political, economic, and social
policies of the member states can be gradually integrated.
The attitudes underlying this have been described by
Secretary-General Bishara,
"despite the fact that the GCC charter does not
contain a clear-cut political theory, there is
consensus on some form of confederacy between its six
member states. Every Arab country is keen to maintain
its special characteristics, its independence and
legislative authorities, while at the same time the
strong desire exists among these states to promote
their regional potential within one framework. There
is common agreement, that acting under the umbrella of
the Council, they will be able to pool their economic
political and other efforts in a confederal manner."
Bishara was to proceed even further. Writing in April 1984,
he declared of the GCC,
"The frame is not federal nor confederal; it is an
elastic frame which responds to the changes of
development and the dynamicism of qccomplishment. No
wedges drag and no poles fetter it."40
This apparent vagueness needs to be set in both the
political context and the cultural context of the Gulf. The
states concerned are deeply conservative, with the heads of
state of the essentially city states of Bahrain and Kuwait
as concerned as Saudi Arabia and Oman to maintain the
status quo. Frequently rivals in the past, their common
language and shared commitment to Islam provide them with a
rich political vocabulary which is not replicated outside
19 KUNA, Special Dossier, pp. 8-9.
20 The Role of the GCC, p. 25.
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the Arab world. What the charter of the Council and the
definitions and glosses of its Secretary-General
demonstrate is the essential pragmatism of the GCC;
vagueness permits initiative and freedom to manoeuvre in an
uncertain world. The articulation of economic and social
aims in the absence of political detail in article 4 of the
charter establishing the Council's objectives avoided any
suggestion that a military alliance was in preparation;
given the situation in the Gulf in spring 1981, freedom of
political manoeuvre was essential in order to enhance
security.
If this is the case, what then is to be made of the
suggestion made by Secretary-General Bishara at a seminar
on Gulf security held in New York that the Gulf enjoyed
more security than was commonly conceded:
"The fact that the GCC is established and is
functioning with remarkable speed has generated in the
area the feelings of security and order. It is not
only a fallback for member states, but it acts with
awareness that the Gulf security is inseparable. It
has generated the realisation that the security of
Kuwait, for instance, cannot be isolated from the
safety of a remote village in Oman. The GCC brought
about a community of concerns, identicality of
survival.., although our charter does not articulate
cooperation on security, yet we realise that economic
integration, which is the cardinal element in the
GCC., cannot be fulfilled without stability, that
economic progress cannot be enjoyeol in an environment
replete with incertainties (sic)."21
This linkage of security with stability and stability with
economic integration was a shrewd way of papering over
differences notably between Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait
on the issue of security. Saudi Arabia was concerned about
its position in respect to the other powerful Gulf states,
21 The First Five Years, p. 21.
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Iran and Iraq. For Sultan Qaboos, however, the fact that
the Strait of Hormuz included Omani territorial waters, and
that the Iran-Iraq war had produced both the local threat
that the straits would be mined as well as the Carter
doctrine, with its corollary of the possible formation of a
rapid deployment force, meant that the prime task of the
Council was to establish a regional protection force. Oman
actually favoured an exclusive relationship with America in
this respect which Saudi Arabia was reluctant to concede.
Reluctance was much more marked on the part of Kuwait which
maintained relations with the Soviet Union. For the
Kuwaitis the economic aspect was the most significant
feature of the Council, and given the different attitudes
on security, Kuwait had the satisfaction of seeing the
first formal act of the Council being the signature of the
United Economic Agreement in the month following its formal
inception. This ambitious document covered trade, the
movement of capital and labour, development coordination,
technical cooperation, transport, communications, and
financial and military cooperation. 22 It was not to go
uncriticised; in late May, Syria, Iraq and the Palestine
Liberation Organisation had protested that the GCC would
"split the 21 nations of the Arab League into blocks of
have and have-not states, instead of promoting unity on
Israel." 23 The primacy of security, however, had been
addressed by the Gulf heads of state meeting for the first
time as the Supreme Council. While affirming
22 See Appendix E.
23 Keesings, 1981, P. 30982.
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"the inevitability of economic integration between
their countries as well as the social integration
between their people"-
they gave more emphasis to their belief
"that the security and stability of the region are the
responsibility of its people and states. Furthermore,
the Council expressed the will of these states and
their right to defend their security and to maintain
their independence. They also reaffirmed their
complete rejection of any foreign interference in
their region, of whatever origin, and called for the
necessity of keeping the entire region isolated from
international conflicts. They declared that guaranteed
stability in the Gulf is tied to the achievement of
peace in the Middle East, thereby confirming the
necessity for settling the Palestinian question and
arriving at a fair settlement which guaxanteed the
legal rights of the people of Palestine."2'e
Preoccupation with security, then, reflected the
environment in which the GCC was established and in the
broad sense of the stability of the existing system was a
major factor in its genesis. Beyond the immediately
contingent, however, the inception of the Council provided
an opportunity to reconsider the earlier theorists of
integration and in particular the views of Haas and
Deutsch. For Haas, the key to integration was
functionalism, and functionalism was ultimately based on
self-interest, in particular that of elites engaged in
functional activities. For Deutsch, the key to integration
lies in the concept of the security community, a
relationship which excludes the use of violence between its
members. It is clear that the Gulf Cooperation Council
exhibits the aspects of a pluralistic security community
and not simply because of the rhetoric surrounding its
foundation, nor the explicit concern of Saudi Arabia and
24 The Final Communiqués of the First 8 Meetings of the
Supreme Council, Riyadh, Secretariat-General, 1988, p.
7. (Henceforth referred to as The Final Communiqués).
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Oman for particular security problems. The decade following
the British withdrawal had seen the settlement of long-
standing disputes between the future members of the
Cooperation Council; Oman and the UAE reached agreement on
territorial boundaries; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on their
continental shelf, (a problem which had grown as oil
exploration moved from land to sea); Qatar and Bahrain came
to terms over the island of Hawar; Saudi Arabia and Abu
Dhabi over common borders. The thorniest problem of all,
the dispute over the Buraimi oasis between Saudi Arabia,
Oman and Abu Dhabi, had origins well back into the 19th
century and all parties to the dispute had heavy
commitments in terms of prestige; the conflict was finally
settled in 1975. It is also clear that the GCC satisfies
the criteria defined by Haas for integration based on
functionalism. There was already by 1981 a mesh of specific
economic arrangements binding various members of the GCC;
indeed, at the time of its foundation there were no less
than 16 institutionalised Gulf cooperation agencies,
ranging from Gulf Air, established as early as 1950, and
the Gulf Petro-chemical Industries Company, established in
Bahrain in December 1979. Perhaps more importantly, the GCC
demonstrates that the neo-functionalist theory of
integration, which developed from the post-war experience
of Western Europe, need not be restricted in application to
Europe, though some European features, such as
parliamentary-style government, are absent. But pragmatic
interest groups not only exist, they are identical with the
elites, whose support would otherwise have to be engaged
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for integration to take place. The economic and social
systems within the Gulf states are remarkably harmonious;
they are indeed actually integrated in a way which is
outside Western experience. The Gulf states share a common
language and a common religion; migration across the
Arabian peninsula from the early 17th until the first half
of the 20th century, whilst giving rise to disputes once
territorial boundaries began to become significant with the
discovery of oil, meant that nationalism, in the sense of
loyalty to a particular state, was absent. It follows then
that once the heads of the states concerned had resolved
territorial disputes, the essential unity of Gulf society
could be recognised. When the GCC held its first summit
meeting in May 1981, the heads of state had no firm idea of
the organisation's ultimate form. They were not prepared to
abandon their sovereignty, which is why the term chosen for
the name of the Council was Gulf cooperation, and not Gulf
federation or Gulf union. However, shared political, social
and economic systems and a common culture provided a firm
base on which pressures requiring integration could be
accommodated in a pragmatic fashion which respected the
instinct for self-preservation on the part of the states
themselves.
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Chapter Three
THE GCC AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
In 1980, a year before the foundation of the GCC, the
Gulf region contained less than 1% of the world's oil
wells, but accounted for 42% of the world's proven crude
oil reserves and 25% of world natural gas reserves. GCC oil
reserves were equivalent to 53 years of production at the
then current rate; Saudi Arabia, by far the biggest oil
producer of the six states, was producing 9.9 million
barrels a day, or over 70% of total GCC production, 1 an
economic preponderance only surpassed by its standing as
the guardian of the most scared shrines of Islam. The
Council states might appear at first sight to form an
impregnable economic power block, providing as they do a
seemingly inexhaustible supply for a product for which
there is an apparently inexhaustible demand.
The reality, however, is less simple. Prior to 1973,
oil revenues of most of the governments of the region were
not sufficient to finance large-scale development effort.
It was only following the dramatic rise in oil prices
during the period October 1973 to January 1974 and the
subsequent increase in domestic ownership of the oil
industry that significant amounts of financial capital
became available to provide the potential for very rapid
economic development. In spite of the massive volume in
1 Kubursi, Atif, Oil, Industrialisation and Development in
the Arab Gulf States, London: Croom Helm, 1984, pp.
41-42.
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revenues that ensued and the huge accumulations of foreign
exchange, the desired pattern of rapid and sustained
economic growth did not follow immediately; the savings and
exports of the region exceeded by far its investment and
import requirements, and a new set of constraints came into
effect, generally referred to as "limitations of absorptive
capacity". Skill shortages, scarcity of physical resources,
inadequate infrastructure, and limited administrative and
institutional machinery for monitoring and controlling the
economy suddenly came into prominence, and the pace of
growth, rapid by any standard, fell far short of the
potential that the new levels of oil revenue seemed to
offer. Any one of the constraining influences would have
been sufficient to thwart the domestic growth process, let
alone the full set of them. Consequently, towards the end
of the 1970's a careful setting of priorities, and an
orderly attack on the problems of limited absorptive
capacity came to be recognized as the essential elements of
national policies.
Both collectively and individually, the Gulf states
came to realize that unless priorities and plans were set
with care, their economic development might not be complete
before their oil reserves ran out. Oil reserves are not
infinite, but finite and non-renewable. As they diminish,
recovery methods can become impractically expensive; once
they are gone, they are gone forever. Accordingly the GCC
states faced the challenge of accumulating enough
productive capital in the non-oil sectors of their
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economies and of raising productivity in these sectors to
offset the depletion of their oil reserves.
Realization that the region has not yet nearly reached
the threshold of sustained economic growth independent of
oil revenue is, however, coupled with the realization that
the necessary rate of sustained growth may be possible only
within a framework of regional cooperation and economic
integration. The general perception of vulnerability
associated with the vast wealth of the region, its limited
military capabilities, its relatively small and dispersed
population, the extensive land mass of the Arabian
peninsula, and the belligerence of some of the neighbouring
states added urgency to the quest for cooperation. Thus, in
the words of the Secretary-General:
"The GCC's charter was signed on 25 May 1981 ... About
8 months earlier, in September 1980, the Iran-Iraq war
was declared and the shadows of instability loomed
large in the region. Yet despite this, the GCC heads
of state opted for economic integration rather then
military cooperation to achieve regional stability.
Only 2 weeks after the signing of the GCC's charter,
the CouncWs Unified Economic Agreement was
announced."
The Economic Agreement (EA) consisted of 7 chapters
comprising 28 articles; its major elements focussed on
1. a free trade area within the region, with no
tariffs on regional products, and a common tariff on
non-regional outputs;
2. coordination of commercial policy when dealing with
trading partners outside the region;
2 Abdulla Y. Bishara, 1 December 1983, London. In The First
Five Years, p. 29.
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3. the creation of a common market area in which
citizens of the Council member countries would be free
to move, work, own, inherit and bequest within each
and every country of the Council;
4. the harmonization of development plans, with the
aims of complete integration;
5. the formulation of a common oil policy and a
coordinated policy of industrialization based on oil
resources;
6. a special emphasis on establishing and promoting
joint projects in all sectors with the aim of tying
the production chains of the region into a common
development sequence;
7. cooperation in the development of local technology
and the joint acquisition of foreign technology;
8. the coordination of manpower policies to prevent
harmful competition for scarce labour;
9. linking the region through roads, rail, air and
water transportation networks;
10. a common legal framework for trade and investment
in the region; and finally -
11. a common development aid policy.
Ambitious as is the EA, it rests upon economic
cooperation between the Arab Gulf states which preceded the
formation of the GCC, under five broad heads. The first was
the extension of direct financial aid for the development
of financial institutions in one Arab Gulf state or area by
another. For example, the General Board of the South and
Arab Gulf, established by Kuwait in 1953, was designed to
46
assist the southern Arab Gulf states. Implicit in this
programme was the realization that the economic condition
of the region as a whole was critical to the viability of
each of its parts. The programme also reflected the natural
propensity of the Gulf states to provide assistance to
other Gulf states presented with economic difficulties.
The second channel of cooperation took the form of
collective infrastructure programmes in the areas of
education, transportation, communication and industrial
development. Initially efforts were aimed at increasing
public welfare through various parts of the region, most
particularly in joint educational institutions such as the
Gulf Technical College, the Arabian States Education
Bureau, and the Higher Education Council. The most notable
cooperative programmes in the fields of transportation and
communication were Gulf Air, the United Arab Shipping
Company, the Gulf Ports' Union, and the Gulf News Agency.
In addition, the Arab Gulf states joined in a number of
bilateral and multilateral industrial and other ventures.
At the bilateral level, enterprises such as the Saudi-
Kuwaiti and Saudi-Bahraini cement companies were formed.
The Gulf International Bank had the sponsorship of states
throughout the Gulf with the exception of Oman. These areas
of cooperation took into account the economic consideration
that resource commitments would be maximized through
collective participation.
The third area of cooperation consisted of bilateral
and multilateral trade and economic treaties, such as
brought about the Gulf Organization for Industrial
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Consulting (GOIC) established in 1976 by Bahrain, Iraq,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, intended to
encourage cooperation in petro-chemical and other
industrial projects. Meetings among representatives of the
various Gulf governments had examined economic planning
from the standpoint of the entire region; as early as 1977,
a meeting of ministers of economy considered a proposal to
establish a common market in the Gulf, while ministers of
planning decided in 1979 to treat the Arabian peninsula as
single economic entity.
Fourth, the Arab Gulf states cooperated in a number of
international organizations involving other states. This
primarily took the form of cooperation with other oil-
exporting states, under the auspices of both the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). Furthermore, the Arab Gulf states participated in
various Islamic forums, the most significant of which was
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) whose
first conference was held in Saudi Arabia in March 1970.
Finally, the development of technology, and in particular
modern transportation and telecommunication systems,
enabled public and private sector representatives from the
Arab Gulf countries to come into far greater contact with
one another; the impact of this heightened personal contact
cannot be overestimated, even in the culturally homogeneous
environment of the Gulf.
The economic programme embraced through the Gulf
Cooperation Council must therefore be viewed as an
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extension of years of growing interaction between the
member states. Implicit in this trend of growing economic
cooperation was the view that coordination was critical to
the success of the development efforts following the oil
price increase of 1973. Economic coordination would lead to
less duplication of large-scale economic programmes, and as
a result remove the potential of competing interests
amongst the states. Because of the structural similarities
between the Arab Gulf economies, and the inherent risk of
generating competing and therefore less efficient economic
sectors, close regional economic cooperation was required
to achieve the longer-range economic objective of sector
diversification. Such cooperation would reduce possible
friction between the states over access to limited national
markets and competition for foreign markets and the limited
financial resources of exhaustible oil resources would be
more fully optimized. Second, because of the
disproportionality of economic structures in the Arab Gulf,
closer cooperation would provide for a compensatory regime
that would seek to promote even development throughout the
region; such a regime would seek to compensate for the
economic dominance of Saudi Arabia and provide
opportunities to less resource-rich states - Bahrain and
Oman in particular - to develop industrial and other
economic programmes that would not generate needless
competition with existing industries in the region.
Thirdly, increased cooperation would allow for unified
positions on economic issues in dealing with third parties.
The limited scope of the Arab Gulf markets themselves, and
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the consequent emphasis on the export of value-added
products necessitated the opening of established foreign
markets; a collective position among the Arab Gulf states
therefore would assist in countering economic and political
obstacles that could arise on securing access to such
markets. Finally, the mechanics of enhanced cooperation,
including data collection and standardization and the
monitoring of economic trends necessarily implied an
institutionalized and centralized framework for
cooperation.
It has to be recognized, however, that there is a
wide range of possible instruments or patterns for economic
cooperation between countries, even countries so
homogeneous as those of the Arab Gulf. These instruments
extend all the way from customs unions to full integration,
and even a cursory inspection of the EA indicates that the
GCC took into account this range of possibilities.
Nonetheless, the most distinctive feature of the agreement
is its clear commitment to gradualism, so that cooperation
is expected to proceed pragmatically and cumulatively
rather than abruptly. Furthermore, the Economic Agreement
stipulates an important role for the private sector in the
implementation and maintenance of economic inter-
relationship. The framework of cooperation is a dynamic
one: the emphasis on a coordination of investments, of
development effort, and of complementary activities takes
its context from a desire to foster growth and development
by reaping the benefits of rationalization of production
and inter-regional specialization. This accepted, the
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Agreement recognizes the formidable barriers to market
integration imposed by the physical environment of the
region. Thus markets and production activities are to be
integrated by deliberate linking of road, rail and air
transport networks; the economic autarky of the area can be
eliminated only as national infrastructures come to be
joined and integrated within a common regional framework.
The common characteristic of an overwhelming and
continuing dependence on oil may be related in some measure
to the small size of the individual economies of the GCC
member states. This limited size may have inhibited
economic diversification of the national economies in the
past; collectively, though, the countries of the GCC seek
to develop and sustain a much more diversified economic
base. Not only is the market greater; so are the pools of
national resources and the bargaining power of the
countries when they act in concert.
To this end, the Council has been concerned to take
stock of the region's natural resources and of its external
sources of supply as an essential step in the planning of a
diversified, resource-based programme of industrial
development. 3 The strategy of basing industrial development
on advanced stages of processing of natural resources is
motivated by the desire to capture the high added value
component of such activities, to diversify production and
exports, and to exploit such comparative advantages as may
3 Secretariat-General,
	
The	 Resource	 Base	 for
Industrialisation in the Member States of Cooperation
Council of the Arab States of the Gulf, Riyadh: Saudi
Arabian Standards Organization, 1985.
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exist in the production of competitive commodities.
Industrial processing may also contribute to several other
development goals. Processing often entails high degrees of
utilization of capital and energy, which fits well with the
resource endowments of the GCC region and with a desire to
avoid increased dependence on an already scarce supply of
labour, especially skilled domestic labour. The
diversification of exports is important, because the
markets in which these products can be sold are more
diversified geographically than those of crude oil and
minerals. Hence, processing before export, or before re-
export, might allow the GCC to capture some of the monopoly
profits formerly absorbed by the heavily concentrated
buyers of crude minerals and other raw materials. When the
processing of raw materials is carried to the fabricating
or manufacturing stages, it may also encourage local
production of products not related to the original raw
materials. In this way forward and backward integration of
the input-output structure of the economy lessen the GCC's
dependence on crude oil and thus promote more generally the
important objective of industrial diversification.
Access to expertise and technology is required for the
design and implementation of investment programmes and for
the operation of new plant and equipment. Furthermore a
market for the output must be assured. The collaboration of
Trans-National Corporations (TNC's) may be necessary as
these often hold strong monopoly control over technology
and markets, but TNC's are not easily persuaded to
relinquish their monopoly power and they may be unwilling
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to share their knowledge with developing countries.
Moreover, the governments of industrial countries are
anxious to protect the interests of their labour and
capital employed in processing within their own
territories, and in this their aims coincide with those of
the TNC's. Such protection is commonly ensured by imposing
tariffs that rise with the degree of processing. In many
cases the effective tariff on value added in processing is
so high as to make profitable processing in developing
countries very difficult.
When foreign support has to be called in, and where
the level of national skill in relevant fields is low, it
may be necessary to conclude a comprehensive management
contract with a TNC to ensure efficient operation. In other
cases resources available within the region may be
sufficient for local staffing of the venture, but foreign
support may nevertheless be needed for special tasks, such
as supervising technical installations or seeking out the
best sales opportunities in the international market.
Sometimes, when foreign services are needed on a
comprehensive basis and the suppliers are in a strong
position to dictate their own terms, the way out is to pay
the foreigner by assigning to them part-ownership of the
venture. The major conclusion here is that independence in
industrial processing presupposes the development of
national competence in the form of skilled and
knowledgeable individuals and institutions. The advantage
of industrial development to a nation tend to be much
reduced in the absence of such competence.
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The present world allocation of processing activities
is, to some extent, the outcome of the biased structure of
transport costs. The savings in transport costs for reduced
volume and weight of processed products is not often fully
reflected in reduced transport charges imposed by shippers,
especially conference shippers. The development of their
own shipping fleets may assist the development of
processing activities in developing countries. The
successful involvement of GCC countries in the processing
of raw materials in semi-finished goods, however, will
depend on a number of inter-related factors, three of which
will be decisive. These are: input availability, conditions
of processing, and characteristics of output.
Input availability must be measured by comparative
cost criteria. Raw materials and other complementary inputs
are assessed in terms of their availability in sufficiently
large quantities to make it possible to process them
economically on site. Whether they be imported at
advantageous prices, as an alternative to domestic supply,
is another critical consideration.
The conditions of processing are determined by the
technologies used in the processing activities, and here
there are three main considerations: the first pertains to
the extent to which economies of scale facilitate or impede
the locating of productive capacity in the region, because
of the abundance, or lack of abundance, either of the
material itself or of complementary inputs. The second
relates to the range of technological choice available
within the industry, and possibly to the availability of
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processing systems particularly suited to the conditions of
the region. The third has to do with the development of new
technologies or variants of existing ones, but may alter
some of the circumstances militating against processing in
the region.
The characteristics of output that are of special
importance in supplying end-products to their markets
include transport and storage, tariff and non-tariff
barriers and other difficulties associated with marketing
and distribution. And it was with these considerations in
mind that a number of other documents followed the Economic
Agreement. In June 1982 the Financial and Economic
Committee of the GCC approved regulations governing transit
goods required under Article 5 of the Economic Agreement
governing freedom of movement. These regulations became
effective on 1 March 1983, and applied to commodities
shipped by land, sea or air within the territory of the GCC
Later that month, Abdul Latif Yussuf Al-Hamed, Kuwaiti
minister of finance and planning, stated in London that the
GCC were proposing a joint investment fund of up to 6,000
million dollars capital, for projects in developing
countries which would "not amount to aid and would be on
commercial terms." In addition, he reported that Kuwait
intended to establish "a semi-autonomous investment
authority to manage its long-term reserves", then estimated
to be worth more than 50,000 million dollars. 4
 In the
event, the Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC) was
established in November 1982 with the principle aim of
4 Financial Times, (London), 1 July 1982.
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identifying and promoting as wide a range as possible of
industrial projects in the public and private sectors. The
GIC is jointly owned by the six governments; its authorized
capital is 2.1 billion dollars, subscribed equally by the
six share-holders. It is effectively an investment
institution with specific aims and a broad outlook as
stated in its articles of association. In February 1984, a
draft Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was approved, which
called for a common policy to unify the agricultural
supplies and demands of the GCC states and the
encouragement of self-sufficiency, especially in the area
of basic food commodities. Given the physical
characteristics of the Gulf region this last was an
extremely ambitious proposition; indeed the first few years
of the GCC saw a plethora of committees, up to and
including the Supreme Council itself, putting forward a
number of similarly ambitious
and February 1983, no less
meetings discussed economic
have individual member states
programmes. Between June 1981
than 90 specific committee
integration; how responsive
been to suggestions raised by
these committees; to what extent has economic cooperation
taken place, and what are the key external and internal
factors at work?
It has to be acknowledged that there is in fact a gap
between aspiration and reality. For example, in May 1985
the GCC finance ministers agreed to establish specialist
committees to study ways of protecting locally produced
goods from competition, and they instructed central bank
governors to study the possibility of coordinating exchange
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rates. They also reviewed suggestions for unifying public
service charges, and measures designed to ease the movement
of goods between member states. In the same month,
however, the UAE Federal National Council criticized the
agreement as enabling Kuwaiti and Saudi manufacturers to
sell in the UAE at the expense of local industries; the
agreement was defended by a UAE government spokesman as
being of overall benefit although it would involve some
sacrifice.
The fact is that in spite of what might seem to be
healthy precedents for economic cooperation between the GCC
states in the oil-boom years before 1981, the irony of the
post-1981 period is that the move towards concerted
economic cooperation coincided with an unprecedented fall
in the oil price. The GCC was in fact born in the twilight
of a dramatic change in the world oil market; from a
sellers' market, it was transformed into a buyers' market.
In the wake of the second oil shock in 1979, Saudi Arabia
had produced more than 10 million barrels of oil a day; by
1985, it produced only about 2.5 million barrels. When the
GCC was established the member states altogether earned
about $450 billion a year; less than 2 years later, their
combined revenue dropped to about half that amount. This
meant that the oil shock was now in reverse. From the first
oil shock in 1973-74 to the second in 1979, oil consumers
had paid for a fifteen-fold rise in prices. Beginning in
1981, however, it was the turn of oil producers to suffer
from diminishing oil revenues because of a glutted market.
This momentous reversal produced two unprecedented
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decisions by OPEC, one on 20 March 1982 and the other on 14
March 1983. For the first time in its history, OPEC decided
to set a formal limit to the level of oil production at a
total daily output of 17.5 million barrels in order to
reduce the world-wide surplus of oil and boost oil prices.
The second decision resulted in a cut in overall oil prices
down to $29 from a high of $35 per barrel; by the end of
the GCC's first five years, however, the price per barrel
was about $12 and OPEC faced an unprecedented disarray in
its ranks. By July 1986 the price of oil had reached $8.20
per barrel, this over a period in which the Omani
government's development planners had anticipated a minimum
price of $23 per barre1.5
Under such circumstances the Economic Agreement's call
for a common oil policy meant that the GCC members had to
cope primarily with the problems of production and prices
in the oil sector. The glutted oil market had weakened the
power that Saudi Arabia and its junior partners had enjoyed
in OPEC ever since its formation; nevertheless the EA
provided a useful framework for coordinating the oil
policies of the GCC states at a crucial juncture in the
history of the international oil market. Outside OPEC, the
four GCC producers managed to coordinate their oil policies
with Oman, (which is not a member of OPEC), with Iraq,
(which is a member of OPEC, though not of the GCC), and
sometimes even with Libya and Iran. Within OPEC, and led by
Saudi Arabia, they still formed the most powerful block of
5 Financial Times, (London), Special Report: Oman, 1
September 1986.
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producers, whether or not Saudi Arabia was acting as "swing
producer".
A brief table of GCC oil export revenues tells the
story and reveals the stresses:
GCC Crude and Refined Oil Export Revenues 1979-1986 
(current US $ millions)
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Oatar, KSA 	 UAE Total %move
1979 291 16,970 2,152 3,661 58,550 13,032 94,656 +56
1980 454 17,613 3,281 5,413 101,474 19,582 147,816 +56
1981 549 13,661 4,403 5,316 110,483 18,761 153,172 + 4
1982 445 8,803 4,099 4,079 73,118 15,965 106,508 -30
1983 366 9,911 4,203 3,046 42,315 13,016 72,856 -32
1984 383 4,280 3,906 4,322 33,771 12,412 59,074 -19
1985 345 NA 4,685 3,459 NA 12,492 NA NA
1986 279 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Source: IMF, Statistics Yearbook, 1987
Such stark statistics forced the GCC producers into
attempting the kind of economic cooperation laid down in
Article 11 of the Economic Agreement. From 1981 to 1985
Saudi Arabia and the UAE sought to stabilize the oil
markets; they maintained marker prices US$2 lower than Iran
and other producers, and with Kuwait attempted to implement
quota arrangements by which they hoped to control
production and pricing. The effect of such quotas, however,
was persistently spoilt by cheating on the part of other
OPEC members such as Libya, Nigeria and Iran, and by the
growth of non-OPEC oil production. In 1985 Saudi Arabia
decided to abandon its untenable role as "swing producer"
in OPEC, whereby it had undertaken to keep prices steady
and maintain some consistency. This meant that Saudi Arabia
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changed both its pricing methods and production levels,
resulting in a flood of Saudi oil onto the market. Kuwait
and the UAE soon followed. The aim was to deliver a shock
to the market and to regain a market share at an acceptable
price level. Disagreements over production levels continued
between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, two small UAE producers, and
on the part of Oman, which continued to increase production
to finance its unfinished infrastructural development. Such
differences were not helped by the fact that the Saudi plan
had an even greater effect than anticipated; the markets
over-reacted, and the price of oil fell far below the low
of $16-18 that had been expected. The position was to get
worse before it got better: the second half of 1988
witnessed increasing over-production by the 13 OPEC
countries, resulting in further reductions in market prices
due mainly to the failure to bring Iraq back into the OPEC
quota system on conditions acceptable both to Iran and
Iraq, despite the August 1988 cease-fire in their
hostilities.
However, the achievement of an unanimous quota
agreement in November 1988 paved the way for reduced
production and rising market prices in the first months of
1989, a trend supported by the cooperation of some non-OPEC
oil-producers in curtailing production in 1989. This
November agreement followed the tabling in the previous
month of concrete proposals by the GCC oil ministers,
(which included the four major OPEC Gulf producers, as well
as Oman and Qatar,) which strongly resembled the November
quota agreements, except that the GCC quotas would have
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been slightly more than was subsequently accepted by the
remainder of OPEC. 6 The importance of the issue was
underlined at the meeting of the GCC Supreme Council in
December 1988; the need for cooperation between OPEC and
non-OPEC oil producers was reiterated, together with the
assertion that stability of prices was a collective
responsibility, coupled with the reaffirmation of support
for the November OPEC agreement.7
In the light of the turbulence over the decade of the
80's, it is perhaps a bold assertion to declare that the
long-term future is in favour of the GCC oil producers. The
fact is that non-OPEC production is declining, and so are
the incentives for expensive new exploration in other parts
of the world. The ability of such producers as Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE to supply oil at low recovery
costs from massive reserves is not affected by the fall in
demand. Furthermore, one third of OPEC's members will cease
to be significant oil exporters over the next decade. These
include Indonesia and Algeria. Other OPEC members such as
Nigeria will experience high pumping costs. Thus the GCC
states, in spite of their differing economic reserves,
(Kuwait now receives more income from its investments than
from its oil, while Bahrain and Oman have very few economic
reserves to fall back on at all), can collectively, if not
always individually, afford to wait for better times. This
is not to decry the severe effects of the oil price
recession and related instability on individual GCC
6 Keesings 1989, P. 36573.
7 Keesings 1989, P. 36956.
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economies. Saudi Arabia failed to publish its annual budget
on time in 1986; when finally published in December it
anticipated a deficit of 30%. The 1987 budget was also
delayed. Kuwait produced a crisis budget anticipating an
oil price of $15/barrel for 1986, and its 1987 budget also
allowed for a large deficit. The UAE was unable to produce
a realistic advance budget at all. Bahrain announced
financial cut-backs, and Oman announced budget cuts of 10%
in 1986 and 14% in 1987, as well as postponing its third
five-year plan. Qatar alone was able to ride out the oil
recession via its reserves.8
These factors, complicated by the distractions of
ensuring a safe route for GCC oil supplies during the Iran-
Iraq war, have had a negative effect on economic
cooperation in the oil and gas sectors. A number of planned
joint infrastructural projects have been postponed or
cancelled. Thus, plans for a regional gas grid have been
repeatedly discussed, but not implemented; a planned oil
refinery in Oman was dropped because of the oil price fall;
a 1,700-kilometre pipeline connecting the GCC states, but
bypassing the Straits of Hormuz and exiting on the east or
south coast of Oman was planned, but not built. The fear of
oil disruption because of the Iran-Iraq war had also
triggered the idea of creating a GCC stock-pile of oil, but
like the pipeline idea, it was never realized. In late 1983
and early 1984, Saudi Arabia had a floating stock-pile of
at least 50 million barrels of crude oil outside the Gulf.
8 Sindelaar, H. Richard and Peterson, J.E. (eds.),
Crosscurrents in the Gulf, London and New York:
Routledge, 1988, p. 126.
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Kuwait also was planning on its own to build a floating
storage facility, because a severe disruption of gas
supplies and oil products could cripple Kuwait's vital
power and desalination plants. The GCC ministers reportedly
reached an agreement on 23 October 1985 to ensure emergency
oil supplies to member countries whose oil production or
export installations were jeopardized.9 The non-
establishment of the strategic oil reserve, however, not
only is a measure of the financial constraints imposed by
the fall in oil revenues; it also indicates differences in
the perspective of the GCC members themselves. Oman,
Bahrain, Qatar and even the UAE have less incentive to
participate in such schemes as compared to Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait.
To some extent economic integration outside the areas
of oil and gas has taken place in ways suggested by the
Economic Agreement. The Gulf Investment Corporation had
$420 million of its $2.1 billion capital paid up by April
1985. Having begun business in May 1984 with a staff of
three, it employed 110 staff by the end of 1985. By 1987,
it was committed in principle to over 30 projects at a
total investment of $750 million and was examining further
project studies; it was also active in the foreign exchange
and securities market. In the field of communications, it
was agreed that prices and fees for telex, telephone,
postal and telegraph services would be standardized, and
some progress has been made to this end, although
implementation has remained at the discretion of individual
9 Keesings 1986, p. 34264.
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members. A proposed peninsula railway to link Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait with Iraq, and thence to
eastern and western Europe was not implemented, but
construction was completed of the causeway between Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain. With regard to agriculture the issue of
food security was coupled to the idea of a proposed
strategic food reserve, but with individual member states
possessed of very different agricultural capabilities the
likelihood of such a reserve being created from collective
local resources was always a distant one.
More importantly, Article 22 of the Economic Agreement
calls for the establishment of a common currency as part of
the process of economic integration. The establishment of a
single Gulf currency will, however, require a far greater
monetary and fiscal coordination than any member has yet
seemed prepared to undertake. As a compromise the GCC has
collectively agreed to try to achieve an alignment of their
separate currencies. Even this proved difficult to reach;
the proposal is to choose a common external peg - for
example, the US$, the International Monetary Fund's Special
Drawing Right (SDR), or a weighted Hbasketu of currencies -
around which member countries would hang with a limited
pre-ordained room for manoeuvre. The problem was to choose
which peg currency and to forecast the political
consequences of distancing the GCC currencies from the US
dollar. In the event, in February 1987, Sheikh Salem Abdul
Aziz Al-Saba (governor of the central bank of Kuwait)
announced that a currency grid broadly similar to the
European monetary system would be established at the end of
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1987 as the first step towards a single currency for the
community.
This said, the GCC states have made some progress in
their attempts to implement the terms of the Economic
Agreement's call for a Gulf common market. With certain
exemptions granted to Oman, because of its less advanced
stages of development, all intra-GCC customs duties on
animals, agricultural products and manufactured goods of
GCC origin were removed from 1 March 1983. The
implementation of a common tariff on non-regional imports
was also put underway, but led to considerable
disagreements between members. Limitations were also
imposed by individual member states on the theoretical
freedom of GCC citizens to own land in other GCC states,
but the right was established - often in a qualified form -
of GCC nationals to market their products throughout the
GCC area, and thereby to claim GCC economic citizenship. In
Oman, for example, the government decreed in April 1984
that GCC nationals would be permitted to operate hotels and
restaurants in which Omani shares would not be less than
25% of the issued capital; after five years of the date of
that decision such activity would be unconditional. The 7th
meeting of the Supreme Council at Abu Dhabi in November
1986 approved measures to allow investors from any member
state to obtain loans from banks and industrial development
funds throughout the community, and also approved measures
to allow citizens to engage in retail or wholesale trade in
any member state on the same terms as that state's own
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nationals. The provisions relating to wholesale trade,
however, were to take effect only in 1990.10
In all this, it is possible to point to the confusion
caused by the oil price falls; and the political
uncertainties brought about by the Gulf war, as negative
and limiting factors in the achievement of economic
integration within the GCC There may, however, be deeper
structural obstacles to integration. It is ironic that the
instability inherent in the world oil market, which was the
basis of the economic strategies set down by the member
states in the late 1970's to diversify their largely one
sector economies, would itself delay the speed with which
diversification programmes would come into effect in the
early and mid- 1980's. A second irony is that overall
industrial development in the region may have been hindered
rather than accelerated by the abundance of oil and gas
resources, as the majority of the major industrial
programmes were related to the hydro-carbon sector; the
result was an uneven industrial development, in which such
sectors as metallic and non-metallic minerals, which are
not as sensitive as hydro-carbons to international
fluctuations, have been largely bypassed. The proposition
that a single product economy is not a diversified one
seems to be a statement of the obvious, but it also does
raise the question of whether or not a single product
economy can ever become diversified on a significant scale.
The terms of the Economic Agreement would seem to suggest
an answer in the affirmative; the facts of the matter
10 The Final Communiqués, p. 38.
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remain to be established. In this respect, even given the
ending of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, and the
gradual recovery of the oil price, it is still pertinent to
ask whether the GCC economies can cooperate and diversify
under normal economic and political conditions.
More specifically, the experience of the GCC states in
respect to hydro-carbons indicates that successful
diversification is not only a matter of production, but
also of penetrating world markets. Saudi Arabia's one
conspicuous achievement in the field of economic
diversification has been its investment in the production
of petro-chemicals. The 600,000-ton per annum Saudi
Methanol Company's Ra-Razi complex came on stream in
February 1984. In June of the same year, the European
Community imposed a 13.5% duty on Saudi methanol imports,
because they had climbed to 12 times the EC ceiling. The
result was little short of a trade war. In November of that
same year Secretary-General Bishara initiated talks on
market access with EC external relation officials, In
February 1985 he visited Europe and spoke with Roland
Dumas, then the French foreign minister, and Giulio
Andreotti, then the Italian foreign minister and president
of the community Council of Ministers. He proceeded
subsequently to discuss the problem of market penetration
with community officials in Brussels; they produced no
agreement. Further discussions followed in May and June,
with the GCC proposing that the tariff be reduced between
4% and 7%. This was rejected, with community officials
reported to have proposed a non-preferential region-to-
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region trade agreement to cover a number of areas,
including petro-chemicals, and conferring a "most favoured
nation" status on the Counci1. 11
 Further discussions took
place in August between Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Saudi
foreign minister, and Claude Cheysson, then the commission
member responsible for the Mediterranean and North-South
relations. Yet further discussions took place in October
between the foreign minister of Luxembourg and Sheikh Saba
Al-Saba, the Kuwaiti deputy prime minister and foreign
minister. At the end of the year once again Bishara talked
in Paris with community officials.
The problem lies in part in the fact that Saudi,
Kuwaiti, Qatari and Bahraini methanol exporters to the
European Community all exploit the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) which is designed to help
industrialization in third world countries. Under this
system, a certain volume of the products can be imported
duty-free, and limited tariffs can be applied to additional
imports. But the European petro-chemical lobby insists that
the GSP was devised to help struggling third world
manufacturers find overseas markets; it was not designed to
help wealthy oil-producing states exploit existing
advantages to carve ,
 out market shares in any area they
choose. In 1986 the European Community increased its trade
barriers to cover further GCC petro-chemical exports, and
by 1987 the relations between the GCC and the European
Community were effectively frozen. In June 1987 a
delegation to Brussels led by Rashid Abdullah Al-Nuaimi,
11 Keesings 1986, p. 34264.
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then UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, met Leo
Tindemans, then Belgian foreign minister and president of
the European Community Council of Ministers; this did
little, however, but express the hope that agreement could
be reached in the future on economic and commercial
cooperation. Outside Brussels a proposed trade cooperation
agreement was discussed by foreign ministers drawn from
both groups during the United Nations General Assembly
session in New York in September, with the GCC calling for
a free trade agreement with the Community, entailing the
progressive lowering of European Community tariffs on
petro-chemicals. This proposal was opposed by a number of
the European Community countries; in the event, an
agreement was signed in June 1988, both sides declaring
their intention to cooperate on technology transfer and to
exchange research information. In an annex to the
agreement, they declared their determination to protect one
another's investments in their respective areas. The
agreement was welcomed by the Supreme Council at its 9th
session meeting in Bahrain in December 1988 which further
authorized the Council of Ministers to enter into official
negotiations with the European Community in respect to a
joint trade agreement. This has yet to produce any tangible
results.
Difficulties were not confined to the European
Community, as indicated by the Supreme Council in its final
communiqué following its 8th session at Riyadh in December
1987:
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"The Supreme Council gave its attention to commercial
exchange between various countries of the world and
expressed its worry regarding the protectionist
policies, especially those which Japan is determined
to apply, with regard to the imposition of duties and
taxes on imports of crude oil and petroleum products.
This policy impedes freedom of international trade and
places obstacles in the way of commercial exchange,
limiting the volume of trade in various nations of the
world, especially between the developing and the
industrialized states. The Council called (sic) the
international	 community,	 and	 especially	 the
industrialized countries, to put an end to
protectionist measures and to follow commercial
policies which are more open, especially in regard to
the developing 11,Ations, including the petroleum
exporting states.H14
Difficulties with Japan were economic. With regard to the
other major trading partner of the GCC there were other
problems. As early as spring 1984 several unnamed GCC
sources were quoted as declaring a growing reluctance to
maintain close ties with the United States, because of her
military role in the Lebanon, her close ties with Israel,
and her refusal to supply Saudi Arabia with Stinger anti-
aircraft missiles. According to reports, Sheik Zayed Bin
Sultan Al-Nahayan, president of the UAE, had warned Richard
Murphy, assistant secretary of state for the Near East,
that continued friendship would require significant policy
changes on the part of the United States in the Gulf
region. The report also spoke of a warning by Prince Bandar
Bin Sultan, the recently appointed Saudi ambassador to the
United States, that Saudi Arabia would examine alternative
sources of arms. 13 The Saudis appear to have been as good
as their word, if indirectly; in late June 1984 Sheikh Saba
Al-Saba, the foreign minister of Kuwait, acknowledged that
Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were cooperating
12 The Final Communiqués, p.47.
13 International Herald Tribune, 24 April 1984.
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fully in their air-defence, with Kuwait benefiting from
AWACS information systems. The following month the Sheikh
went for a ten-day visit to the Soviet Union, and concluded
an arms agreement to purchase air defences, surface-to-
surface missiles and tanks to the value of $327 million.
Later, 10 Soviet officers were seconded to Kuwait for
training activities. 14
 Thus political as well as economic
problems complicated GCC and United States relations, and
threatened to prevent the implementation of Article 7 of
the Unified Economic Agreement:
"member states shall coordinate their commercial
policies and relations with other states and regional
economic groupings and blocks, with a view towards
creating balanced trade relations and favourable
returns of trade."
Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that the first
fruits of the foundation of the GCC was an Economic
Agreement, it remains to be seen whether in fact economic
cooperation on the lines sketched in the agreement is
likely to come about within the foreseeable future. The
effects of the oil price movement and economic disparities
between member states combined to reinforce the suggestion
that the GCC may find it difficult to integrate along its
stated lines. This caution is supported by the fact that
notwithstanding bland official statements regarding
economic cooperation and integration, there emanate from
GCC sources statements suggesting that the future may not
be as constructive as the statements imply. Thus Abdullah
El-Kuwaiz, the associate secretary-general for economic
affairs of the GCC, stated as early as November 1986:
14 Keesings 1986, P. 34784.
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"In reflecting on what has been accomplished in the
last five years, a great deal of ground has been
covered in the economic area. In most cases the
sailing has been smooth and welcomed by member states.
However, as we continue going will get less smooth, as
has been the case in all similar economic groupings.
The GCC is not an exception. A slowing-down of
integratiyp therefore is expected and quite
natural."-"
It is worth recalling, however, the words of the
Secretary-General himself at the very beginning of the GCC
enterprise:
"Our target is that by the end of the 80's, the Gulf
will be the Gulf Common Market, with all the
consequences that such as step entails: equality in
economic activities; freedom of movement of people and
goods; the completion of infrastructure, such as
deepening of ports, transportation, telecommunication
and training. This means the emergence of the Gulf
states as one solid economic entity that will set in
motion a strenuous competition from indunrial
countries for the obtainment of major projects."-L°
This strenuous competition from industrial countries has
yet to manifest itself; the GCC states have individually
paid a high price for the collapse of the oil market,
partly caused by their own influence on OPEC prices and
production levels. Cancelled economic plans, arrested
development, lost opportunities in the petro-chemical
sector, has characterized the decade. In the non-oil
sector, however, the opening for business of the Gulf
Investment Corporation at least begins to fulfill some of
the ideals of its articles of association. It remains to be
seen how soon it will run up against the fact that so far
only a limited number of joint venture industrial
15 Abdullah El-Kuwaiz, "Economic Integration of the GCC",
American-Arab Affairs, Winter 1986-87, No. 19, pp. 28-
37.
16 Abdullah El-Kuwaiz, 22 September 1983, St.Louis. In The
First Five Years, pp. 39-40.
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opportunities at intra-GCC level have emerged. In the
absence of significant cross-border trade within the GCC
the elimination of internal customs tariffs was a minor
step forward, and one into an uncertain future.
But it has to be admitted that while Bishara's
aspirations in 1983 have not been fulfilled, yet equality
in economic activity, freedom of movement of people and
goods and the completion of infrastructure, such as the
deepening of ports, improvements in transportation,
improvements in telecommunication and training, have in
fact provided an essential base for future economic
integration. In the aftermath of the oil price falls, it
remains to be seen how far the GCC can summon the necessary
will to respond of its own accord to the need for economic
integration; the record of rhetoric suggests that in the
first five years at least this need was taken seriously.
The record of achievement since then suggests that serious
progress in this area proved to be more difficult than was
first realized.
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Chapter Four
THE GCC AND INTERNAL SECURITY
It has already been pointed out that when the GCC was
launched in spring 1981 its members chose to dwell on its
economic role, while Western observers tended to focus on
its significance in the security area. Thus the Islamic
summit at Ta'if was said to have produced an agreement on
"the coordination of all government policies between
the member countries with a view to safeguarding
security and stability in the Gulf",
and notwithstanding the drift of the inaugural communiqué
of the Supreme Council,
"it was ... widely accepted that the defence and
security of the area and of the oil installations had
been a key factor in its deliberations."±
In fact, there was little distinction between these two
issues as least as far as the heads of the cooperating
states were concerned; for them, economic integration was
dependent on stability in the broadest sense within the
Gulf area. Mention has already been made that the other GCC
members held back on pushing security aspects at the pace
Oman would have preferred. At least one of their
considerations was the feeling that it was important to
keep the emergent cooperation council from appearing as a
defence pact aimed against Khomeini's revolution spilling
over from Iran. 2
 As things turned out, however, the
December 1981 discovery of an attempt by Iranian-backed
1 Keesings 1981, p. 30982.
2 The Economist (London), 30 May 1981.
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terrorists to assassinate Bahraini leaders sharply
refocused the Gulf Cooperation Council on security
cooperation. It was on 13 December 1981 that the government
of Bahrain announced that it had arrested a group of
saboteurs trained by Iran and charged to assassinate
Bahraini officials. It was stated that these belonged to
the Islamic Front with headquarters in Tehran and that its
60 members were Shi'ite Muslims. The actual number turned
out to be 73: 60 were Bahraini; the others included 11
Saudi dissidents, 1 Omani, and 1 Kuwaiti; there were no
Iranians in the group. This did not prevent the Bahraini
prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, from
placing the responsibility on the shoulders of outsiders:
"the external danger is Iran and the present regime in
Tehran. This Iranian regime is exploiting the Shi'ites
in Bahrain and the Gulf ... training them in the use
of weapons and acts of sabotage to foment chaos and
shake security."3
Despite the years that have passed since the discovery of
the group, the facts of the matter are still unclear. What,
however, is certain is that the Bahraini incident
encouraged the government of that country dramatically to
increase its enthusiasm with regard to security
cooperation. In some ways Saudi denunciation of the plot
surpassed even that of Bahrain, with the most condemnatory
statements coming from the Saudi interior minister, Prince
Naif:
"We had hoped that Iran, our neighbour and friend,
would not have such conspiratorial intentions. But
after what has happened in Bahrain, our hopes have
unfortunately been dashed and it has become clear to
us that Iran has become a source of danger and harm to
3 Al-Mustaqbal, 23 January 1982.
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Gulf nations and their security. At the very beginning
of their revolution, the men in power in Iran said
they would not be the policemen of the Gulf. Today
they 4ve unfortunately become the terrorists of the
Gulf."
Saudi-Iranian relations had already been strained by
the conflict which occurred in October 1981 between Iranian
pilgrims on the annual haj pilgrimage and Saudi security
forces. Nor were they improved by the statement in the
Saudi newspaper Okaz' charging Ayatollah Khomeini with
cooperating with Israel in draining Iraqi energy from the
conflict with Israel. Not only did Saudi Arabia outdo its
GCC partners in denouncing the Khomeini rdgime, however, it
also took the leadership in the signing of several
bilateral security agreements with them. The first of these
was negotiated with Bahrain, followed by three others, with
the United Arab Emirates, with Qatar, and with Oman. The
agreements provided for an exchange of equipment, expertise
and training, and for extradition of criminals and border
cooperation. Despite the hopes of the Saudi minister of the
interior, Prince Naif, however, Kuwait refused to sign any
security agreement with Saudi Arabia, this notwithstanding
the fact that in the first five years of the GCC's
existence Kuwait experienced the greatest threats to its
own internal security. In spite of sundry relatively
insignificant terrorist attempts in Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia, terrorism in the Gulf was
largely directed at Kuwaiti society. In less than two years
the tiny city state suffered four major assaults on its
internal security; these were viewed by the Cooperation
4 Al-Majallah, 16 December 1981, p.11.
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Council as attacks on the security and stability of all
member states.
The first major attempt took place on 12 December
1983. The target of terrorist attacks included the United
States and the French embassies; other targets included
American business offices, the airport control tower, the
Ministry of Electricity and Water, a major petro-chemical
refining complex and other facilities. Responsibility for
these attacks was claimed by Islamic Jehad. In general,
commentators blamed Iran for these attempts, although it
was notable that as in the Bahraini case none of the
accused subsequently tried were Iranian. It was, however,
believed, that all belonged to the Iraqi Shi'ite
underground movement Al-Dawa. The second assault on Kuwaiti
security involved the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airline plane
in December 1984. It had been on its way from Dubai to
Karachi, and was allowed to land in Iran as it was running
out of fuel. A third attempt on Kuwaiti stability followed
within 6 months when a direct attack on the head of state
rammed into the motorcade of the Emir on 25 May 1985.
Sardonically enough Islamic Jehad congratulated the Emir on
his escape and expressed the hope that the message had been
clearly understood. The fourth act of political violence
took place in July 1985, when bombs were exploded at two
popular cafés in Kuwait where families and friends often
gathered. The numbers involved included 11 dead and 89
wounded. The responsibility for the blast was claimed by a
revolutionary group which had in the past claimed
responsibility for attacks on diplomats from Jordan and the
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UAE in Europe, India and the rest of the Gulf region. On
this occasion, however, Kuwait and the GCC officials took
care not specifically to implicate Iran. Thus the Kuwaiti
minister of the interior declared:
"Our democracy and freedom may not please some people,
but I do not believe that they are the reason for the
terrorist and criminal acts committed against Kuwait.
The region we live in is a hotbed of tension and we
have adopted principled political attitudes towards
national and Islamic issues, some of them fateful
issues. I believe that these attitudes are the real
targets of the terrorists and the criminals. Our
policies are based on principles based on justice. We
will never change our attitude or abandon our policies
which are drawn up by our Emir and leader, because
Kuwait's policies stem from right, faith and
justice. "5
While Kuwait took the brunt of terrorist attacks in
the Gulf area, all GCC heads of state were sharply reminded
of the realities of the situation at their fourth summit
conference at Doha in Qatar in November 1983, a meeting
surrounded by the most stringent security because of the
alleged discovery of a plot to assassinate all the heads of
state during the course of the conference. However,
notwithstanding the enthusiasm of Saudi Arabia and indeed
the other members of the Council for a comprehensive
security agreement, Kuwait refused to sign even a bilateral
security agreement with Saudi Arabia, let alone join its
other partners in a multi-lateral agreement. There appeared
to be two reasons for this reluctance: the first, Kuwaiti
fear that a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia might
hurt its image as a non-aligned state, because of Saudi
Arabia's dependence on the United States for much of its
security equipment. Secondly, given the relatively hardline
5 Al-Tadamun, (London), 27 July - 2 August 1985, p.22.
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stance of Saudi Arabia towards Iran, the signing of either
a bilateral or a multi-lateral agreement might identify
Kuwait too closely with Saudi Arabia and cause even greater
Iranian annoyance. This said, such a consideration ceased
to apply as Kuwaiti-Iranian relations soured considerably
in the mid-80's with Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti shipping.
The main objection of Kuwait probably reflected the concern
of its leaders with domestic political considerations.
Compared to other GCC states, Kuwait is a relatively open
society. Indeed an emergent parliament was reopened in 1981
and parliamentary elections were held in 1985, although
subsequently the assembly was suspended in summer 1986,
following growing parliamentary scrutiny of the Al-Saba
royal family. The intrusion of security forces from other
GCC states into Kuwaiti territory in hot pursuit of
suspected criminals might, it was feared, provoke a hostile
reaction within Kuwait itself. Article 12 of a draft
agreement submitted by Saudi Arabia provided for pursuit
patrols to penetrate the borders of the neighbouring
country up to a distance of 20 kms when in hot pursuit of
criminals and terrorists.6
The failure of the GCC states to conclude a multi-
lateral defence agreement, however, should not be
exaggerated. In practise, they have cooperated bilaterally
and multi-laterally in combating acts of political
violence. As has been noted, Saudi Arabia quickly concluded
bilateral agreements with the four other Gulf states for
cooperation on internal security and the net effect was a
6 Al-Anbar, (Kuwait).
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working internal security arrangement with a Kuwaiti
reservation as to making it formal. The smaller states
could rest easier, knowing that the sort of informal
cooperation Bahrain had received from Dubai security forces
in exposing the 1981 plot would henceforth work on an
institutionalized basis, and after the 1985 assassination
attempt against the Emir of Kuwait, the Kuwaiti government
itself emphasized a coordinated GCC approach to internal
security. Thus riot control equipment has been exchanged,
expertise and intelligence information provided. All the
states have taken parallel measures in fighting terrorism
by such means as deporting suspects and restricting visas,
travel, and indeed publications. Furthermore, in the
relatively closed societies of the GCC, where security is a
paramount concern of the governments, any expression of
dissent that is judged to threaten a regime's stability can
be suppressed; for all practical purposes opponents are
counted as criminals.
It is for this reason that the few liberal voices
raised in the GCC, as well as their Western counterparts,
tend to reduce the underlying causes of the problem of
political violence in the Gulf to the lack of political
participation in the GCC states. This is the single
greatest concern of the modernized intelligentsia of the
GCC societies, as well as many other Third World societies.
The absence of opportunities and institutions for
expressing legitimate political opposition may contribute
to the problem of political radicalization and violence.
But to believe that if the GCC regimes offered political
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participation to their citizens that the problem of
political violence would vanish is as simplistic as to
believe that political repression will do the trick.
Empirically, the causes of political violence in the GCC
are complicated and dynamic; they include aspects which are
both social, economic, political, cultural, and indeed
psychological; they vary from place to place and from time
to time.
Although a multi-lateral internal security agreement
proved impossible of achievement, the GCC did well in
tightening internal security both individually and
severally in the first violent years of its existence, and
in view of the Iranian glee at individual terrorist attacks
on the various Gulf states, perhaps the most impressive
feature of the GCC response was the moderation of their
overall tone with regard to Iran.
The revolutionary example set by the Khomeini rdgime
in Iran tended to destabilise the GCC countries in four
major ways. First, there were individuals and groups of
people within the Gulf states to whom the Khomeini ideology
had a special appeal. Khomeini himself claimed that his
ideology was "all-Islamic" and non-sectarian. For such
people the fact that Shi'ite particularism cannot be
separated from Khomeini's overall ideology did not seem to
matter; they took him at his word. Nor did the fact that
Khomeinism is the official creed of the Iranian state seem
to disturb them. Secondly, many politically aware GCC
citizens and expatriates welcomed the absolutist and
uncompromising Khomeini crusade against the superpowers,
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against what he described as the pro-American Gulf regimes,
and against the perceived ostentatious living, corruption,
and waste of the middle and upper classes. Third, to the
lower classes in the GCC communities the populist emphasis
of the Iranian model had a particular appeal; some Gulf
Arabs were inclined to believe that only in revolutionary
Iran had the oil wealth been equitably distributed. And
fourth, a combination of Iran's antagonism towards the
United States and its call for the destruction of Israel,
as well as its demand for a fully-fledged Palestinian
state, had a profound effect on many Gulf Arabs regardless
of their wealth, status or profession.
This said, Iran's revolutionary example did not
provoke a universal appeal throughout the GCC communities.
Many GCC citizens simply did not believe the all-Islamic
claim of Khomeini, preferring to see it as a particular
Shi'ite belief system. Many Gulf Arabs also disliked the
Iranian type of government, with Iranian clerics having
political power out of all proportion to that enjoyed by
their opposite numbers living in the Gulf states. Further,
the brutality of the revolution repelled many members of
the modernized middle classes in the GCC countries. In
short, during the first five years of the Cooperation
Council, Iran's revolutionary example did not pose the kind
of formidable threat to the stability of the GCC regime's
that was at first feared. The single most lasting effect of
the Iranian revolutionary example has been the
intensification of political consciousness throughout the
Gulf region. In the future, the challenge to the stability
38
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36
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of the Gulf regimes will be in part the widespread
political awakening among the GCC citizens which Iran's
revolutionary example intensified to an unprecedented
degree. A major factor in the increase in political concern
and interest in the GCC countries is related to the growing
number of young people as revealed below.
Youth Population in the Arab Gulf Region (in thousands) 
Country
1980
Total Age %
Popu- Group [*]
lation 10-34
1990
Total Age %
Popu- Group [*]
lation 10-34
2000
Total Age %
Popu- Group [*]
lation 10-34
Bahrain
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
S.Arabia
UAE
Total
Gulf
313 160 51
38126 17558 46
13072 5884 45
	
1353	 600 44
	
891	 393 44
	
237	 116 49
8960 4059 45
	
726	 360 50
63678 29130 46
410 196 48
51033 23998 47
18136 8343 46
	
2101	 945 45
	
1208	 541 45
	
330	 136 41
12908 5776 45
	
1025	 402 39
87151 40337 46
515 200 38
64916 31772 49
24198 11525 48
2524 1403 56
	
1651	 758 46
	
425	 163 38
17805 7965 45
	
1286	 480 37
113319 54266 48
GCC 12480 5688 46 17982 7996 45 24205 10969 45
More Developed
Regions of the world 40
USA	
1	
43
[* rounded to nearest whole unit]
Source: United Nations, Department of International
Economic and Social Affairs, Demographic Indicators of 
Countries: Estimates and Projections as assessed in 1980,
New York: United Nations, 1982.
One of the most striking aspects of the problem of
political violence in the Gulf region is the involvement of
the young. Many of the individuals who participated in the
Bahrain coup were teenagers, and others were only in their
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twenties. In the most serious examples of the multiple
bombings in Kuwait, of the 21 terrorists whose ages are
known, all but three were under 30 years of age, and of the
21 convicted, 16 were in their twenties. If indeed
political violence goes hand in hand with the problem of
political rejuvenation, then the GCC states cannot
disregard this correlation in trying to cope with the
problem of political fragility.
Nor can the GCC authorities overlook the relationship
between political fragility and the high percentage of
foreigners in the GCC countries. The population figures
given above have 1980 as the base year; at roughly the same
time the foreign population in relation to the total
population was estimated as below:
Foreigners as a percentage of total population
Bahrain 	  32.1%
	 Qatar 	
 73.2%
Kuwait 	  61.2%
	 Saudi Arabia . 23.3%
Oman 	  18.2%
	 UAE 	
 69.0%
Sources:
for Bahrain, Arab Times (Kuwait), 24 August 1982
for Kuwait, MEED: Kuwait and the Middle East, May
1982.
for Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Demographic and
Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for
Countries of the Economic Commission for
Western Asia, Beirut: United Nations, May
1982
for the UAE, Quarterly Economic Review for the UAE -
Annual Supplement 1981, London: Economist
Intelligence Unit, 1981.
It is true that a great many expatriates are leaving the
Gulf because of the decline in oil revenues. Since the
multiple bombings in December 1983, Kuwaiti has expelled
many thousands of expatriates, some 20,000 since the
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assassination attempt against the Emir in 1985. But for
those who remain, second-class status becomes more irksome
as economic rewards diminish.
The highly politicized younger generation provides the
main social base for recruitment by various political
groups, be they the underground cells of Al-Dawa, to the
open gathering of such groups as the Kuwaiti Jamaat Islah
or the pro-Iranian Jamaat Saciafah. These examples do not
imply that only Islamic groups recruit alienated
individuals; all kinds of secular groups and individuals
are also politically active, and notably in Kuwait. Here
the weekly Diwanniya of leading government critics have
attracted thousands of supporters and at the beginning of
1990 had won agreement in principle for a return to some
form of democracy. The alienation of one particular group
in the GCC societies, however, is a particular source of
potential destabilisation: the Gulf region is the Shi'ite
heartland of the world, and most of those who have
participated in acts of political violence have been
Shi'ite Muslims. In Bahrain they in fact constitute the
majority of the citizen population, and there are large
numbers in the other states. It is not, however, simply
their sect or their number that make them a potential
source of destabilisation; rather it is their sense of
victimisation regardless of the country in which they live.
The Saudi, Bahraini and other GCC governments in recent
years have tried to improve their living condition as a
means of redressing grievances. Yet their perception of
8 5
being deprived persists, except among those who happen to
be affluent.
If in the past it was feared that rapid modernization,
fuelled by a massive rise in oil revenues, would trigger
societal dislocation, income mal-distribution, and life-
style disruption, it is now feared that economic recession
as a result of the drastic fall in oil prices will produce
many new sources of alienation. The danger is that in
trying to head off an economic problem, the GCC governments
may inadvertently produce a social one, by cutting back on
spending, by abandoning dispensable projects, and
withdrawing subsidies, especially of water and electricity.
The Shi'ite poorer classes are particularly vulnerable, but
many members of the middle class, who have been unhappy
with the lack of political freedom may well become restless
as their material comfort is undermined. The politically
disaffected Saudis, for example, may become more vocal
about the ever-extended promise of a consultative assembly,
while their Bahraini counterparts may increase their
pressure for the reopening of their suspended parliament.
Thus the task of maintaining the status quo involves
more than coping with acts of political violence; it
requires coping with all the causes that constitute the
environment of such violence. As if this were not a
formidable enough challenge, the fear of the spread of the
Iran-Iraq war complicated the GCC's agenda. When the
Council was established only 6 months after the outbreak of
the war, the Arab leaders could not have had the slightest
idea that the war would continue for seven years after the
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birth of the new organization, becoming in consequence the
most protracted and disastrous war in the contemporary
history of the Middle East. More specifically, its outcome
was seen to be crucial to the existing structures in the
Gulf. According to Secretary-General Bishara:
"Iran erred, exactly as did Nasser, when it failed to
comprehend the socio-political structure of Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states. The consignment of
Islamic fundamentalism from Iran to the Gulf ... is
bound to fail when there is no environmental
acceptance of such fundamentalism."
Earlier on the same occasion, Bishara had emulated the
Bahraini prime minister in denying the existence of
internal threats to the Gulf states; but his rhetoric ran
away with him -
n ... the Gulf is not threatened from within ... there
are no externally planted hostile forces that seek to
undermine the almost unanimously accepted political
structure. There are no indigenous political parties
that try to emulate the now bankrupt doctrines that
polluted the Arab world in the fifties and sixties. In
the Gulf, internally, there are genuine local forces
that advocate the Westernisation of traditional
dialogue between the nationals and the system. But
these protestations depend on pers4asion not violence,
on cooperation not confrontation."'
It was a brave effort on Bishara's part, but it did
not tally with Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa's
assertions of Iranian attempts to whip up local Shi'ites,
nor Prince Naif's condemnation of the men in power in Iran
as terrorists. For the heads of the Gulf states, security
was indivisible because ruling families and the states were
indivisible; any threat to security was to be countered, as
was any attempt by external forces to foment domestic
dissatisfaction with the existing political status. The
7 Abdulla Y. Bishara, 22 September 1982, New York. In The
First Five Years, p. 23.
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instinct for survival of the heads of state was and remains
perfectly understandable; while their response to internal
threats was simple and effective, their response to
external threats was more varied and circumspect, as will
be discussed in the following chapter. But it will already
have become apparent that the GCC constitutes a pluralistic
security community in a special sense, in that not only do
the members eschew violence in the resolution of conflicts
of interest; they actively cooperate in maintaining
security as a perceived objective.
88
Chapter Five
THE GCC AND REGIONAL SECURITY
Between the Ta'if Islamic summit of January 1981 and
the first meeting of the heads of state of the GCC
countries in May of the same year, the Gulf states were
forcefully reminded of their defence liabilities, following
visits from John Nott and by Mrs.Thatcher in early April.
Following the enunciation of the Carter doctrine in January
1980, there had been suggestions emanating from the United
States for a rapid deployment force to be established,
ready for intervention if necessary in the event of Soviet
excursions or Iranian penetration into the Gulf itself.
Nott indicated British readiness to contribute to such a
force. While accepting that Gulf security was the
responsibility of the Gulf states themselves and insisting
that the rapid deployment force would only be employed if
its use was requested by the heads of state themselves, he
stressed that while the Gulf internally was politically
stable there was a Soviet threat which would not go away
and that Soviet expansionism would continue, unless the
Gulf countries showed and demonstrated their readiness to
resist. Prior to a visit in late April, Mrs.Thatcher
reiterated Nott's comments, though she rather blurred their
impact, by stating that the rapid deployment force was not
specifically intended for problems in the Gulf, as one did
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not know where there might be trouble throughout the
world.'
Notwithstanding John Nott's visits, (which took in
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates,) there was no agreement on regional defence
reached in Abu Dhabi during the preparatory talks prior to
the formal establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Differences between Oman, proposing that the Straits of
Hormuz be defended in conjunction with Western forces, and
Kuwait insisting upon a strict non-alignment, meant that
the heads of state, while "perceiving the inevitability of
economic integration" contented themselves in their first
communiqué with the most general expressions of
determination to maintain security and stability as the
responsibility of the regions' peoples and states; foreign
intervention and foreign entanglements were expressly
condemned. However, as Secretary General Bishara stated:
"At the second heads of state summit in November 1981,
Oman argued for greater emphasis on security issues,
while trade-oriented states like Kuwait stressed
economic issues. The traditional openness in the Gulf
has made trade the basis of life for many states in
the region, but the Omanis, in whose territory lies
the strategic Hormuz straits, are naturally interested
in security issues, and the second summit agreed to
send a delegation to Oman in recognition of its
legitimate concerns. The report submitted by the
delegation galvanized GCC interest in improving our
collective defence posture. In January 1982, the first
meeting of GCC defence ministers was convened as a
result of this report. Meanwhile other events helped
determine this course of events, for Bahrain had
experienced an externally-inspired coup attempt in
December 1981. Strengthening cooperation amongst
interior ministers regarding internal security also
became a high priority."
1 Keesincts 1981, p. 30982.
2 Secretary-General Bishara, September 1986, Washington, in
The First Five Years, p.98.
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Internal security was seen as linked to external
security in that the Bahraini coup attempt was firmly
placed at Iran's door, the director of the Gulf Affairs
Section in Iran being specifically named as responsible for
the outrage in the Bahraini press. 3
 The Saudi minister of
the interior, Prince Naif, declared that the sabotage plot
was engineered by the Iranian government and directed
against Saudi Arabia; and his opposite number from Bahrain,
Sheikh Muhammad Bin Khalifa Al-Khalifa, spoke of the need
for a rapid deployment force in the Gulf that would be
capable of quickly providing assistance when needed. The
Bahraini authorities were clearly interested in their
immediate internal security position; as far as external
pressure was concerned, Bahrain, which is within eyesight
of the vital Saudi Dhahran defence area, was very much
within the Saudi defence perimeter; as a senior Saudi
official told a United States Senate staff member:
"We consider the defence of Bahrain to be the defence
of Saudi Arabia."
Bahrain's small defence force, while carefully organized
and trained, has always been so light on modern equipment
as to be able to offer only token resistance to any outside
military threat; the government has seen national security
in a broad diplomatic and social context, looking to Saudi
Arabia for protection.
As has been suggested earlier, on the other hand
Kuwaiti apprehension about possible interference in her
3 Akhbar Al-Khajil, (Manama), 30 December 1981.
4 Staff Report, War in the Gulf, Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, August 1984.
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internal affairs by her partners has prevented her from
being as keen as other members of the GCC to see the
creation of anything genuinely approaching an internal
rapid deployment force. Kuwait was equally careful not to
respond positively to the call in December 1981 by Prince
Naif for Arab countries to abandon their neutrality and
support Iraq in defence of the whole Arab nation. This
followed the signing of a frontier treaty between Saudi
Arabia and Iraq confirming their unratified agreement of
July 1975, providing for the division of the neutral zone
of territory on their common border. This lack of
enthusiasm was notwithstanding the fact that Kuwait was
coming the closest to direct involvement in the Iran-Iraq
war, as the closing of the port of Basrah had increased
Iraqi dependence on Kuwaiti transport facilities. Iranian
violation of airspace demonstrated Kuwaiti vulnerability,
and in the autumn of 1981 an oil-gathering station in north
Kuwait was in fact bombed by Phantom jets, an attack which
was in fact decried by Iran as Kuwaiti propaganda. Limited
consensus within the GCC was replicated in the wider arab
context: while Iraq enjoyed to a greater or lesser extent
the support of the GCC countries and Jordan, Iran was
supported - at least verbally - by both Syria and Libya. In
spring 1982, the Syrian foreign minister, however, asserted
that Syria would cease to support Iran in the event of its
invading Iraq, because if Syria agreed to abandon any part
of Arab territory, she would also have to abandon
Palestine. On the same day the foreign ministers of the GCC
states met in Riyadh and called for an united Arab position
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on the Iran-Iraq conflict. But as reported subsequently, a
united Arab response would have involved the GCC in
agreeing to the removal of President Hussein. Syria and
Iran had reached an understanding on a successor Iraqi
government of national unity under Brigadier Hassan Mustafa
Al-Naqib, but whereas Syria was prepared to see the
Brigadier emerge as the first head of state, Iran favoured
the eventual formation of an Islamic republican government
under Hojatolisham Bakr Hakim. 5 Mistrustful as the
conservative heads of state of the Gulf were of Saddam
Hussein, they could not concede that the supreme authority
in Iraq was subject to outside endorsement, to say nothing
of their distaste for the possible expansion of Islamic
fundamentalist zealotry.
At the end of 1981 and beginning of 1982 events seemed
to suggest that increased defence cooperation would in fact
come about fairly quickly. The second session of the
Supreme Council in November 1981 had studied the report
prepared earlier in the year by the chiefs-of-staff of the
member states and decided to invite the defence ministers
to meet to set the priorities which the member countries
required to secure their independence and sovereignty. The
Omanis in particular were in favour of close coordination
between the Gulf states including joint naval and air
commands. This, however, predictably failed to meet with
the support of Kuwait; it was noted at the time that Oman
was currently participating in a United States marine
landing exercise code-named Bright Star which seemed to be
5 The Times (London), 5 July 1982.
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a less than positive contribution to the GCC's stated
objection to foreign military activity in the region. In
January 1982, the defence ministers of the separate states
met in Riyadh in secret session with tension mounting
between the Council and Iran. There was no communiqué,
Saudi defence minister Prince Sultan insisting on
confidentiality, but it was reported that the defence
ministers had approved recommendations by the chiefs-of-
staff for a joint air defence system based on the Saudi
AWACs and the establishment of a Gulf arms industry.
Similar reports followed a further meeting of the defence
ministers in October 1982 6 , but no formal agreements were
reached at the third Supreme Council meeting held the
following March in Manama. The final communiqué 
"approved the recommendations of the defence ministers
which aimed to build the intrinsic strength of GCC
members and coordinate within them to achieve self-
reliance."
On this occasion, as well as the expected Kuwaiti
opposition to formal agreement, there were signs of some
unease on the part of the Omanis, lest a formal agreement
could weaken its connections with the United States and
Britain. Even at the fourth meeting of the Supreme Council
in November 1983 at Doha, despite the stringent security
following the discovery in September of a plot to
assassinate the delegates, the heads of state concentrated
on the economic agreements and the possibility of unifying
such utilities as water, power, communications and gas.
Notice was given, not of specific defence issues but of
6 Keesings 1983, p. 32050.
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studies in hand to create a strategic food reserve, to
develop a joint agricultural policy, to examine the
feasibility of establishing an export refinery in Oman to
be fed by a pipeline passing through all GCC countries, the
establishment of a network of gas pipelines linking gas
fields to industrial sites, and the possibility of a rail
link between member states. In fact, none of these studies
actually bore fruit. It was not simply a matter of
declining revenues from oil sales; the very range of the
proposals suggests excessive bureaucratic zeal.
Increased military cooperation was once again on the
agenda of the defence ministers in February 1984. When
meeting at Doha they yet again discussed the
recommendations of the chiefs of staff on the establishment
of a joint arms manufacturing industry, but also on a
policy of diversifying sources of arms supplies in order to
reduce dependency on the United States. Some two months
later the International Herald Tribune quoted several
unnamed GCC sources on the growing reluctance of the member
states to maintain close ties with the United States
because of her military role in the Lebanon, her close ties
with Israel, and her refusal to supply Saudi Arabia with
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. According to the report
Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahayan, President of the UAE, had warned
Richard Murphy, then the US Assistant Secretary of State
for the Near East, that continued friendship with the Gulf
states would require significant policy changes on the part
of the United States. The report also carried a warning by
Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the recently appointed Saudi
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Ambassador to the United States, that Saudi Arabia would
examine alternative sources of armaments.7
Preoccupation with weaponry reflected developments in
the Iran-Iraq war. Beginning in 1984, the threat of the
spread of hostilities began to be particularly keenly felt.
In February Iran launched a new offensive against Iraq, and
whereas all previous offensives had failed, the fifth
attempt succeeded. Iranian forces seized parts of the
artificial oil islands of Majnoon, inside the Iraqi
marshes, north of Basrah, the vital Iraqi port city
inhabited mostly by Shi'ites. Apart from its intrinsic
value, the islands could be used as a jumping-board for an
offensive against the Baghdad-Basrah strategic ivispma 0INIu
6 miles away. A further development affected the GCC states
directly for the first time. During the three years before
spring 1984 the Iraqis had attacked more than 60 ships,
two-thirds of them commercial vessels from nations not
involved in the war; in April they used French-made planes
to fire Exocet missiles at oil tankers in the Gulf.
Ironically enough two Saudi oil tankers were hit.
Subsequently the Iranians attacked two Kuwaiti oil tankers
and a third Saudi oil tanker. The following month Saudi
fighter jets shot down an Iranian plane, in response to its
encroachment on Saudi territorial waters; the Iranians
protested that the aircraft had been shot down in
international waters. Insignificant as the incident in fact
was, it did show Saudi political resolve and it helped to
stiffen the morale of the smaller GCC states which depended
7 International Herald Tribune, 24 April 1984.
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primarily of Saudi military deterrence. The aftermath of
the crisis, however, was no less important as both Iran and
the GCC countries showed mutual restraint. This said, the
so-called "tanker war" further goaded the GCC states into
seeking to increase efforts for common defence. Thus
Secretary-General Bishara was reported as saying:
"The Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers
have prompted the Council's states to speed up
unificati9n of the military effort under a united
command."°
Secretary-General Bishara was commenting on a meeting of
the chiefs-of-staff where they decided to abandon the GCC's
foreign ministers' earlier ideas for designating a sea
corridor close to the shores of their states over which
would be extended a GCC-provided air umbrella; they decided
instead that air cover was the best means for protecting
navigation outside the Iran-Iraq war zone in the northern
part of the Gulf. The chiefs-of-staff further decided to
recommend to the GCC leaders a grant of some 2 billion
dollars to Oman to upgrade its air defence system and to
increase the effectiveness of its radar network in the
Straits of Hormuz in order to monitor Iranian activities.
But it was not without significance that their final
recommendation was for the formation of a "semi-unified
command" for the armies of the 6 countries. The only
tangible outcome of their meeting was the joint military
manoeuvres, code-named Peninsula Shield 2, held in October
some 700 miles north-east of Riyadh, this a year following
the first such manoeuvres held in the UAE.
8 Al-Oabas, 22 June 1984.
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According to the commander of the joint exercises, the
manoeuvres represented joint training of the forces of the
six countries; only the troops of each country would defend
the country against attack. In other words although these
forces would learn about the terrain and other logistical
matters in each others' countries, the aim of the exercise
was not to train them to fight together in battle, but
rather to train commanders and staff in achieving
coordination for various military operations. In effect,
the Peninsula Shield exercises seemed rather to prepare for
a GCC rapid deployment force, basically designed to deter
any interference in the individual states' internal
affairs.
Following the flare-up in attacks on tankers, two
further developments occurred, one political and one
military. At the military level, the United States finally
agreed in May to provide Saudi Arabia with 400 Stinger
missiles and 200 launchers. At the political level, the GCC
representatives at the United Nations succeeded in
persuading the Security Council to pass Resolution 552
calling on all states to respect the right of free
navigation in the Gulf and refrain from any act which may
lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict. By
the end of the year, the GCC leaders had also demonstrated
their ability to together in that they agreed to create a
joint command for a rapid deployment force consisting of
two brigades to be stationed in Saudi Arabia under the
command of a senior Saudi officer. They further began to
assist Bahrain and Oman to build up their military
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strength. This said, the rapid deployment force could only
be taken to be symbolic: it exists only in theory, having a
headquarters staff at Hafr Al-Batin without actual brigades
on the ground, as long as there is no emergency. Actual
deployment and operational employment requires the
unanimous decision of the GCC Supreme Council. Further its
mission seems to be viewed differently by different GCC
leaders and officials; it is still unclear whether the RDF
is intended as a counter-insurgency force permitted to
intervene in any GCC country in an emergency or a common
defensive force against external aggression, or indeed
both. At the time of the announcement of the formation of
the rapid deployment force in November 1984, Sheikh Saba
Al-Saba, the Kuwaiti deputy prime minister and foreign
minister emphasized that the force was a temporary
expedient which would be periodically reviewed.9
Notwithstanding its exposure to Iranian attack, Kuwait
had shown its readiness to stand a little apart from its
GCC associates earlier in the year. In late June 1984
following President Reagan overruling Congress objections
in supplying Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Saudi
Arabia, the United States rejected a request for the same
equipment from the Kuwaiti defence minister, Sheikh Salim
Al-Saba. In response the Kuwaiti foreign minister insisted
that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were cooperating fully in air
defence and the following month the defence minister went
with a delegation to the Soviet Union; an arms agreement
was reached for the provision of air defences, surface-to-
9 Keesings 1985, p. 33370.
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surface missiles and tanks, an agreement which led to the
subsequent arrival in Kuwait of 10 Soviet officers for
training purposes. As if to demonstrate impartiality,
however, in October 1984 it was announced that France would
train Kuwaiti air-force pilots. Kuwait in fact looked to
benefit by the development of Saudi Arabia's Peace Shield
programme, a 4 billion dollar project to create the most
technologically advanced integrated air defence system
outside NATO and the Soviet bloc. The first major contract
for the system, scheduled to become operational in 1992,
was awarded to Boeing in early 1985.10
GCC political pressure brought to bear on the Iran-
Iraq war was not confined to the United Nations; the sixth
meeting of the Supreme Council, held in Muscat in November
1985, was notable for a considerably more evenhanded
reference to the two protagonists. While calling upon Iran
to respect the principles contained in Security Council
resolutions 540 of 1983 and 552 of 1984, the Council also
reaffirmed its declaration in the fifth meeting and
especially its affirmation to continue efforts to put an
end to the war and
"to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of the
two parties in arriving normal relations between
the states of the region.""
Reference to their legitimate interests, however, had
little effect on Iran's behaviour. In February 1986,
Iranian forces, which for months had distracted Iraqi
10 Middle East Economic Digest, (henceforth referred to as
NEED) 11 May 1984, 14 December 1984 and 1 February
1985.
11 The Final Communiqués, p.30.
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attention to the north and east of Basrah, suddenly hit the
far south sector, by crossing the Shatt al-Arab and
capturing the Iraqi oil port of Fao. Only 50 miles away lay
Iran's main target, the highway linking Basrah to Kuwait
and the Gulf. This success on the battlefield shook the GCC
states badly. Secretary-General Bishara was later to
describe this as the peak of the Iraq-Iran war; he declared
in the autumn following the successful Iraqi attack:
"We in the Gulf have become passionate about
security... The GCC is a product of the status quo and
it seeks to preserve stability in the region. This
stability rests on the balance of power in the Gulf.
Internally the GCC states face very few security
threats. It is the use of force which threatens the
status quo and tries to upset the balance of power; we
abhor and condemn the use of force. Regional staWity
must be based on coexistence and understanding."-"
Bishara was speaking after meetings with the oil and
foreign ministers of the separate states held in August
1986 to discuss protecting oil tankers using GCC ports. In
the same month, the GCC's military committee had advocated
protection by what was described as an enhanced radar
network, this taken by observers to mean the AWACs shortly
to be supplied to Saudi Arabia by the United States.
Further discussions on military cooperation actually took
place in Kuwait in September, and in October defence
ministers met in Muscat to discuss the possibility of
establishing a Gulf arms manufacturing industry, if only to
save the huge funds that were described as being squandered
on the importing of arms.13
12 Abdulla Y. Bishara, September 1986, Washington. In The
First Five Years, p.97.
13 Keesings 1985, p. 33753.
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The increase in GCC nervousness following the Iranian
offensive in the spring of 1986 leading to the capture of
Fao found a reflection in the communiqué following the
sixth meeting of the Supreme Council in November 1986.
While deploring the Iran-Iraq war as damaging the best
interests of two Muslim peoples, and while affirming GCC
support for the various security council resolutions
calling for an immediate cease-fire and a withdrawal to
borders, as well as freedom of navigation in international
waterways, the Council expressed its appreciation of what
it described as "fraternal Iraq's response" to efforts
being made to put an end to the war and called upon Iran to
make a similar positive response. The Council went on to
confirm a number of undisclosed recommendations in regard
to military cooperation and it praised the progress and the
achievements of the rapid deployment force, now described
as the Peninsula Shield Force, this, however, being
referred to as "a symbol of the collective determination
for joint defence". 14
 As things turned out, there was
little other than rhetoric to indicate military cooperation
following the Iraq offensive in 1986 and the termination of
hostilities in 1988. It was not that the years were devoid
of incident. Thus in February 1987, the ministers of
interior of the GCC states met once again to try to
implement a comprehensive security strategy, the need for
which was amply demonstrated during the haj pilgrimage of
that year in which several casualties including fatalities
occurred in clashes between Saudi security forces and
14 The Final Communiqués, p.35-37.
102
mainly Iranian Shi'ite elements. Attacks on shipping
continued. In January 1988 the United Nations Security
Council deplored the slow pace of consultation on the
application of its resolution 598 of July 1987 calling for
a cease-fire and pointing out that in the weeks from 6
December 1987 to the time of its meeting no less than 20
tankers had been attacked in the Gulf by both belligerents.
Further there was renewed intensification of fighting in
the land battle in the southern sector of Iraq. The eighth
meeting of the Supreme Council in November 1987 ratified
the recommendations of the ministers of defence with regard
to military cooperation without going into a great deal of
detail; the ninth meeting in December 1988 concentrated on
the Council's expectations of positive advances in
stability in the Gulf following the cease-fire between the
two belligerents earlier that summer.
Such expectations served to underline the fact that
the Iraq-Iran war had been the primary catalyst for
military cooperation amongst the GCC states; the GCC
structure itself facilitated the development of the
requisite degree of consensus among the leaders of the six
states. The principle of the indivisibility of the security
of the six states was accepted, as was the principle of
self-reliance, namely that the security of the Gulf region
was a factor to be attended to by the littoral states
themselves. Agreement had been reached also on a number of
issues: a joint command for a rapid deployment force; the
assistance afforded to Bahrain and Oman; and the Peninsula 
Shield exercises which helped the ground forces of the six
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countries to learn about a variety of weapons' systems and
different terrain. There was also recognition of the all-
important need to create an integrated air defence system.
At the same time, there were a number of constraints
affecting GCC military cooperation. The Peninsula Shield
Force existed only on paper and its precise role was never
fully articulated; as late as 1985 Sultan Qaboos was
insisting that,
"as a first step toward an integrated military
infrastructure, each of the Gulf states should
strengthen it own defence system and military
capabilities."1-5
The development of national military systems, however,
requires enhanced training and greater national as opposed
to expatriate participation in the armed forces, while an
integrated military infrastructure requires reduced
dependence on foreign suppliers, a streamlining of command
structures, and longer-range planning of armaments
acquisition. There is, however, little to suggest that the
arms acquisition programmes of the GCC member states have
been influenced by considerations of GCC compatibility or
inter-operability. Apart from exploratory discussions
relating to the joint purchase and deployment of a maritime
surveillance capability, GCC military cooperation has not
yet reached a level at which large-scale common security
and defence programmes can in fact be implemented. Kuwait
and the United Arab Emirates at various points in the Iran-
Iraq war were subjected to political and other pressures
from Tehran, taking the form of direct threats and actual
15 Interview April 1985 quoted in MEED, 28 October 1985,
p.9
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subversion. One result of these efforts was a reluctance on
the part of Kuwait and the UAE to participate in certain
areas of coordination, such as the effort to link air
defences. The war in fact was responsible for both
impelling and preventing the GCC member states from
engaging in ever-closer cooperation, though there is little
doubt that the war served as one of the catalysts to the
formation for the GCC itself as well as the catalyst for
degrees of cooperation. Especially during times when the
conflict threatened to become more internationalized, as
during the outset of the "tanker war" in late 1983 and the
first half of 1984, the severity of events was such that
concerns among the GCC states of provoking Iran were
superceded. At other points, however, the situation
stabilized to the extent that the continued pace of GCC
military cooperation could have been viewed as
unnecessarily confrontational, leading to a deliberate and
cautious attitude, particularly amongst those states most
susceptible to efforts at destabilization by Iran. Thus it
can be concluded that though the war was a catalyst for
military cooperation, it has resulted in such cooperation
being highly uneven.
Relations with Western states also constituted a
second area of apparent difference amongst the GCC states
that may have served to slow the rate of military
coordination. The spectrum of political and defence
cooperation with third party states traverses Kuwait's
declaratory policy of strict non-alignment at one end, and
Oman's close military relations with both Britain and the
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United States on the other. The British relationship was
clearly demonstrated in late November and December 1986
when a joint Oman-U.K. military exercise, Swift Sword,
involving some 3,800 British troops was held. The defence
links between Oman and the United States are manifested
primarily in the defence agreement for United States use of
military facilities in Oman. These have presented obstacles
for those GCC states for which even the perception of a
direct military association with the United States could
create problems. The role of the United States in the
development of the armed forces of Saudi Arabia cannot be
over-emphasised, the most visible element being the
operation in the Gulf of AWACs systems by both Saudi Arabia
and the United States and the role of United States'
corporations in the ongoing Peace Shield programme. But
because of political difficulties arising from the Arab-
Israeli conflict, relations between Saudi Arabia and the
United States will continue to confront political
obstacles.
This said, GCC relations with the United States were a
function of the perceived threats in the region at any one
time. Relations between the GCC states and the United
States intensified substantially once the threat of a
prolonged disruption of shipping in the Gulf became a
reality. This was particularly visible in the policy of
Kuwait, which approached the permanent members the United
Nations Security Council in autumn 1987 when repeated
Iranian attacks on its vessels were beginning to jeopardize
its economic life-line. Kuwait had been the most consistent
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advocate within the GCC for strict non-alignment, yet it
agreed to a United States military escort operation in late
July 1987 rather than weather the brunt of continued
Iranian intimidation and attacks. It is noteworthy to
mention that Iran in the aftermath of United States and
Soviet approval to engage in reflagging and escorting
operations for Kuwait emphasized its capacity to strike
Kuwait with long-range artillery and ground-to-ground
missiles. It would, however, be a mistake to expect that
closer defence cooperation with the United States would
endure now that hostilities are finished. The decision by
those GCC states with a long-established recipient/supplier
relationship with the United States to diversify their
weapons sources is a clear indication of their resolve to
limit the perceptions of their political attachment to
Washington. Moreover, in addition to limitations brought
about by the shifting intensity of the Iran-Iraq war and
the complex set of defence, political and economic ties to
the United States, there are other constraints occasioned
by varied command structures and equipment and different
planned force developments which cannot be swept away by
political directives, even by such a body as the Supreme
Council, but which can only be resolved through long and
time-consuming deliberation.
Finally the importance of economic trends for
military development must not be overlooked. The outlook
for the international oil market has enormous significance
for the capacity of the GCC states to sustain their
military build-up. In the near term it has to be said,
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however, that despite over-production by both Iran and Iraq
to fuel their war campaign, the early 1990's are expected
to see an increase in oil demand and a decrease in supply
to an extent whereby oil will resume its importance in geo-
strategic and economic terms. For this reason the economic
outlook for the GCC states, emerging as they are from a
period of comparative economic austerity, is relatively
favourable.
To these various considerations regarding the
potential for enhanced GCC military cooperation, one must
also add perceptions of common threats, mutual interests,
and structural compatibility imperative to the development
of cooperation. The heads of the GCC states have identified
a wide range of mutual threats. There are common political,
social, and religious threads which bind GCC societies
together. The GCC states have clearly mutual interests in
developing stable and prosperous economies through the
maximization of collective resources and through the
reduction of competition, and there is an inter-
organisational balance of power, providing for a structural
complementarity between the member states which could lead
to more even development in economic and military terms. As
things stand at the beginning of the 1990's, the general
guidelines established by GCC leaders have led to the
creation of a central command with a token rapid deployment
force which has enjoyed a certain amount of limited
collective military exercise. At the bilateral level,
however, there has been a relatively impressive series of
military exercises between GCC member states. This has led
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to agreement on and the implementation of information
exchange and a certain amount of centralized planning in
the course of RDF deployment and the conduct of joint
exercises. The experience of the negotiation of the joint
security agreement while revealing both the complexity of
such planning and the deliberate pace the GCC members are
maintaining in the implementation of joint security
nevertheless implies exchange of information regarding
force equipment and procedures. By contrast, there has been
less progress in the implementation of the GCC military
framework at the national level which involves the
surrender of important sovereign prerogatives. The desire
to maintain such prerogatives is even more pronounced in
military areas than in the area of economic and social
cooperation. It was to be expected then that the GCC during
its first years would see member states maintaining their
independent force composition and development plans to the
greatest extent possible. While it could be argued that the
existence of a GCC central command structure, however
skeletal, indicates that national interest is not entirely
supreme, it is also true that the diminution in regional
instability following the end of the Iran-Iraq war somewhat
reduces the pressure on further erosion of national
sovereignty in the defence field. The extent to which GCC
states narrow their policies and attitudes regarding for
example relations with third party states, however, will
persist, though their efforts at military integration are
certain to continue to be both deliberate and extremely
cautious.
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Chapter Six
THE GCC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION
In discussing political cooperation within the GCC it
is worth noting the preamble to the Charter, as well as
article four of the Charter itself which details the
objectives of the Cooperation Council. The preamble speaks
of the desire to coordinate, cooperate and integrate in the
interests of the peoples of the member states to serve
Arabic and Islamic causes; article four repeats the
commitment to coordinate and integrate the activities of
the member states in all fields before detailing the areas
in which it is intended to effect cooperation and
concluding with the assertion of readiness to stimulate
scientific and technological progress. The supreme
decision-making body of the organization is the Supreme
Council of the heads of member states which meets annually;
the Council of Ministers, normally composed of the foreign
ministers, is the main executive body and meets quarterly.
In the general political area, statements from the Council
of Ministers, and notably from the Supreme Council,
constantly referred to the Iran-Iraq war, to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, unfulfilled Palestinian self-
determination, and Islamic issues, the latter reflecting in
particular on the role of Saudi Arabia as custodian of the
Muslim holy places. Initially too the potential for
conflict between the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
and Oman found mention in official statements of both
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Councils. In their efforts to achieve their political
objectives the member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council have as a base a sense of a common identity; their
shared historical background and similar social and
political systems, the sense of a shared identity, is in
marked contrast to other less fortunate attempts at Arab
political cooperation, notably the attempts in the 50's to
establish the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria. In
the economic field, the GCC states have reached a stage
where economic cooperation is more of a necessity than a
choice: they are primarily one-sector economies with oil
and natural gas resources as overwhelmingly their most
important sources of income and they must cooperate in
economic development or face the prospect of wasteful and
harmful competition. In the volatile political atmosphere
in the Gulf it is equally clear that the GCC states must
cooperate, and their cooperation will be examined within
the context of the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israel conflict,
peninsular affairs, and relations with the super-powers.
It is not without interest that the first communiqué
of the Supreme Council issued in May 1981 placed the Iran-
Iraq war at the end of a list of security and stability
problems associated with the Gulf. Beginning by declaring
their will and right to defend their security, the member
states - or rather the heads of the member states _
reaffirmed their rejection of foreign interference;
declared that stability on the Gulf was tied to the
achievement of peace in the Middle East, including the
right of the people of Palestine to return to their own
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country and set up an independent state; they referred to
the Lebanon and the threats by Israel against Syria, and
only then declared that they supported efforts being made
to put an end to the Iran-Iraq war, since it was one of the
problems which threatened the region and increased the
possibility of foreign intervention. This ranking of
priorities was designed to counter criticism emanating from
Syria, Iraq and the Palestine Liberation Organization, that
the formation of the GCC would split the Arab League,
instead of promoting unity with regard to the Arab-Israel
conflict. This said, the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war
seemed to be running in favour of Iraq and while attempting
to mediate in the conflict themselves, the member states of
the GCC sought to secure broader international support for
attempts at mediation, encouraged the restoration of
relations between Iraq and Syria, and when the war began to
turn against Iraq, sought to gain international support
when the conflict began to affect Gulf shipping.
Within six months of the inception of the GCC,
however, the security of the Gulf and its stability
received such extended treatment in the communiqué emerging
from the Supreme Council at its second meeting in November
1981 as clearly to demonstrate security as the primary
objective. Some of the member states sought to support Iraq
as a fellow Arab country, while seeking to maintain
communication links with Iran, and this because they
believed that Iraqi action was partly motivated by the wish
to contain the Iranian revolution, an objective which they
shared without approving of war as a means to that end.
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Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in fact aided the Iraqi war effort
both financially and logistically. Financial assistance was
covert, whereas logistically - at least in the early years
of the war - Saudi Arabia made three ports available for
the trans-shipment of military equipment to Iraq; Kuwait
became a military life-line for Iraq, a role for which it
paid dearly, as there were "accidental" Iranian air-raids
on Kuwait, twice in November 1980, once in June 1981 and
once again in October of the same year. Support for Iraq,
however, was not total; until the Iranian revolution the
Gulf leaders had felt threatened by the subversive
activities of the Ba'ath regime in Baghdad and if Iraq was
to win the war, it was feared that the possibility of
subversion would return with a vengeance. This said, at the
time, the threat of Iranian fundamentalism seemed the
greater evil to be guarded against.
In fulfillment of the statement made in the first
communiqué of the Supreme Council, that the heads of state
supported efforts to bring an end to the war, a range of
high level discussions was conducted, in order to explore
the means by which the combatants could be induced to
desist from continued fighting. The GCC leaders, and
notably the Saudis, had been initially more disturbed by
the allegedly Iranian-supported coup plot in Bahrain,
rather than developments on the war front, but following
the impressive Iranian offensive early in 1982, and
especially the follow-up offensive in May of the same year,
the GCC capitals witnessed an enormous amount of diplomatic
activity, followed by several extraordinary meetings of the
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ministerial council. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had initiated
contacts with Iraq, with Syria and with Algeria; under
Iranian pressure, Iraq asserted its readiness to withdraw
to the international border. Given the initial Iranian
victories, there was little interest emanating from Tehran
for the intensification of efforts to end the war; when the
Iranian forces finally carried the war into Iraqi territory
in July 1982, the GCC dropped all pretence of impartiality.
The Iraqis were depicted as peace-seekers and, at first by
implication, the Iranians as the real obstacle to any
negotiated peace settlement. The Iranian July offensive
proved to be a failure, but the decision had already been
taken within the GCC to internationalize the pressure on
the combatants to desist, as indicated by the assistant
general secretary for political affairs in a newspaper
interview given in August: in response to a question as to
whether the GCC was continuing its efforts to end the war
he declared:
"All the contacts that have been held to end the Iran-
Iraq war were made after contacts had been made by the
GCC countries with the Arab brothers and other parties
which - due to their close relations with the GCC
countries and the Arab brothers on the one hand, and
with peace-loving and politically influential
countries' international issues on the other - showed
a readiness in this regard."1
Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahim Al-Subhi was referring
to the preliminary steps being taken to obtain diplomatic
support at the first summit of the Arab League in September
1982. These efforts were successful in that there was
passed at the summit a resolution declaring that in the
1 Al-Anbar (Kuwait), 22 August 1982.
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event of Iran failing to respond to the peace efforts and
continuing its war against Iraq, its actions could be
viewed as an act of war against the Arab nation. With the
backing of the Arab League, the GCC henceforth began to
depict the Iranian offensives as acts against the whole of
the Arab world. At their third summit meeting in Bahrain in
November 1982, the GCC leaders declared their great anxiety
over the developments in the war. The most serious
development they believed was the crossing of the
international border by Iran which posed "the great threat
to the safety and security of the Arab nation." The
communiqué went on:
"These developments, these recent occurrences, took
place at a time when the Arab nation is working to
affirm its solidarity and to gather its strength for
confronting increasing Zionist aggression which
requires collective efforts on the part of the Islamic
states. The Council also confirmed its support for
Iraq in its efforts to end this war by peaceful means
and to further the attempts being made in this respect
by the committee formed by the Islamic conference, the
non-aligned states, and the United Nations. It also
requests that Iran reciprocate in these efforts."2
Notwithstanding the readiness of the GCC leaders to
stress their Arab credentials, thus a favouring of Iraq,
they took care not to cut off lines of communication with
Iran. In May 1983 the Kuwaiti deputy premier and minister
for foreign affairs, together with the UAE minister of
state for foreign affairs, visited both Iran and Iraq to
discuss the conflict and to explore the means by which the
oil spill in the Gulf resulting from the attack on the
Iranian Nowruz oil-field could be stopped. The mission was
important if for no other reason than the reflection of the
2 The Final Communiqués, p. 16.
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desire in both the GCC capitals and Tehran, despite their
many differences, to engage in continuing discussions
regarding the war as well as other issues. The visit was
carried out shortly after the request of all the GCC states
at the 7th meeting of the non-aligned movement in 1983 to
examine the international implications of the conflict.
Kuwaiti Emir Jabir Al-Ahmed Al-Saba personally called upon
the non-aligned movement to use its resources to bring the
hostilities to an end. Likewise during the convocation of
an extraordinary session of Arab foreign ministers the
following year in March 1984, the GCC states were
instrumental in the formation of a seven-member committee
whose mandate was to explore means by which the hostilities
could be brought to an end. In addition to ministers from
Iraq itself, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Yemen Arab Republic,
the secretary-general of the League, the Kuwaiti deputy
premier and foreign affairs minister, Saba Al-Ahmed Al-
Saba, and the Saudi foreign minister, Saud Al-Faisal,
served on the committee.
Within the Arab context a third area of GCC diplomatic
activity involved attempts to effect a rapprochement 
between the competing Ba'ath regimes in Baghdad and
Damascus. By undermining the links that had developed
between Syria and Iran, it was hoped that political
pressure could be brought to bear on Tehran to accept a
peaceful settlement. Thus in October 1983 Qatari minister
of state for foreign affairs, Ahmad Ibn Saif Al-Thani,
travelled to both Baghdad and Damascus in order to find out
whether some improvement in relations could be brought
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about. The UAE president subsequently made a personal visit
to Algeria in October 1983 to help clear the Arab
atmosphere, including the problems inherent in Iraq-Syria
relations. In the same month the Saudi foreign minister,
Saud Al-Faisal, also travelled to Algiers for the same
purpose. October 1983, however, provided the GCC ministers
of foreign affairs with opportunities further to
internationalize their efforts. In that month the Security
Council of the United Nations had passed a resolution
concerning the threat from Hashaimi Rafsanjani, the speaker
of the Iranian ma'lis, to cut off oil exports from the Gulf
states by blocking the Straits of Hormuz. The Security
Council deplored this and a week later, at its fourth
summit meeting, the GCC latched onto the Security Council
resolution.
"The Council ... expressed its support for the
resolution of the Security Council issued on 21st
October which called for the cessation of all military
operations in the Gulf, the cessation of subjecting
the cities' economic installations and sea-ports to
attack, and the immediate stoppage of all aggressive
operations in the Gulf, including all its sea passages
and waterways. It noted with satisfaction the
acceptance of Iraq of this resolution, and calling on
Iran to respond positively and not threaten freedom of
navigation in the Gulf and its straits ... The Council
also calls on the permanent membership of the Security
Council to fulfill its responsibilities in adopting
the necessary measures for implementing this
resolution.
The Council renewed its readiness to recommend the
good offices which the state of Kuwait and the state
of the United Arp Emirates undertook on behalf of the
Council states."'
In retaliation for Iraqi attacks in the spring of
1984, however, the Iranians began to strike oil tankers
within the Gulf; for all practical purposes from then on
3 Ibid, p. 21.
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the GCC publicly sided with Iraq despite its declared
policy of neutrality. Even before the Iranian attacks on
Saudi and Kuwaiti oil tankers in May 1984, the GCC states
had decided to go on a diplomatic offensive against Iran
for another reason: on 24 February Iranian forces seized
parts of the artificial island of Majnoon inside the Iraqi
marshes north of Basrah. The foreign ministers of the six
states met at Riyadh and flew to Baghdad in March when the
Arab League tried to force Iran to the negotiating table by
in effect calling on all countries to stop furnishing her
with arms. More critically GCC leaders managed to get the
Arab League in the meeting of 20 May 1984 to characterize
the Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers as
acts of aggression. Further, a direct appeal was made to
the Security Council. Speaking on behalf of the GCC the
representative of Kuwait declared:
"We are not here out of weakness or fear, but rather
out of faith in the need to settle international
disputes in accordance with the principles embodied in
the Charter - by methods that will obviate the resort
to force ... our appearance here is in itself an
assertion of our desire to keep conflicts away from
the region and to provide ways and means of preventing
the devastating war that will surely strike the region
if it is not seriously and responsibly prevented by
the world at large.u4
Although Iran was not specifically named in the text,
resolution 552 was designed to provide the basis for the
imposition of "effective measures" by the UN Security
Council members if the acknowledged threat to international
peace and stability were to continue. The final resolution
made specific reference to the ports of Kuwait and Saudi
4 UN Security Council S/PV 2546, pp. 59-60 .
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Arabia rather than citing the general rights of non-
belligerent states under international maritime law. This
political initiative, taken by the GCC states, was
significant not only because it represented the first
concerted approach made by all the member states in the
United Nations but also because it demonstrated that the
GCC policy-making process could effectively rally
international support for its political interests. A
parallel campaign by the GCC was carried out to generate
additional support for a negotiated settlement for the war.
To this end the Kuwaiti deputy premier and foreign affairs
minister, as well as the Iraqi minister of external
affairs, travelled to Japan in May 1984 to discuss Japan's
relations with Iran and the steps that Japan could take to
encourage a political settlement between the belligerents.
In the meantime, less public efforts were made to defuse
the situation; in a far-reaching interview with a Kuwaiti
correspondent, King Fand of Saudi Arabia declared, in
response to a question as to the initiatives proposed by
the GCC countries to end the war,
"The Gulf countries are performing good offices with
the brothers in Iraq and Iran to end this painful
conflict between brothers; from this premise gny
effort from any party whatsoever is a good effort."
The efforts described by King Fand were to include a
dramatic visit by the heir apparent and Saudi foreign
minister, Saud Al-Faisal, to Tehran in May 1985, during
which visit a set of proposals regarding mediation and
financial assistance was reportedly advanced on behalf of
5 Al-Majalis (Kuwait), 8 December 1984.
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the GCC states. During the Supreme Council summit session
the previous November in Kuwait, though the leaders had
singled out Iran for its lack of willingness to pursue a
political settlement, they had reiterated the GCC's
readiness to carry out any direct endeavour which would
achieve progress towards dialogue and negotiation. Not all
the GCC ddmarches were as dramatic as the visit of the
Saudi foreign minister to Iran; a secondary source reported
that the UAE president had proposed at the Supreme Council
meeting of November 1984 "a Marshall plan" to reconstruct
the destroyed Iranian and Iraqi areas.6
While there was no official confirmation of the
readiness of the GCC states to help reconstruction in Iran
and Iraq, the "war of cities" in 1985, when Iraq and Iran
struck each other's population centres, clearly motivated
the GCC ministerial council in March 1985 to its most
explicit offer of mediation for ending the war. This was
the fourteenth formal meeting of the ministerial council
since the inception of the GCC; during the proceedings the
Kuwaiti deputy premier and foreign minister left for a
lightning visit to Baghdad for talks with Saddam Hussein.
The visit of the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud Al
Faisal, in May has already been mentioned. The following
December Iran's foreign minister, Ali Akabar Velayati, paid
a return visit to Saudi Arabia at the invitation of Prince
Saud. While no positive move towards ending the war
resulted from this exchange of visits, both Saudi Arabia
and the GCC as a whole seemed to temper their tilted
6 Middle East, December 1984.
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neutrality towards Iraq. The November 1985 communiqué of
the Supreme Council referred
"to the readiness of the Council states to continue
their efforts with parties concerned to help to put an
end to this destructive war and to ensure the
legitimate rights and interests of the two parties in
arriving at normal relations between the states of the
region."7
This more balanced approach was severely tested, however,
because of the sporadic violence that had occurred since
the Iranian revolution during Iranian participation in the
annual pilgrimage to the holy places of Mecca and Medina.
Political demonstrations during the haj produced minor
problems during the pilgrimages which in August 1987
exploded into a large demonstration broken up by Saudi
forces. Deaths and casualties occurred within both sides
and started a bitter political confrontation between the
two states. More covert, but subversive activity by Iran
had been reflected earlier in the year with the discovery
of a large arms cache in the days preceding the
organization of the Islamic community meeting in Kuwait in
February 1987. Tehran was directing these efforts at Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia because of their financial support of
Iraq; in this context it has to be recognized that there
was a significant difference of outlook within the GCC
states, with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia being the more
vehement supporters of the Iraqi war effort, while Oman,
the UAE, and the smaller GCC states held more ambivalent
positions and maintained contacts with Tehran.
7 The Final Communiqués, p. 30.
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More directly, Iranian missile strikes on Kuwaiti oil
facilities and ships impelled Kuwait to seek the assistance
of the super-powers to ensure freedom of navigation in the
Gulf. This widening of the conflict and the concern it
generated was reflected in the communiqué following the
November 1987 summit meeting of the Arab League held in
Amman. It is significant that on this occasion Syria joined
the other Arab states in a condemnation of intransigence in
the war; previously Secretary-General Bishara had declared
that the GCC
"does not accept the Syrian argument that confinement
of the war to Iran and Iraq does not present a serious
threat. We argue that their aid is wrong because it
prolongs the conflict and any prolongation is
dangerous. ,,8
Saudi influence in Damascus secured Syrian readiness to
criticize Iran for its refusal to accept UN Security
Council resolution 598 which called for a cease-fire
between the belligerents and a return to pre-conflict
boundaries. The Arab leaders also declared their opposition
to
"the Iranian regime's ... provocations and threats
against the Arab Gulf states, declared their
solidarity with Kuwait in confronting the Iranian
regime's aggression, and denounced the bloody criminal
acts perpetrated by the Iranians in the vicinity of
the holy mosque in Mecca".
The Arab leaders also
"affirmed ... support for Kuwait in all the measures
it has taken to protect its territories and waters and
safeguard its security and stability ... and affirmed
... total solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and its total support for the measures Saudi Arabia
8 Abdulla Y. Bishara, September 1986, Washington. In The
First Five Years, p. 102.
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has adopted to ensure a st.kitable climate for pilgrims
visiting the holy places."
Less than a month after the summit Oman announced that it
would soon re-establish diplomatic relations with Damascus,
a sign that relations between GCC states and Syria were
improving; improvement was not restricted to Syria, because
the summit cleared the way for the Arab countries to
restore diplomatic relations with Egypt, by declaring that
diplomatic relations between the member states and Egypt
was a sovereign matter to be decided by each state in
accordance with its constitution and laws. This was not
only a marked softening of attitude on the part of the Arab
League, it reflected a growth of consensus on the issue
within the GCC. Some three years previously, in September
1984, Jordan had announced its restoration of diplomatic
relations with Egypt "in recognition of Egypt's solidarity
with the struggle of the Arab people in Palestine, Iraq and
Lebanon." This was widely welcomed in the West, and
especially in the United States; the majority of the
members of the Arab League, however, criticized Jordan for
the unilateral nature of its decision, though initially no
Gulf state condemned the move. Following a telephone
conversation between King Fand and King Hussein, a Saudi
spokesman expressed disapproval of unilateral action, a
disapproval voiced later by the UAE and Kuwait, though
Kuwait also praised President Mubarak and his policies "in
the field of Arab action". Oman, however, applauded the
Jordanian move as "reinforcing Arab solidarity"; it
certainly reinforced solidarity between Jordan and Oman
9 Jordan Times, 12-13 November 1987.
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because Oman had never broken its diplomatic links with
Egypt. 10 In 1987, however, relations with Cairo were
particularly important because Egypt could serve as a
counter-weight to increased Iranian power in the Gulf.
Within a week of the summit meeting Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had all restored formal ties with
Egypt.
The 8th meeting of the Supreme Council in Riyadh in
December 1987 marked an apparent change of attitude towards
the war. Departing from its past efforts of sending
emissaries to Baghdad and Tehran, it opted instead to
stress its support of the initiatives taken by the United
Nations, and in particular Security Council resolution 598.
It was noted that Iraq agreed to implement this resolution
without reservation, while it was also noted with regret
the attempt of Iran to procrastinate vis a vis its
acceptance. A marked stiffening of tone towards Iran was to
be noted, the Council expressing its hope that it would
adopt a stand in response to the will of the international
community and accept the call of the Islamic community to
end the war, to make peace, to stop the bloodshed, and to
save its energies to confront the enemies of the Islamic
community. Attention was also focused on
"the events which occurred in Holy Makkah and the
sedition which the Iranians stirred up in the
precincts of the Holy House of God. The Council also
considered the rocket bombardment and Iranian
aggression aimed at the security and stability of
Kuwait; the Iranian aggression against the embassies
of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Tehran;
the bombardment of oil tankers and commercial vessels
proceeding to and from the sea-ports of the Council
10 Keesings 1985, p. 33370
124
states in the waters of the Gulf; and the implications
of these aggressions in respect of violations of
internatival law and the charter of the United
Nations.H-Li
The 8th Supreme Council meeting was notable for the
presence of a number of Egyptian officials. In its
immediate aftermath a high profile visit of the Egyptian
president, Hosni Mubarak, to each of the GCC states
confirmed the new level of GCC/Egyptian relations.
In the final analysis, the activity employed by the
GCC to effect a political settlement to the war is
difficult of evaluation. Its efforts at collective
diplomacy utilized both disapprobation and dialogue, a two-
fold characteristic which in part reflected the
vicissitudes of the fighting: the GCC states blew hot and
cold depending on the perceived current threat of the war
to their interests. Their behaviour also reflected a degree
of convergence of interest between the GCC states and Iran
on a number of issues, including opposition to super-power
military intervention in the Gulf, anti-Communism, a basic
distrust of Iraq, and certain mutual economic benefits,
particularly between Dubai and Sharjah on the one hand and
Iran on the other. The war was to peter out in the summer
of 1988 following the virtual exhaustion of both
combatants. But if the diplomatic demarches of the GCC
states are difficult to evaluate, they demonstrated that
the Council was capable of reaching a consensus on the
interests of its member states, both with regard to the
belligerents and to various international organizations.
The GCC engaged in direct mediation efforts on behalf of
11 The Final Communiqués, p. 42.
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all its six members, it advanced commonly determined
diplomatic initiatives at the United Nations, within the
Arab League, the OIC, and the non-aligned movement and it
fashioned and carried out a corollary campaign to secure
action on the part of a number of important third party
states.
All the above were carried out against the background
of a political problem of a variable intensity but
seemingly permanent nature: the Arab-Israeli dispute. From
the inception of the Gulf Cooperation Council the linkage
between stability in the Gulf and the realization of peace
in the Middle East has been stressed by the Supreme Council
and declared to necessitate a just solution to the
Palestinian cause, including the obtaining of the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to return to
their homeland and establish an independent state, as well
as Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab land, and in
particular from East Jerusalem. The large number of
Palestinians within GCC countries was and remains a
permanent reminder of the Arab-Israel issue, but the
explicit mention by the Supreme Council of the link between
Gulf security and Middle East security was a consequence of
the wide-spread perception that such Israeli political and
military activity as the '81 attack on the Iraqi Osirak
reactor, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, overflights of GCC
states and the bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunisia
represented a major threat to the stability of the area. At
the November 1981 meeting of the Supreme Council the eight
points that had been advanced by the then Crown Prince Fand
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the previous August were commended by the heads of state;
the so-called Fand plan was a variant of the "territory for
peace" precept of the critical UN Security Council
resolution 242 that was adopted after the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war and in effect would provide for the establishment of a
Palestinian state on the Israeli-occupied West Bank with
its capital in East Jerusalem. All forms of religious
worship and access to religious sites in Jerusalem would be
guaranteed. In exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied territories and the dismantling of the Israeli
settlements built there, a regime guaranteed by the UN
Security Council (or certain members of the Security
Council) would be imposed such that "all countries of the
region can live in peace". The plan was notable for its
conciliatory tone, particularly the language pertaining to
the right of regional states to exist peacefully. The
reference in the plan to guarantees by certain members of
the UN Security Council also provided the means by which
the Soviet Union could be excluded from the process. The
plan reflected not only the attitude of Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf states, but those of many other Arab states; it
was in fact an alternative to the 1979 Camp David accords,
which had already stalled, primarily over the matter of
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations over Palestinian self-
determination.
The response of the Reagan administration was
ambiguous, but wide-spread interest in the Fand plan was
expressed in several European capitals and the GCC leaders
agreed to submit the proposals to the next meeting of the
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Arab League. The huge gap, however, between the political
stances of various radical Arab states, notably Iraq and
Syria, and the more conservative monarchies could not be
bridged and the proposal was shelved, but not for long. The
1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and United States direct
military involvement alongside other peace-keeping forces,
and the suggestion in September 1982 by President Reagan of
new proposals for a Middle East peace, impelled the Arab
League to re-examine its willingness to advance a series of
points of its own. The result was the unanimous adoption of
eight points at the conclusion of the 12th Arab League
meeting in Fez on 9 September 1982, points that were
extremely similar to these contained in the earlier Fand
proposal. The Fez points did not include reference to
territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war; rather the
plan required the withdrawal by Israel from Arab
territories including East Jerusalem, the West Bank and
Gaza Strip being mentioned in connection with a transition
period. More positively the Fez plan was explicit with
regard to the PLO as the sole representative of the
Palestinians. The entire UN Security Council was to
guarantee implementation of its provisions, primarily
because the prevailing links between some of the Arab
states and Moscow forced a consensus that the Soviet Union,
as one of the five permanent members of Security Council,
could not be excluded.
In the event neither the Fand plan nor the Fez points
produced any satisfactory result; nevertheless the Fand
initiative sparked a process separate and distinct from the
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Camp David approach. If only for a short period, the GCC
states accomplished what they set out to do, as defined in
their second regular session, namely the objective of
formulating a unified Arab stance on the Palestinian case.
The readiness of Saudi Arabia implicitly to permit the
Soviet Union a voice in the implementation of the UN-
sponsored peace plan indicated a clear manifestation of the
GCC's commitment to promoting unity among ideologically
diverse Arab states. Further attempts to promote unity
occurred in response to the prolonged and intense inter-
Palestinian hostilities in Lebanon that arose during 1982.
In autumn 1983 a GCC mission to Syria composed of Kuwaiti
deputy premier and foreign affairs minister, Sheikh Saba
Al-Saba, and the Qatari minister of state for foreign
affairs, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Thani, met senior Palestinian and
Syrian officials to discuss resolving the conflict through
peaceful means. The Doha meeting of the Supreme Council in
November 1983 expressed the hope that all the parties
concerned would observe a cease-fire, but stressed in
categorical terms its support of the PLO as the only
representative of the Palestinians. Together with other
diplomatic developments, the GCC initiative undoubtedly
assisted in the imposition of a cease-fire and ultimately
in the conclusion of the mid-July 1984 Algiers agreement
between the rival Palestinian elements. Shortly before the
Doha meeting the Council of Ministers of the GCC had
discussed the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
and resolved that the GCC would sever political, economic
and all other ties with any state which resumed diplomatic
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relations with Israel. While such assertions were
essentially symbolic, they indicated that the GCC member
states could effectively amalgamate their respective
national interests through the collective mechanism of the
GCC with the intention of advancing proposals and exerting
diplomatic and financial influence on third party states as
well as remedying inter-Arab conflicts.
High on the agenda of such attempts to remedy inter-
Arab conflicts were relations between certain members of
the Cooperation Council itself. In the decade following the
withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf and the birth of
the GCC many disputes between the Gulf Arab states had been
settled, but a number of others remained. Two of these were
between Bahrain and Qatar: one concerned Zubarah - the
Bahraini ruling family claimed a piece of land on the
northern coast of the peninsula of Qatar, a claim based in
part on the fact that the area had been the ancestral home
of the Khalifa family before their conquest of Bahrain in
1783; the other concerned the claim of Qatar to Hawar
island - an island ruled by Bahrain, but contested by Qatar
on the grounds that it is close to the Qatar peninsula.
Saudi Arabia was requested by the Council of Ministers to
offer its good offices to resolve the dispute, which
resulted in Bahrain and Qatar committing themselves to
freeze the situation and not to cause any further
escalation in the dispute. Saudi Arabia in the person of
King Fand was instrumental in the ending of a further
crisis which occurred in April 1986 concerning a reclaimed
coral reef, Fasht Al-Dibal, located between Bahrain and the
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mainland of Qatar. Qatari forces occupied the island and
arrested 30 people who were engaged on a contract to build
what was described as a coast-guard station. The situation
was confused: according to the Middle East Economic Digest
the station was
"being built with GCC appvqval and with GCC money,
including some from Qatar".-L4
The GCC, led by Saudi Arabia, arrested the escalation of
the dispute within a month of the eruption of the crisis.
In both these instances, it is to be noted that the GCC
rulers chose not to be restricted by the terms of the
charter which provided for the Supreme Council to transform
itself into a commission for the settlement of disputes
(article 10); no reasons for this were ever advanced, but
it is not unreasonable to speculate that Saudi Arabia was
designated as arbiter because of its prestige as the most
powerful member as well as one enjoying influence as
"guardian of the holy shrines". Given the perceived threat
of the spread of the Iran-Iraq war, once again the two
neighbouring states seemed able to de-escalate both old and
new disputes. While to Western eyes a storm in a teacup,
the significance of the Fasht Al-Dibal dispute clearly was
tied up with long-standing family rivalries within the
Gulf; the outspoken Sharjah newspaper, Al-Khalij, reported
that diplomatic sources within the Gulf believed that the
dispute could threaten the very existence of the GCC. 13
 The
most significant dispute on the Arabian peninsula, however,
was between a member and a non-member of the Gulf
12 MEED, 3 May 1986, P. 23.
13 Al-Khalij (Sharjah), 20 May 1986.
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Cooperation Council: this was the long-time conflict
between Oman and South Yemen, at the core of which was
South Yemeni support for a group known as the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG),
founded partly with the aid of George Habash, the leader of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
The Popular Front waged a war against the regime of Sultan
Qaboos with material and moral support not only of South
Yemen, but also of the Soviet Union, East Germany and Cuba.
On the other hand, Jordanian, Pakistani, British and
especially Iranian forces helped the Omanis, who finally
crushed the armed rebellion in Dhofar by 1975. The fact
was, however, that as long as South Yemen provided a
sanctuary for rebels within its territory, the threat of a
resumption of guerilla warfare continued. Even in the
absence of conflict, hostility smouldered, each country
refusing to accord the other diplomatic recognition. Kuwait
and the UAE as early as 1982 attempted mediation when
several meetings with experts were held in the presence of
delegations from South Yemen and Oman. An agreement was
finally signed in October for a settlement of the long-
standing conflict. The GCC mediation resulted in the
parties' commitment to exchange ambassadors, to refrain
from interfering in each other's internal affairs, and to
negotiate on the future of military facilities for foreign
powers)-4 The durability of the rapprochement between Oman
and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, to give
South Yemen its official name, was called into question
14 Middle East, December 1982.
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after the coup against President All Nasr Muhammad in
January 1986. When the foreign minister of the new regime
visited the GCC countries in March, Oman was conspicuously
absent from the itinerary. The South Yemeni foreign
minister carried messages from the new leader, Haydar Abu
Bakr Al-Attas, to the other five rulers dealing with
bilateral relations, local Arab and other international
issues. The principles of peaceful coexistence from which
the foreign minister said that his discussion with GCC
leaders proceeded, were identical with those that were
announced at the time when South Yemen's Supreme People's
Council approved the original agreement with Oman. This
agreement in fact was reaffirmed at the end of a visit of
the Omani foreign minister himself to South Yemen in June
1986. Once again it seemed that the GCC had been able to
bring pressure to bear upon one of its own members to be
conciliatory in regard to a new regime taking power in what
had been a long-standing opposition state.
The range of GCC political attitudes regarding
relations with the super-powers, as has been seen, ranged
on the one hand from Kuwait being the only GCC state at the
inception of the Council to have formal diplomatic ties
with the Soviet Union, while Oman on the other hand had
strong relations with the United States, including
agreements for United States' use of Omani facilities under
certain predetermined conditions. The GCC states, however,
have all reiterated their desire to exclude direct
involvement by the super-powers in the affairs of the Gulf.
This said the requirements of national military development
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had necessarily meant some degree of participation by
foreign powers, in particular the United States and
European states, together with a more limited intervention
of the Soviet Union in the provision of military supplies
to Kuwait, which has made complete non-alignment with the
super-powers a theoretical rather than a practical
objective. The economic linkage between the United Sates,
Europe and the Gulf requires very little emphasis. This
said, this linkage has encountered a number of formidable
obstacles since the inception of the GCC. To quote
Secretary-General Bishara; in his discussion about super-
power rivalry in September 1982, he declared that United
States policy
"suffers from a congenital defect that separates the
Gulf from the main Arab concern with the conflict with
Israel, President Eisenhower set the fashion of
failure, when he - in 1958 - issued his doctrine, to
convince the Arabs that international communism was
more a threat to them than Zionism: the doctrine
failed. President Carter in the heat of the American
dispute with Iran and with the Soviets in Afghanistan
came up with his doctrine; the essence is the same as
was the case with President Eisenhower's doctrine: the
Soviets are a bigger danger than Israel. It failed
again and that will be the fate of any doctrine that
places more weight on the danger of the Soviets than
it does on the danger of Israel."15
Bishara's voice was but one of many such in the Arab world,
and to no avail. Since the formation of the GCC there has
been continued substantial United States military and
economic aid to Israel, an apparent shift by the Reagan
administration regarding the illegality of Israeli
settlements in the occupied West Bank and tacit United
States support of the June 1983 Israeli invasion of the
15 Abdulla Y. Bishara, 22 September 1982, New York. In The
First Five Years, p. 24
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Lebanon coupled with the conclusion of a strategic
cooperation agreement between the United States and Israel
and the decision to enter into a free trade agreement under
terms highly favourable to Israel. On top of this, add the
failure of Washington to expand its short-lived effort in
the autumn of 1982 to breathe life into the peace process
and a lack of determination by the administration to secure
congressional approval for arms sales to GCC member states,
and the balance adds up to a formidable list of reasons for
Gulf resentment of United States policy.
The Soviet Union by contrast had only limited
relations with the GCC states, principally through Kuwait,
and its only source of influence on the Arabian peninsula
consisted of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; the
commitment of the GCC states to Islam and to a free
enterprise system militated against close and long-standing
relations with the Soviets. The December 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan, however, raised a major issue in regional
defence considerations as well as a political impediment to
any improved Soviet relations with the GCC states.
Disapprobation of the Soviet invasion found its expression
initially in the meetings of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC); after the establishment of the
GCC the issue of Afghanistan continued to receive
significant attention from the members. In view of the
escalating threats posed by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
and the Iran-Iraq war, however, the GCC focus on the
continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan became somewhat
muted, if only because the notion that the Soviet Union
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would be able to use it as a springboard for expansion was
effectively being disproved. This said, when Oman and the
Soviet Union established formal diplomatic relations in
September 1985, many observers found this a source of
considerable surprise: Oman clearly had the closest
military ties with Washington and also continuing economic
and military ties with Britain. The decision to establish
diplomatic relations between Muscat and Moscow, however,
reflected the determination of Sultan Qaboos to stifle
propaganda attacks and subversive activities in Dhofar
undertaken by or with the support of the regime in Aden,
given Moscow's continuing influence in south Yemen. The
newly established Omani-Soviet ties together with
perceptions that, at a time when the outlook for Iraq in
the Iran-Iraq war was far from favourable, and that - as a
power contiguous to Iran - the Soviet Union would be able
to influence foreign policies carried out by Tehran, were
considerations that led to the formalization of diplomatic
ties between the United Arab Emirates and the Soviet Union
in November 1985.
The apparent inactivity of both super-powers in
relation to any serious attempt to bring an end to the
Iran-Iraq war was a source of political frustration for the
Gulf states, who appreciated that both the United States
and the Soviet Union were actually engaged in selling
weaponry to both belligerents. In September 1986 Secretary-
General Bishara visited Washington to hold extensive
discussions with American officials. The overt American
decision to prevent through its Operation Staunch arms
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sales to either combatant was nullified, along with any
impact the policy may have had, when revelations were made
in the fall of 1986 regarding the transfer of US arms to
Iran in the "arms for hostages" deal, the so-called
"Irangate" crisis. These revelations did not, however,
redound to the advantage of the Soviet Union: ironically
enough there may have been a convergence of Soviet
interests with United States' objectives in preventing the
emergence of a hegemonic power in the Gulf in either a
victorious Iran or Iraq. In addition, for Moscow there was
the consideration of the susceptibility of its substantial
Muslim populations in the South to the infectious Islamic
revolution; and finally the Soviet Union had to balance its
long-established links with Baghdad with potential benefits
in relations with Tehran once hostilities finally came to
an end.
Notwithstanding the earlier stated desire to maintain
the Gulf immune from super-power penetration, the
intensification of attacks on Gulf shipping at the end of
1986 prompted Kuwait to approach both Washington and Moscow
with a proposal to reflag Kuwaiti tankers. The response
from Moscow was swift: the mechanics of the reflagging
process were set into motion soon after the proposal was
advanced. In the United States by contrast there was little
reaction to the proposal during the extended policy
paralysis of the "Iran-Contra" hearings. In the end the
Reagan administration decided to engage in both a
reflagging and military escorting policy to prevent the
Soviet Union from making diplomatic and military gains in
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the region. By the end of 1987 the United States naval-
escorted and reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and growing Iranian
militancy in the Gulf were at the centre of an intense
policy debate in the United States. This said, the
reflagging affair and the heightened presence of the super-
powers in the region did not bring about a fundamental
shift in the GCC political programme; with the termination
of hostilities in the Gulf to say nothing about the intense
preoccupations in 1989 of the Soviet Union and the United
States with developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union itself, the possibility of super-power competition in
the Gulf appears to have receded beyond what can reasonably
be expected to pose a threat over the next few years.
To conclude, the GCC can be said to have maintained
political stability in the vortex of conflicting political
and strategic interests in the Arab Gulf. The wide range of
diplomatic activity carried out since its inception by the
GCC itself and by its individual members shows that the
Gulf Cooperation Council has been a catalyst for close
political consultation between the member states and the
avenue through which a number of important diplomatic
initiatives have been taken. But it is also true that the
GCC has not by any means replaced the individual foreign
policies of the member states, but rather has served as the
vehicle for the implementation of consensus policies among
them. It is therefore apparent that while cooperation in
the GCC framework is an established fact, the Council
remains a cooperation council which, if approached from the
angle of integration theory, appears to fit neatly into the
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framework of the pluralistic security community as
postulated by Deutsch and his associates. Perhaps the best
illustration of this is the Fasht Al-Dibal dispute.
Insignificant as was the coral reef in question, and
notwithstanding the puny size of both contenders compared
to the designated arbiter, both Bahrain and Qatar refused
to accept the judgment of fellow-members of the Council,
but rather agreed to refer the case ultimately to the
International Court of Justice, meanwhile pledging to take
no action to force a unilateral settlement. Trivial as the
issue appeared, Al-Khalij was correct in saying that it
could have prejudiced the very existence of the GCC; had
their partners not recognized and respected the autonomy of
their weaker brethren, the Council could not have continued
in accordance with its own charter. The fact that it did
not collapse is not a reflection of the triviality of the
conflict at issue, but rather of the importance of the
maintenance of sovereignty within a community of states
which form a security community both in Deutsch's sense of
states which have renounced violence between themselves,
but are also collectively concerned about both internal and
external security.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
At the beginning of this study attention was given to
various theories of integration; it was suggested that
integration theory itself is not wholly integrated,
consisting as it does of various tentative hypotheses
operating at different levels of analysis. It was also
concluded that varied as these theories might be, it was
possible to identify generally accepted factors or
conditions held to promote the process of integration.
These include political factors, for while economic,
technological, and indeed cultural pressures may bring
about political change, the change has to be initiated by
those who act in the name of the state. These are the
elites. Political elites shape demand and support or they
mobilize denial and rejection, and they influence the
general public through their high dominance of the media.
General acceptance of the importance of the political
factor does not undervalue the economic and social
pressures in favour of integration; these may well induce
the political elites to accept the need for economic and
social functions to be carried out by institutions larger
than those of the individual states. Further it was
recognized that political integration among states might
well be provoked by external influence such as apparent
political, military, or economic threat; the desire for
security is a powerful stimulant to integration. And
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finally, cultural homogeneity, the similarity of linguistic
and ethnic background is considered a major factor to
encourage integration.
What then of the Gulf Cooperation Council? The choice
of title - a Gulf cooperation council - was deliberate, for
the Council was created primarily as a vehicle for
cooperation amongst the six Gulf Arab states in the face of
what were perceived at the beginning of the decade of the
eighties as threats to their existence. The major threat
perceived was that of the contagion of Islamic
revolutionary fundamentalism. The GCC states, in the
pronunciations of the Council of Ministers and in the
communiqués of the Supreme Council, took care never to
present their grouping as an alliance against Iran: they
perceived a threat larger than Iranian expansionism. What
they feared most were the tremors of the Islamic revolution
amongst their own people and within their own society,
particularly because of the presumed susceptibility of
their own Shi'ite inhabitants to the Islamic revolutionary
movement. It is true that at the foundation of the GCC the
Arab leaders said that their states would cooperate in "all
fields, especially in the economic and social domains", and
this has led some observers, particularly those with
memories of the emergence of the European Community from
the original European Coal and Steel Community and the
European Economic Community, to conclude that the founding
fathers of the GCC intended to create an economic community
which subsequently developed security aspects.
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This view is essentially superficial. The GCC was
created primarily as a vehicle for cooperation, with the
overriding purpose of preserving the existing political
structure of the Gulf in the face of the revolutionary
Islamic fundamentalist movement sweeping across the region.
The reference of the GCC leaders to cooperation especially
in the economic and social domains was a statement of the
means that they preferred to utilize at the inception of
the GCC to achieve this objective, the objective of
security. At the time they believed that they could
accomplish this by pooling the enormous economic resources
of the world's richest oil-producing states. Social and
economic cooperation was essential because it was social
and economic malaise induced by the Shah's rdgime which had
brought about its collapse. The heads of the Gulf states
looked to social and economic means to achieve their
primary objective, security. Subsequently, of course,
internal security, starting with the Bahraini plot, and
external security, starting with the first successful
Iranian offensive in September 1981, impelled the Gulf
leaders to emphasize diplomatic and indeed military means,
rather than economic ones, but this was a shift in means
and not of purpose. To quote Secretary-General Bishara:
"The GCC's charter was signed on 25th May 1981 ...
about 8 months earlier in September 1980 the Iran-Iraq
war erupted, and the shadows of instability loomed
large in the region. Despite this, GCC heads of state
opted for economic integration rather than military
cooperation to achieve regional stability. Only two
weeks after the signing of the GCC's charter, ttle
Council's unified economic agreement was announced."'
1 Abdulla Y. Bishara, 1 December 1983, London. In The First
Five Years, p. 29.
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In the pursuit of stability, the GCC states elaborated
policies to combat subversion and terrorism and to deter
the spread of the Iran-Iraq war. They sought to integrate
their economies and to coordinate their diplomacy. The
efforts of the GCC states to contain the spread of the war
by diplomatic and military means were related to their
overriding desire to counter the contagion of the Islamic
revolutionary fundamentalism. It was not that they did not
wish to see the war spread to their territories; this went
literally without saying. What they feared most was an
unconditional victory by Iran. They feared that, were Iraq
to be defeated, the Iranian forces would press on to
greater victories in exporting their revolution. The
opportunity for revenge would have been too great for the
Iranians to resist, particularly as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
had repeatedly failed to heed Iran's warnings to stop
assisting Iraq financially and logistically. An
unconditional Iraqi victory would provoke different
considerations; as the most populous Arab state of the
Gulf a victorious Iraq could have revived its old Ba'athist
dream of establishing Iraqi hegemony over the Gulf
countries in the name of the Arab nation. But despite their
ambivalent attitude towards Iraq, the GCC leaders feared
the perceived threat of the Islamic revolution after an
unconditional victory more than any potential Iraqi
subversion after an Iraqi victory.
We have seen that in pursuit of stability the GCC
states mediated on such problems as the conflict between
Oman and South Yemen; their mediation of October 1982 seems
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to have survived the shock of the coup in South Yemen in
January 1986. Reference has also been given to the
solution, in the sense of the freezing, of disputes between
Bahrain and Qatar. It was the protracted conflict between
Iraq and Iran that preoccupied the GCC leaders both in
public and behind the scenes, directly and indirectly
through international and regional organizations, and both
as supporters of Iraq and as mediators between the two
belligerents. Their various demarches followed the ebb and
flow of the war itself, as did their efforts to strengthen
their own military forces. Saudi Arabia had been
modernizing its armed forces with the help of the United
States for decades before the formation of the GCC. Its
military build-up was greatly intensified after the Iranian
revolution and the outbreak of the war itself. The threat
of the spread of war helped promote the idea of an
integrated air defence system; it helped the creation of
the GCC rapid deployment force, however symbolic this might
in fact on examination appear; it led to the holding of two
multi-lateral Peninsula Shield exercises and a number of
bilateral joint military manoeuvres. Given the nature of
their economic endowments, cooperation in the economic
field was a necessity. Yet the details of cooperation in
some instances reflected the progress of the war. It goes
without saying that the GCC states were concerned with the
depletion of their finite oil resources and the collapse in
oil prices, but such projects as the construction of a
joint oil refinery in Oman, to be serviced by an oil
pipeline, proposals which were finally shelved because of
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the collapse of oil revenues, were clearly influenced by
the threat of the spread of war. In regard to internal
security, most aborted, attempted, or indeed completed acts
of terrorism were blamed on Iran; the security agreements
signed by Saudi Arabia with all its junior partners except
Kuwait, and the draft multi-lateral agreement for internal
security were all intended to preserve the six states
against internal convulsion. So were all the exchanges of
equipment for riot control, intelligence information and
training, as well as all the restrictions imposed on visas,
travel, and publication, to say nothing of the forced
repatriation of non-indigenous populations.
Now that the war is over a major destabilising factor
has been removed from the Gulf security equation. The
cessation of the war, without a clear victory on either
side, in fact was an outcome which could hardly have been
more welcome to the GCC leaders, but there still remains
the spectre of Iranian fundamentalism and the possible
export of the Islamic revolution. The response of Saudi
Arabia to the publication of the Satanic Verses by Salman
Rushdie is in marked contrast to the bloodthirsty vehemence
of Iran. Given the size of the Shi'ite population in the
eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and the fact that the
majority of the Bahraini population is in fact Shi'ite, it
is reasonable to conclude that cooperation for security
will remain as a bond maintaining the Gulf Cooperation
Council.
With stability in oil prices albeit at a lower level
than the heydays of the 1970's, is cooperation for security
145
likely to be supplemented by such other objectives as the
creation of a true economic community with the ultimate aim
of political unity? Although the founders of the GCC spoke
of the ideal of Arab unity within the framework of the Arab
League, they did not posit political unity amongst the GCC
states as their ultimate goal as did the European Economic
Community countries in 1958. It is true that observations
of some GCC leaders and officials have led some observers
to conclude that political unity was indeed the purpose of
the Gulf Cooperation Council. Thus Secretary-General
Bishara, speaking in Bahrain at the beginning of 1982,
declared,
"The Gulf Cooperation Council came about in order to
satisfy the aspirations and the expectations of the
people of the Gulf ... the people wanted unity so as
to be able to ward off the Great Powers' rivalry in
spheres of influence. They wanted an end to state
individualism, and to be replaced by state
collectivism. ,,2
Later, at the time of the organization's second anniversary
in May 1983, he was to assert that the consensus within the
Council was for a confederal structure, a confederal
structure in which each country would retain its own
characteristics, legislative power and sovereign
attributes. At the opening of the decade of the 90's, there
has been no institutional advance from the early days of
the Council and it may be argued that GCC experience seems
to mirror that of the European Community. Just as the
movement towards political unification, forecast by some
theorists of integration in the 50's and 60's, failed to
2 Abdulla Y. Bishara, 14 January 1982, Bahrain. In The
First Five Years, p. 11.
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materialize in Western Europe, so also statements implying
political unification have proved to be more rhetorical
than analytic. But the matching interests amongst the GCC
states have not in fact changed dramatically since the
formation of the organization, notwithstanding the end of
the Iran-Iraq war. The progress of the war, and the
fluctuations in the world oil market as the war was waged,
intensified rather than diminished the constellation of
mutual interests that sparked the creation of the
organization in the first place.
More particularly, the political activities of the
Council afford us the opportunity to assess the degree of
its integration. These political activities included
diplomatic campaigns to reduce the tension between Oman and
South Yemen to a whole range of initiatives and efforts to
bring to an end the Iran-Iraq war presented at a host of
international forums, with delegations being sent to, and
received from, the belligerent states themselves. Such
steps indicate a high degree of cooperative action; they do
not, however, erode national status in favour of supra-
nationality. The same may be said in regard to the
economies of the member states. It is true that steps have
been taken to realize the ambitious blue-print of economic
integration set out in the Economic Agreement. So by 1983 a
free-trade area, with a common external tariff was in
place, and a number of important economic rights had been
extended to GCC nationals across the Council's region; a
number of common economic institutions, such as the Gulf
Investment Committee were established; the Secretariat
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engaged in negotiations with third party countries; joint
studies and programmes were also initiated, leading to the
articulation of a joint agricultural policy and a joint
industrial strategy. These, however, are only at the first
level of activity and there have been time-lags in
implementation which reflect the reluctance of the
individual states to accept a new rêgime in which their
individual interests are subject to uncertainties. In the
final analysis it can be said that at best the GCC is
moving from the state of a customs union to that of a
common market.
Not as much progress can be said to have emerged in
the development of military cooperation, mainly because no
publicly known programme for GCC military development
exists. It is true that occasional speeches have mentioned
military cooperation as a desirable goal and it is also
true that the member states have conducted a number of
bilateral and multi-lateral military exercises leading to
the establishment of a skeleton rapid deployment force. The
delicate process of reaching an agreement on internal
security has been mentioned earlier in this study; when
coupled with military cooperation it is obvious that a
great deal more would need to be done for a clear breach of
the border between national sovereignty and regional supra-
nationality.
If this so far sounds less than impressive it is
essential to remind oneself that the endurance of the GCC
is itself quite remarkable, representing as it does an
embracing cooperative framework of much longer duration
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than previous Arab experiments at unity. Indeed, if one
looks at regional international organizations outside
Western Europe, the longevity of the GCC is noteworthy. The
unity amongst the GCC states and the development of the GCC
system has been maintained against a back-drop of regional
instability and acute economic difficulty. This unity rests
on the organizational structure of the GCC, based primarily
on consensus building. The charter and the Supreme Council
rules of procedure ensure that no set of states can out-
vote other states; the emphasis is on consultation and the
development of common positions to which all the member
states can agree. There is no doubt that this formula will
continue to be a mainstay of the GCC's approach to
political, economic and indeed military matters. Its future
rests on the continued identity of political, economic, and
military interests among its member states, as well as on
the effects of a number of external elements. The
commonality of interests that has brought about the GCC has
over the years intensified. The necessity of devoting
sharply reduced national revenues to non-competing
industries and deriving maximum benefit from national
resources by definition necessitates a greater measure of
GCC cooperation; diplomatic cooperation during the course
of the Iran-Iraq war has strengthened the linkages between
the ruling elites in the states. There is no indication
that the constellation of their mutual interests has been
anything but bolstered during ten years of formidable
adversity. One advantage accruing to the GCC is the
prevalent belief at the beginning of the 1990's that the
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international oil market will strengthen; if this proves to
be the case the GCC states will be in a much better
position to engage in even greater endeavours to harmonize
their economies; they will be less costly in political
terms to the leadership, because the benefits of collective
economic planning and development have been highlighted by
the upheavals in the mid-1980's as various member states of
OPEC indulged in "beggar-my-neighbour" pricing policies.
The termination of the Iran-Iraq war with neither side
emerging supreme has lifted a massive burden, economically
and politically, from the shoulders of the Supreme Council,
and the restoration of stability to Gulf shipping forms a
direct advantage to GCC economies, to say nothing of the
savings to be accrued from the cessation of assisting
Baghdad in its war efforts.
It also needs to be recognized that the end of the
Iran-Iraq war not only leaves still outstanding problems
arising from the Iranian revolution and Islamic
fundamentalism, but also the Arab-Israeli conflict, which
has persistently been underrated in the West. Hesitancy of
the Middle Eastern peace process at the end of the 1980's,
coupled with the shrillness of Islamic fundamentalism
emanating from Iran after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini
form a powerful incentive to continue Gulf cooperation. It
is true that as far as the economic agenda is concerned the
90's are likely to see a greater scrutiny amongst the
member states of the rate of return of their economic
inputs; they can be expected to engage in careful
assessments of the extent to which the GCC is providing
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benefits in return for their participation. Together with
the natural reluctance to surrender sovereign prerogatives,
such rate-of-return assessments may well slow down the
organization's momentum. This potential effect must be
considered as understandable and indeed perhaps necessary.
The GCC remains a notable experiment in regional
international organization. It has endured during an
extended period of acute economic adversity and severe
regional instability. It clearly corresponds to what
Deutsch would describe as a pluralistic security committee,
but its practical and highly pragmatic imperatives, and its
cultural homogeneity, would seem to ensure its continuation
at least until the end of the current century. Even now the
nearest parallel to the GCC would seem to be the European
Community in the mid-1970's following the admission of
Britain. Notwithstanding the apparent opposition between
the views of President de Gaulle and successive British
prime ministers on both sides of the British political
spectrum, the Community which Britain joined and the
Community which now exists in fact reflects not a tightly
integrated political community, but rather a highly
articulated cooperative structure; given the current
developments in Eastern Europe it cannot be asserted with
any degree of confidence that it will evolve much further
by the end of the century. But the European Community is
regarded and regards itself as a modern political success;
given the fact that the GCC has survived almost the first
ten years of its existence, it can be regarded as an
equally successful venture in international political
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cooperation and as a vindication of theories of integration
and notably of the theory of the pluralistic security
community which long pre-dated its formation.
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APPENDIX A
CHARTER
The Cooperation Council
For The Arab States of the Gulf
The United Arab Emirates
The State of Bahrain
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Sultanate of Oman
The State of Qatar and
The State of Kuwait
Being fully aware of the ties of special relations, common
characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of
Islam which bind them; and
Believing in the common destiny and the unity of aim which
link their peoples; and
Desiring to effect co-ordination, 	 integration and
interconnection between them in all fields; and
Having the conviction that co-ordination, cooperation, and
integration between them serve the sublime objectives of
the Arab Nation; and,
In pursuit of the goal of strengthening cooperation and
reinforcement of the links between them; and
In an endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all
essential areas that concern their peoples and realize
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their hopes for a better future on the path to unity of
their States; and
In conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab States
which calls for the realization of closer relations and
stronger bonds; and
In order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve
Arab and Islamic causes,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE ONE
The Establishment of the Council
A Council shall be established hereby to be named The
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
hereinafter referred to as the Cooperation Council
(G.C.C.).
ARTICLE TWO
Headquarters
The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
ARTICLE THREE
Cooperation Council meetings
The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it
has its headquarters, and may convene in any member state.
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ARTICLE FOUR
Objectives
The basic Objectives of the Cooperation Council are:
1. To effect co-ordination, integration and inter-
connection between Member States in all fields in order
to achieve unity between them.
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of
cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in
various fields.
3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields
including the following:
a. Economic and financial affairs
b. Commerce, customs and communications
C. Education and culture
d. Social and health affairs
e. Information and tourism
f. Legislative and administrative affairs
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in
the fields of industry, mining, agriculture, water and
animal resources; to establish scientific research; to
establish joint ventures and encourage cooperation by
the private sector for the good of their peoples.
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ARTICLE FIVE
Council Membership
The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states
that participated in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held at
Riyadh on 4 February 1981.
ARTICLE SIX
Organizations of the Cooperation Council
The Cooperation Council shall have the following main
organizations:
1. The Supreme Council to which shall be attached the
Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
2. The Ministerial Council.
3. The Secretariat-General.
Each of these organizations may establish sub-agencies as
may be necessary.
ARTICLE SEVEN
Supreme Council
1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the
Cooperation Council and shall be formed of heads of
member states. Its presidency shall be rotatory based
on the alphabetical order of the names of the member
states.
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2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every
year. Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the
request of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the
territories of member states.
4. A Supreme Council's meeting shall be considered valid if
attended by two-thirds of the member states.
ARTICLE EIGHT
The functions of the Supreme Council
The Supreme Council shall endeavour to realize the
objectives of the Cooperation Council, particularly as
concerns the following:
1. Review matters of interest to member states.
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council
and the basic lines it should follow.
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and joint
ventures submitted by the Ministerial Council for
approval.
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General
is charged to prepare.
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and
international organizations.
6. Approve the rules of procedure of the Commission for the
Settlement of Disputes, and nominate its members.
7. Appoint the Secretary-General.
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.
9. Approve the Council's internal rules of procedure.
157
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General.
ARTICLE NINE
Voting in the Supreme Council
1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive
matters shall be carried by unanimous approval of the
member states participating in the voting, while
resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by
majority vote.
ARTICLE TEN
Commission for the Settlement of Disputes
1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called
"The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes" which
shall be attached to the Supreme Council.
2. The Supreme Council shall establish the composition of
the Commission for every case on an "ad hoc" basis in
accordance with the nature of the dispute.
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or
implementation of the Charter and such dispute is not
resolved within the Ministerial Council or the Supreme
Council, the Supreme Council may refer such dispute to
the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes.
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or
opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme Council for such
action as the Supreme Council deems appropriate.
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ARTICLE ELEVEN
Ministerial Council
1. The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the Foreign
Ministers of the member states or other delegated
Ministers. The Council presidency shall be for the
member state which presided the last ordinary session
of the Supreme Council, or if necessary, for the state
which is next to preside the Supreme Council.
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months
and may hold extraordinary sessions at the invitation
of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Ministerial Council shall determine the venue of its
next session.
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by
two-thirds of the member states.
ARTICLE TWELVE
Functions of the Ministerial Council
1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and
projects aimed at developing cooperation and co-
ordination between member states in various fields and
adopt the resolutions or recommendations required in
this regard.
2. Endeavour to encourage, develop and co-ordinate
activities existing between member states in all
fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be
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referred to the Ministerial Council for further
submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme
Council for appropriate action.
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to
formulate policies whereby the Cooperation Council's
resolutions may be put into effect.
4. Encourage means of cooperation and co-ordination between
the various private sector activities, develop existing
cooperation between the member states' Chamber of
Commerce and industry, and encourage the movement
within the G.C.C. of workers who are citizens of the
member states.
5. Refer any of the various aspects of cooperation to one
or more technical or specialized committee for study
and presentation of appropriate recommendations.
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter
and submit appropriate recommendations to the Supreme
Council.
7. Approve Rules of Procedure of both the Ministerial
Council and the Secretariat-General.
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated
by the Secretary-General, for a period of three years,
renewable.
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and
regulations relating to administrative and financial
affairs proposed by the Secretary-General, and submit
recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of
the budget of the Secretariat-General.
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10. Make recommendations for meetings of the Supreme
Council and prepare its agenda.
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
Voting in the Ministerial Council
1. Every member state shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive
matters shall be carried by unanimous vote of the
member states present and participating in the vote,
and in procedural matters by majority vote.
ARTICLE FOURTEEN
The Secretariat-General
1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a
Secretary-General who shall be assisted by assistants
and a number of staff as required.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint a Secretary-General,
who shall be a citizen of one of the Cooperation
Council states, for a period of three years which may
be renewed once only.
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the Assistant
Secretaries-General.
4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat-
General's staff from among the citizens of member
states, and may not make exceptions without the
approval of the Ministerial Council.
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5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for
the work of the Secretariat-General and the smooth flow
of work in its various organizations. He shall
represent the Cooperation Council with other parties
within the limits of the authority vested in him.
ARTICLE FIFTEEN
Functions of the Secretariat-General
The Secretariat-General shall:
1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and co-
ordination, and to integrated plans and programmes for
member states' action.
2. Prepare periodic reports on the work of the Cooperation
Council.
3. Follow up the implementation by the member states of the
resolutions and recommendations of the Supreme Council
and the Ministerial Council.
4. Prepare reports and studies requested by the Supreme
Council or Ministerial Council.
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial
regulations commensurate with the growth of the
Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities.
6. Prepare the budgets and closing accounts of the
Cooperation Council.
7. Make preparations for meetings and prepare agendas and
draft resolutions for the Ministerial Council.
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8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the
convening of an extraordinary session of the Council
when necessary.
9. Any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council
or Ministerial Council.
ARTICLE SIXTEEN
The Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretaries-General
and all the Secretariat-General's staff shall carry out
their duties in complete independence and for the joint
benefit of the member states.
They shall refrain from any action or behaviour that is
incompatible with their duties and from divulging
confidential matters relating to their appointments either
during or after their tenure of office.
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN
Privileges and Immunities
1. The Cooperation Council and its organizations shall
enjoy on the territories of all member states such
legal competence, privileges and immunities as are
required to realize their objectives and carry out
their function.
2. Representatives of the member states on the Council, and
the Council employees, shall enjoy such privileges and
immunities as are specified in agreements to be
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concluded for this purpose between the member states. A
special agreement shall organize the relation between
the Council and the state in which it has its
headquarters.
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item
2 above are prepared and put into effect, the
representatives of the member states in the Cooperation
Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic
privileges and immunities established for similar
organizations.
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
The Implementation of the Charter
1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is
signed by the Heads of State of the six member states
named in this Charter's preamble.
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia which shall act as custodian and shall
deliver a true copy thereof to every member state,
pending the establishment of the Secretariat-General,
at which time the latter shall become depository.
ARTICLE TWENTY
Amendments to the Charter
1. Any member state may request an amendment of this
Charter.
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2. Request for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the
Secretary-General who shall refer them to the member
states at least four months prior to submission to the
Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall become effective if unanimously
approved by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE
Closing Provisions
No reservations may be voiced in respect of the provisions
of this Charter.
ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO
The Secretariat-General shall arrange to deposit and
register copies of this Charter with the League of Arab
States and the United Nations, by resolution of the
Ministerial Council.
This Charter is signed on one copy in the Arabic language
at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401
corresponding to 21 May 1981.
The United Arab Emirates
The State of Bahrain
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Sultanate of Oman
The State of Qatar
The State of Kuwait
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APPENDIX B
RULES OF PROCEDURE
of the
SUPREME COUNCIL
The Cooperation Council
For The Arab States of the Gulf
ARTICLE ONE
Definitions
These regulations shall be called Rules of Procedure of the
Supreme Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council
and shall encompass the rules that govern procedures for
convening the Council and the exercise of its function.
ARTICLE TWO
Membership
1. The Supreme Council shall be composed of Heads of State
of the member states of the Cooperation Council. The
Presidency shall rotate on the basis of the
alphabetical order of the names of the member states.
2. Each member state shall notify the Secretary-General of
the names of the members of its delegation to the
Council meeting, at least seven days prior to the date
set for opening the meeting.
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ARTICLE THREE
With due regard to the objectives of the Cooperation
Council and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council as
specified in Articles 4 and 8 of the Charter, the Supreme
Council may:
1. Form technical committees and select their members from
member states' nominees who specialize in the
committees' respective fields.
2. Call upon one or more of its members to study a specific
subject and submit a report thereon to be distributed
to the members sufficiently in advance of the meeting
arranged to discuss that subject.
ARTICLE FOUR
Convening the Supreme Council
1. a. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session
every year, and may hold extraordinary sessions at
the request of any one member seconded by another
member.
b. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions at the
level of Heads of State.
c. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the
member states' territories.
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d. Prior to convening the Supreme Council, the Secretary-
General shall hold a meeting to be attended by
delegates of the member states for consultation on
matters related to the agenda of the said meeting.
2. a. The Secretary-General shall set the opening date of
the Council's session and suggest a closing date.
b. The Secretary-General shall issue the invitations for
convening a regular session no less than thirty days
in advance, and for convening an extraordinary
session, within no more than five days.
ARTICLE FIVE
1. The Supreme Council shall at the start of every session
decide whether the meetings shall be in closed or open
session.
2. A meeting shall be considered valid if attended by the
Heads of State of two-thirds of the member states. Its
resolutions in substantive matters shall be carried by
unanimous agreement of the member states present and
participating in the vote, while resolutions in
procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote.
Any member abstaining shall record that he is not bound
by the resolution.
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ARTICLE SIX
1. The Council shall hold an extraordinary session in the
event of:
a. A resolution passed in a previous session.
b. A request by a member state seconded by another
state. In this case, the Council shall convene
within no more than five days from the date of issue
of the invitation for holding the extraordinary
session.
2. No matters may be placed on the agenda for the
extraordinary session other than those which the
session was convened to discuss.
ARTICLE SEVEN
1. Presidency of the Supreme Council shall, at the opening
of each regular session, go to a Head of State by
rotation based on the alphabetical order of the member
states' names. The President shall continue to exercise
the functions of the Presidency until such functions
are entrusted to his successor at the beginning of the
next regular session.
2. The Head of State of a country which is party to a
dispute outstanding may not preside over a session or
meeting called to discuss the subject of the dispute.
In such case, the Council shall designate a temporary
president.
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3. The President shall declare the opening and closing of
sessions and meetings, the suspension of meetings, and
closures, and shall see that the Cooperation Council
Charter and these Rules of Procedure are duly complied
with. He shall give the floor to speakers based on the
order of their requests, submit suggestions for
acceptance by the membership, direct voting procedures,
give final decisions on points of order, announce
resolutions, follow up on the activities of committees,
and inform the Council of all incoming correspondence.
4. The President may take part in deliberations and submit
suggestions in the name of the state which he
represents and may, for this purpose, assign a member
of his state's delegation to act on his behalf in such
instances.
ARTICLE EIGHT
Supreme Council Agenda
1. The Ministerial Council shall prepare a draft agenda
which shall be conveyed by the Secretary-General, together
with explanatory notes and documentation, to the member
states under cover of the letter of convocation at least
thirty days before the date set for the meeting.
2. The draft agenda shall include the following:
a. A report by the Secretary-General on the activities
of the Supreme Council between the two sessions, and
actions taken to carry out its resolutions.
170
b. Reports and matters received from the Ministerial
Council and the Secretariat-General.
C. Matters which the Supreme Council had previously
decided to include on the agenda.
d. Matters suggested by a member state as being in
need of review by the Supreme Council.
3. Every member state may request inclusion of additional
items on the draft agenda provided such request is
tabled at least fifteen days prior to the date set for
opening the session. Such matters shall be listed in an
additional agenda which shall be sent, along with
relevant documentation, to the member states, at least
five days before the date set for the session.
4. Any member state may request inclusion of extra items on
the draft agenda as late as the date set for opening a
session, if such matters are considered both important
and urgent.
5. The Council shall approve its agenda at the start of
every session.
6. The Council may, during the session, add new items that
are considered urgent.
7. The ordinary session shall be adjourned after completion
of discussions of the items placed on the agenda. The
Supreme Council may decide to suspend the session's
meetings before completion of discussions on agenda
items, and resume such meetings at a later date.
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ARTICLE NINE
Office and Committees of the Supreme Council
1. The Supreme Council office shall comprise, in every
session, the Council President, the Chairman of the
Ministerial Council and the Secretary-General. The Office
shall be headed by the Supreme Council President.
2. The Office shall carry out the following functions:
a. Review the form of resolutions passed by the
Supreme Council without affecting their contents.
b. Assist the President of the Supreme Council in
directing the activities of the session in general.
c. Other tasks indicated in these Rules of Procedure
or other matters entrusted to it by the Supreme
Council.
ARTICLE TEN
1. The Council may, at the start of every session, create
any committees that it deems necessary to allow
adequate study of matters listed on the agenda.
Delegates of member states shall take part in the
activities of such committees.
2. Meetings of committees shall continue until they
complete their tasks, with due regard for the date set
for closing the session. Their resolutions shall be
carried by majority vote.
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3. Every committee shall start its work by selecting a
chairman and a reporter from among its members. The
reporter of the committee shall act for the chairman in
directing the meeting in the absence of the chairman.
The chairman, or the reporter in the chairman's
absence, shall submit to the Council all explanations
that it requests on the committee's reports. The
chairman may, with the approval of the session's
President, take part in the discussions, without
voting, so long as he is not a member of the Supreme
Council.
4. The Council may refer any of the matters included in the
agenda to the committees, based on their specialization
for study and reporting. Any one item may be referred
to more than one committee.
5. Committee may neither discuss any matter not referred to
them by the Council, nor adopt any recommendation
which, if approved by the Council, may entail a
financial obligation, before the committee receives a
report from the Secretary-General regarding the
financial and administrative results that may ensue
from adopting the resolution.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
The Process of Deliberation and Putting Forward Proposals
1. Every member state may participate in the deliberation
of the Supreme Council and its committees in the manner
provided for in these Rules of Procedure.
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2. The President shall direct discussion of the items as
presented in order on the agenda of the meeting and
may, when necessary, call upon the Secretary-General or
his representative in the meeting to provide such
clarification as he sees fit.
3. The President shall give the floor to speakers in the
order of their requests. He may give priority to the
chairman or reporter of a committee to submit a report
or explain specific points.
4. Every member may, during deliberations, raise points of
order on which the President shall pronounce
immediately and his decisions shall have effect unless
voted by a majority of the Supreme Council member
states.
ARTICLE TWELVE
1. Every member may, during the discussion of any subject,
request suspension or adjournment of the meeting or
discussion of the subject, or closure. Such requests
may not be discussed but the President shall put them
to the vote, if duly seconded, and decision shall be by
majority of the member states.
2. With due regard to provisions of item 4 of the preceding
Article, suggestions indicated in item 1 of this
Article shall be given priority over all others based
on the following order:
174
a- Suspension of the meeting
b- Adjournment of the meeting
c- Postponement of discussion of the matter in hand.
d- Closure of discussion of the matter in hand.
3. Apart from suggestions on formulation or procedural
matters, draft resolutions and substantive amendments
shall be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General
or his representative who shall distribute them as soon
as possible to the delegations. No draft resolution may
be submitted for discussion or voting before the text
thereof is distributed to all the delegations.
4. A proposal on which a decision has been taken may not be
reconsidered in the same session unless the Council
decides otherwise.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
The President shall follow up on the activities of the
committees, inform the Supreme Council of correspondence
received, and formally announce before members all the
resolutions and recommendations arrived at.
ARTICLE FOURTEEN
Voting
Every member state shall have one vote and no state may
represent another state or vote on its behalf.
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ARTICLE FIFTEEN
1. Voting shall be by calling the names in alphabetical
order of the states' names, or by raising hands. Voting
shall be secret if so requested by a member or by
decision of the President.
The Supreme Council may decide otherwise. The vote of
every member shall be documented in the minutes of the
meeting if voting is effected by calling the names. The
minutes shall indicate the results of the voting, if
the vote is secret or by show of hands.
2. A member may abstain from a vote or express reservations
over a procedural matter or part thereof, in which case
the reservation shall be read at the time the
resolution is announced and shall be duly documented in
writing. Members may present explanations about their
stand in the voting after voting is completed.
3. Once the President announces that the voting has
started, no interruption may be made unless the matter
related to a point of order relevant to the vote.
ARTICLE SIXTEEN
1. If a member request amendment of a proposal, voting on
the amendment shall be carried out first. If there is
more than one amendment, voting shall first be made on
the amendment which in the President's opinion is
farthest from the original proposal, then on the next
farthest, and so on until voting is completed on all
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proposed amendments. If one or more such amendments is
passed, then voting shall be made on the original
proposal as amended.
2. Any new proposal shall be deemed to be an amendment to
the original proposal if it merely entails an addition
to, omission or change to a part of the original
proposal.
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN
1. The Supreme Council may create such technical committees
charged with giving advice on the design and
implementation of Supreme Council programmes in
specific fields.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the members of the
technical committees from specialists who are citizens
of the member states.
3. The technical committees shall meet at the invitation of
the Secretary-General and shall draw up their work
plans in consultation with him.
4. The Secretary-General shall prepare the agenda of the
committees after consultation with the chairman of the
committee concerned.
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
Amendment of the Rules of Procedure
1. Any member state may propose amendments to the Rules of
Procedure.
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2. No proposed amendments may be considered unless the
relevant proposal has been circulated to member states by
the Secretariat-General at least thirty days prior to
submission to the Ministerial Council.
3. No basic changes may be introduced to the proposed
amendment mentioned in the preceding paragraph unless the
text of such proposed changes has been circulated to the
member states by the Secretariat-General at least fifteen
days before submission to the Ministerial Council.
4. Except for items based on the provision of the Charter,
and with due regard to the provisions of preceding
paragraphs these Rules of Procedure shall be amended by a
resolution of the Supreme Council approved by a majority of
the members.
ARTICLE NINETEEN
Effective Date
These Rules of Procedure shall go into effect as of the
date of approval by the Supreme Council and may not be
amended except in accordance with procedures set forth in
the preceding Article.
These Rules of Procedure are signed at Abu Dhabi City,
United Arab Emirates on 21 Rahab 1401 AH Corresponding to
25 May 1981 AD.
The United Arab Emirates
The State of Bahrain
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Sultanate of Oman
The State of Qatar
The State of Kuwait
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APPENDIX C
RULES OF PROCEDURE
of the
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL
The Cooperation Council
For The Arab States of the Gulf
ARTICLE ONE
1. These regulations shall be called Rules of Procedure of
the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council and shall encompass rules governing
meetings of the Council and the exercise of its
functions.
2. The following terms as used herein shall have the
meanings indicated opposite each:
Cooperation Council :	 The Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council
Charter
	
:	 Statute establishing the
Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council
Supreme Council	 :	 The highest body of the
Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council
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Council	 :	 Ministerial Council of the
Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council
Secretary-General	 The Secretary-General of the
Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council
Chairman	 :	 The Chairman of the
Ministerial Council of the
Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council
ARTICLE TWO
States Representation
1. The Ministerial Council shall be composed of the member
states' Foreign Ministers or other delegated Ministers.
2. Every member state shall, at least one week prior to the
convening of every ordinary session of the Ministerial
Council convey to the Secretary-General a list of the
names of the members of its delegation. For
extraordinary session, the list shall be submitted
three days before the date set for the session.
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ARTICLE THREE
Convening the Sessions
1. The Ministerial Council shall decide in every meeting
the venue of its next regular session.
2. The Secretary-General shall decide, in consultation with
the member states, the venue of extraordinary sessions.
3. If circumstances should arise that preclude the
convening of an ordinary or extraordinary session at
the place set for it, the Secretary-General shall so
inform the member states and shall set another place
for the meeting after consultation with them.
ARTICLE FOUR
Ordinary Sessions
1. The Council shall convene in ordinary session once every
three months.
2. The Secretary-General shall set the date for opening the
session and suggest the date of its closing.
3. The Secretary-General shall address the invitation to
attend a Council ordinary session at least fifteen days
in advance, and shall indicate therin the date and
place set for the meeting, as well as attaching thereto
the agenda of the session, explanatory notes and other
documentation.
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ARTICLE FIVE
Extraordinary Sessions
1. The Council shall hold an extraordinary session at the
request of any a member state seconded by another
member.
2. The Secretary-General shall address the invitation to
the Council's extraordinary session and attach a
memorandum containing the request of the member state
which has requested the meeting.
3. The Secretary-General shall specify in the invitation
the place, date and agenda of the session.
ARTICLE SIX
1. The Council may itself decide to hold extraordinary
sessions, in which case it shall specify the agenda, time
and place of the session.
2. The Secretary-General shall send out to the member
states the invitation to attend the extraordinary meeting
of the Council along with a memorandum containing the
resolution of the Council to this effect, and specifying
the date and agenda of the session.
3. The extraordinary session shall be convened within a
maximum of five days from the date of issue of the
invitation.
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ARTICLE SEVEN
No matters, other than those which the session was called,
may be placed on the agenda.
ARTICLE EIGHT
Agenda
The Secretary-General shall prepare a draft agenda for a
Council's ordinary session and such draft shall include the
following:
1. The report by the Secretary-General on the work of the
Cooperation Council.
2. Matters referred to him by the Supreme Council.
3. Matters which the Supreme Council had previously decided
to include on the agenda.
4. Matters which the Secretary-General believes should be
reviewed by the Council.
5. Matters suggested by a member state.
ARTICLE NINE
Member states shall convey to the Secretary-General their
suggestions on matters they wish to include on the
Council's agenda at least thirty days prior to the date of
the Council's ordinary session.
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ARTICLE TEN
Member states or the Secretary-General may request the
inclusion of additional items on the Council's draft agenda
at least ten days prior to the date set for opening an
ordinary session. Such items shall be listed on an
additional schedule which shall be conveyed along with
relevant documentation to the member states at least five
days prior to the date of the session.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
Member states or the Secretary-General may request
inclusion of additional items on the agenda for the
Council's ordinary session up to the date set for opening
the session if such matters are both imnportant and urgent.
ARTICLE TWELVE
The Council shall approve its agenda at the beginning of
every session.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
A Council's ordinary session shall end upon completion of
discussion of matters listed on the agenda. The Council
may, when necessary, decide to suspend its meetings
temporarily before discussion of agenda items is completed
and resume its meetings at a later date.
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ARTICLE FOURTEEN
The Council may defer discussion of certain items on its
agenda and decide to include them with the others, when
necessary, on the agenda of a subsequent session.
ARTICLE FIFTEEN
Chairmanship of the Council
1. Chairmanship of the Council shall be entrusted to the
member state which presided the last ordinary session
of the Supreme Council, or, if necessary, to the state
which is next to preside the Supreme Council.
2. The Chairman shall exercise his functions until he
passes his post on to his successor.
3. The Chairman shall also preside over extraordinary
sessions.
4. The representative of a state that is party to an
outstanding dispute may not chair the session or
meeting assigned for discussing such dispute, in which
case the Council shall name a temporary Chairman.
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ARTICLE SIXTEEN
1. The Chairman shall announce the opening and closing of
sessions and meetings, the suspension of meetings and
closure of discussions, and shall ensure respect for
the provisions of the Charter and these Rules of
Procedure.
2. The Chairman may participate in the Council's
deliberations and vote in the name of the state he
represents. He may, for such purpose, delegate another
member of his delegation to act on his behalf.
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN
Office of the Council
1. The Office of the Council shall include the Chairman,
Secretary-General, and heads of working sub-committees
which the Council has resolved to set up.
2. The Chairman of the Council shall preside over the
Office.
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
The Office shall carry out the following tasks:
1. Assist the Chairman to direct the proceedings of the
Session.
2. Co-ordinate the work of the Council and the sub-
committees.
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3. Supervise the drafting of the resolutions passed by the
Council.
4. Other tasks indicated in these Rules of Procedure or
entrusted to it by the Council.
ARTICLE NINETEEN
Sub-committees
1. The Council shall call upon preparatory and working
committees to assist in accomplishing its tasks.
2. The Secretariat-General shall participate in the work of
the committees.
ARTICLE TWENTY
1. The Secretary-General may, in consultation with the
Chairman of the session, form preparatory committees
charged with the study of matters listed on the agenda.
2. Preparatory committees shall be composed of delegates of
member states and may, when necessary, seek the help of
such experts as they may deem appropriate.
3. Each preparatory committee shall meet at least three
days prior to the opening of the session by invitation
of the Secretary-General. The work of the committee
shall end at the close of the session.
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ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE
1. The Council may, at the start of each session, form
working committees and charge them with specific tasks.
2. The work of the working committees shall continue until
the date set for closing the session.
ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO
1. Each sub-committee shall start its work by electing a
chairman and a reporter from among its members. When
the chairman is absent, the reporter shall act for him
in directing the meetings.
2. The chairman or reporter of each sub-committee shall
submit a report on its work to the Council.
3. The chairman or reporter of a sub-committee shall
present to the Council all explanations required
regarding the contents of the sub-committee's report.
ARTICLE TWENTY-THREE
1. The Secretariat-General shall organize the technical
secretariat and sub-committees of the Council.
2. The Secretariat-General shall prepare minutes of
meetings documenting discussions, resolutions and
recommendations. Such minutes shall be prepared for all
meetings of the Council and its sub-committees.
3. The Secretary-General shall supervise the organization
of the Council's relations with the information media.
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4. The Secretary-General shall convey the Council's
resolutions and recommendations and relevant
documentation to the member states within fifteen days
after the end of the session.
ARTICLE TWENTY-FOUR
The Council's secretariat and sub-committees shall receive
and distribute documents, reports, resolutions and
recommendations of the Council and its sub-committees and
shall draw up and distribute minutes and daily bulletins in
addition to safeguarding documents and performing other
tasks required by the Council's work.
ARTICLE TWENTY-FIVE
Texts of resolutions or recommendations made by the Council
may not be announced or published except by resolution of
the Council.
ARTICLE TWENTY-SIX
Deliberations
Every member state may take part in the deliberations of
the Council and its sub-committees in the manner
presecribed in these Rules of Procedure.
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ARTICLE TWENTY-SEVEN
1. The Chairman shall direct deliberations on matters on
hand in the order they are listed on the Council's
agenda.
2. The Chairman shall give the floor to speakers in the
order of their requests. Priority may be given to the
chairman or reporter of a particular committee to
present its report or explain certain points therein.
The floor shall be given to the Secretary-General or
his representative whenever it is necessary.
3. The Council Chairman may, during deliberations, read the
list of the names or members who have requested the
floor, and with the approval of the Council, close the
list. The only exception is exercise of the right of
reply.
ARTICLE TWENTY-EIGHT
The Council shall decide whether the meetings shall be held
in open or closed session.
ARTICLE TWENTY-NINE
1. Every member state may raise a point of order, on which
the chairman shall pronounce immediately and his
decision shall take effect unless vetoed by a majority
of the member states.
190
2. A member who raises a point of order may not go beyond
the point he has raised.
ARTICLE THIRTY
1. Every member may, during discussion of any matter,
propose the suspension or adjournment of the meeting,
or discussion of the matter on hand or closure. The
Chairman shall in such cases put the proposal to the
vote directly, if the proposal is seconded by another
member. Such proposal requires the approval of the
majority of the member states to pass.
2. With due regard to the provisions of the preceding
paragraph proposals indicated therein shall be
submitted to the vote in the folloiwng order:
a. Suspension of the meeting
b. Adjournment of the meeting
c. Postponement of discussion of the matter in hand.
d. Closure of discussion of the matter in hand.
ARTICLE THIRTY-ONE
1. Member states may suggest draft resolutions or
recommendations, or amendments thereto, and may
withdraw all such unless they are voted upon.
2. Drafts indicated in the preceding item shall be
submitted in writing to the Secretariat-General for
distribution to delegations as soon as possible.
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3. Except for proposals concerning formulation or
procedures, drafts indicated in this Article may not be
discussed or voted upon before their texts are
distributed to all delegations.
4. A proposal already decided upon may not be reconsidered
in the same session unless the Council decides
otherwise.
ARTICLE THIRTY-TWO
The Chairman shall follow up the work of the committees.
inform the Council of incoming correspondence, and formally
announce before members the resolutions and recommendations
arrived at.
ARTICLE THIRTY-FOUR
Voting
1. The Council shall pass its resolutions with the
unanimous approval of the member states present and
participating in the vote, while decisions in
procedural matters shall be passed by a majority vote.
Any member abstaining from voting shall record the fact
that he is not bound by the vote.
2. If members of the Council should disagree on the
definition of the matter being put to the vote, the
matter shall be settled by majority vote of the member
states present.
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ARTICLE THIRTY-FOUR
1. Every member state shall have one vote.
2. No member state may represent another state or vote on
its behalf.
ARTICLE THIRTY-FIVE
1. Voting shall be by order of the names in the
alphabetical order of the states' names, or by show of
hands.
2. Voting shall be by secret ballot if so requested by a
member or by decision of the Chairman. The Council,
however, may decide otherwise.
3. The vote of every member shall be recorded in the
minutes of the meeting if voting is called by names.
The minutes shall indicate the result of voting if the
vote is secret or by show of hands.
4. Member states may explain their positions after the vote
and such explanations shall be recorded in the miunutes
of the meeting.
5. Once the Chairman announces that voting has started, no
interruption may be made except for a point of order
relating to the vote or its postponement in accordance
with the provisions of this Article and the next.
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ARTICLE THIRTY-SIX
1. The Council Chairman with the help of the Secretary-
General shall endeavour to reconcile the positions of
member states on disputed matters and obtain their
agreement to a draft resolution before submitting it to
the vote.
2. The Council Chairman, the Secretary-General or any
member state may request postponement of a vote for a
specific period during which further negotiations may
take place on the item submitted to the vote.
ARTICLE THIRTY-SEVEN
1. If a member requests amendment of a proposal, voting on
the amendment shall be carried out first. If there is
more than one amendment, voting shall first be made on
the amendment which the Chairman considers to be
farthest from the original proposal, then on the next
farthest, and so on until all proposed amendments have
been voted upon. If one or more amendments have been
voted upon. If one or more amendment is passed, then
voting shall be made on the original proposal as
amended.
2. A new proposal shall be deemed to be an amendment to the
original proposal if it merely entails an addition to,
omission from, or change to a part of the original
proposal.
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ARTICLE THRITY-EIGHT
1. Any member state or the Secretary-General may propose
amending these Rules of Procedure.
2. No proposed amendment to these Rules of Procedure may be
considered unless the relevant proposal is circulated
to the member states by the Secretariat-General at
least thirty days before submission to the Council.
3. No basic changes may be introduced to the proposed
amendment mentioned in the preceding item unless the
texts of such proposed change have ben circulated to
the member states at least fifteen days prior to
submission to the Council.
4. Except for items based on provisions of the Charter, and
with due regard to preceding items, these Rules of
Procedure shall be amended by a resolution of the
Council approved by a majority of its members.
ARTICLE THIRTY-NINE
Effective date
These Rules of Procedure shall go into effect as of the
date of approval by the Council and may not be amended
except in accordance with procedures set forth in the
preceding article.
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Thus, these Rules of Procedure are signed at Abu Dhabi
City, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 AH
corresponding to 25 May 1981 AD.
The United Arab Emirates
The State of Bahrain
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Sultanate of Oman
The State of Qatar
The State of Kuwait
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APPENDIX D
RULES OF PROCEDURE
of the
COMMISSION FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
The Cooperation Council
For The Arab States of the Gulf
Preamble
In accordance with the provisions of Article Six of the
Charter of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council; and
In implementation of the Provisions of Article Ten of the
Cooperation Council Charter,
A Commission for Settlement of Disputes, hereinafter
referred to as Commission, shall be set up and its
jurisdiction and rules for its proceedings shall be as
follows:
ARTICLE ONE
Terminology
Terms used in these Rules of Procedure shall have the same
meanings as those established in the Charter of the Gulf
Arab States Cooperation Council.
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ARTICLE TWO
Location and Session of the Commission
The Commission shall have its headquarters at Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, and shall hold its meetings on the territory of the
state where its headquarters is located, but may hold its
meetings elsewhere, when necessary.
ARTICLE THREE
Jurisdiction
The Commission shall, once installed, have jurisdiction to
consider the following matters referred to it by the
Supreme Council:
a. disputes between member states.
b. Differences of opinion as to the interpretation or
implementation of the Cooperation Council Charter.
ARTICLE FOUR
Membership of the Commission
a. The Commission shall be formed of an appropriate number
of citizens of member states not involved in the
dispute. The Council shall select members of the
Commission in every case separately depending on the
nature of the dispute, provided that the number shall
be no less than three.
b. The Commission may seek the advice of such experts and
consultants as it may deem necessary.
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c. Unless the Supreme Council resolves otherwise, the
Commission's task shall end with the submission of its
recommendations or opinion to the Supreme Council
which, after the conclusion of the Commission's task,
may summon it at any time to explain or elaborate on
its recommendations or opinions.
ARTICLE FIVE
Meetings and Internal Procedures
a. A meeting of the Commission shall be valid if attended
by all members.
b. The Secretariat-General of the Cooperation Council shall
prepare procedures required to conduct the Commission's
affairs, and such procedures shall go in to effect as
of the date of approval by the Ministerial Council.
c. Each party to the dispute shall send representatives to
the Commission who shall be entitled to follow
proceedings and present their defence.
ARTICLE SIX
Chairmanship
The Commission shall select a chairman from among its
members.
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ARTICLE SEVEN
Voting
Every member of the Commission shall have one vote, and
shall issue its recommendations or opinions on matters
referred to it by a majority of the members. In the event
of an indecisive vote the party with whom the chairman has
voted shall prevail.
ARTICLE EIGHT
The Secretariat of the Commission
a. The Secretary-General shall appoint a Secretary for the
Commission, and a sufficient number of officials to
carry out the work of the Commission's Secretariat.
b. The Supreme Council may if necessary create an
independent organization to carry out the work of the
Secretariat of the Commission.
ARTICLE NINE
Recommendations & Opinions
a. The Commission shall issue its recommendations or
opinions in accordance with the Cooperation Council's
Charter, with international laws and practices, and the
principles of Islamic Shari'ah. The Commission shall
submit its findings on the case in hand to the Supreme
Council for appropriate action.
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b. The Commission may, while considering any dispute
referred to it and pending the issue of its final
recommendations thereon, ask the Supreme Council to
take interim action called for by necessity or
circumstances.
c. The Commission's recommendations or opinions shall
specify the reasons on which they were based and shall
be signed by the Chairman and the Secretary.
d. If an opinion is not passed wholly or partially by
unanimous vote of the members, the dissenting members
shall be entitled to record their dissenting opinion.
ARTICLE TEN
Immunities and Privileges
The Commission and its members shall enjoy such immunities
and privileges in the territories of the member states as
are required to realize its objectives in accordance with
Article Seventeen of the Cooperation Council Charter.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
The Budget of the Commission
The Commission's budget shall be considered part of the
Secretariat-General's budget. Remunerations of the
Commission's members shall be established by the Supreme
Council.
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ARTICLE TWELVE
Amendments
a. Any member state may request for amendments to these
Rules of Procedure.
b. Requests for amendments shall be submitted to the
Secretary-General who shall relay them to the member
states at least four months before submission to the
Ministerial Council.
c. An amendment shall be effective if approved unanimously
by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
Effective Date
These Rules of Procedure shall go into effect as of the
date of approval by the Supreme Council.
These Rules of Procedure were signed at Abu Dhabi City,
United Arab Emirates on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to
25 May 1981 AD.
The United Arab Emirates
The State of Bahrain
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Sultanate of Oman
The State of Qatar
The State of Kuwait
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APPENDIX E
THE UNIFIED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF
THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
With the help of God the Almighty;
The Governments of the Member States of the Arab Gulf
Cooperation Council;
In accordance with the Charter thereof, which calls for
closer relations and stronger links; and, desiring to
develop, extend and enhance their economic ties on solid
foundations, in the best interest of their peoples and for
the sake of working to coordinate and standardize their
economic, financial and monetary policies, as well as their
commercial and industrial legislation, and Customs
regulations have agreed as follows:
CHAPTER ONE
TRADE EXCHANGE
ARTICLE 1
a. The Member States shall permit the importation and
exportation of agricultural, animal, industrial and
natural resource products that are of national origin.
Also, they shall permit exportation thereof to other
Member States.
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b. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural
resource products that are from Member States shall
receive the same treatment as national products.
ARTICLE 2
1. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural
resource products that are of national origin shall be
exempted from reciprocal charges.
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage,
storage, transportation, freight or unloading, shall
not be considered as customs duties when they are
levied on domestic products.
ARTICLE 3
1. For products of national origin to qualify as national
manufactured products, the value added ensuing from
their production in Member States shall not be less
than 40% of their final value as at the termination of
the production phase. In addition Member States
citizens' share in the ownership of the producing plant
shall not be less than 51%.
2. Every item enjoying exemption hereby shall be
accompanied by a certificate of origin duly
authenticated by the appropriate government agency
concerned.
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ARTICLE 4
1. Member States shall establish a uniform minimum Customs
tariff applicable to the products of countries other
than G.C.C. Member States.
2. One of the objectives of the uniform Customs tariff
shall be the protection of national products from
foreign competition.
3. The uniform Customs tariff shall be implemented
gradually within five years from the date on which this
agreement becomes effective. Arrangements for its
gradual implementation shall be agreed upon within one
year from the said date.
ARTICLE 5
Member States shall grant all facilities for the transit of
any Member States's goods to other Member States, exempting
them from all duties and taxes whatsoever, without
prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 2.
ARTICLE 6
Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from
entry into the territory of a Member States by its local
regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between
the Customs authorities of the Member States.
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ARTICLE 7
Member States shall coordinate their commercial policies
and relations with other states and regional economic
groupings and blocs with a view to creating balanced trade
relations and equitable circumstances and terms of trade
therewith.
To achieve this goal, the Member States shall make the
following arrangements:
1. Coordination of import/export policies and regulations.
2. Coordination of policies for building up strategic food
stocks.
3. Conclusion of collective economic agreements in cases
where joint benefits to Member States would be realized.
4. Taking of action for the creation of collective
negotiating position vis-à-vis foreign parties in the field
of importation of basic needs and exportation of major
products.
CHAPTER TWO
THE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND INDIVIDUALS
AND THE EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
ARTICLE 8
The Member States shall agree on executive principles to
ensure that each Member State shall grant the citizens of
all other Member States the same treatment as is granted to
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its	 own citizens without
	
any	 discrimination of
differentation [sic] in the following fields:
1. Freedom of movement, work and residence.
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity.
4. Free movement of capital.
ARTICLE 9
The Member States shall encourage their respective private
sectors to establish joint ventures in order to link their
citizens' economic interests in various spheres of
activity.
CHAPTER THREE
COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT
ARTICLE 10
The Member States shall endeavour to achieve the
coordination and harmonization of their respective
development plans with a view to achieving integration in
economic affairs.
ARTICLE 11
1. The Member States shall endeavour to coordinate their
policies with regard to all aspects of the oil industry
including extraction, refining, marketing, processing,
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pricing, the exploitation of natural gas, and
development of energy sources.
2. The Member States shall endeavour to formulate united
oil policies and adopt common positions vis-à-vis the
outside world, and in international and specialized
organizations.
ARTICLE 12
The achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement, the
Member States shall
1. Coordinate industrial activities, formulate policies and
mechanisms which will lead to industrial development
and the diversification of their products on an
integrated basis.
2. Standardize their industrial legislation and regulations
and guide their local production units to meet their
needs.
3. Advocate industries between Member States according to
relative advantages and economic feasibility, and
encourage the establishment of basic as well as
ancillary industries.
ARTICLE 13
Within the framework of their coordinating activities, the
Member States shall pay special attention to the
establishment of joint ventures in the fields of industry,
agriculture and services, and shall support them with
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public, private or mixed capital in order to achieve
economic integration, productive interface, and common
development on sound economic bases.
CHAPTER FOUR
TECHNICAL COOPERATION
ARTICLE 14
The Member States shall collaborate in finding spheres for
common technical cooperation aimed at building a genuine
local base founded on encouragement and support of research
and applied sciences and technology as well as adapting
imported technology to meet the needs of the region and to
achieve the objectives of progress and development.
ARTICLE 15
Member States shall establish procedures, make arrangement
and lay down terms for the transfer of technology,
selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes
thereto as would serve their various needs. Member States
shall also, whenever feasible, conclude uniform agreements
with foreign governments and scientific or commercial
organizations to achieve these objectives.
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ARTICLE 16
Member States shall formulate policies and implement
coordinated programs for technical, vocational and
professional training and qualification at all levels and
stages. They shall also develop educational curricula at
all levels to link education and technology with the
development needs of the Member States.
ARTICLE 17
Member States shall coordinate their manpower and shall
formulate uniform and standardized criteria and
classifications for the various categories of occupations
and crafts in different sectors in order to avoid harmful
competition among themselves and to optimize the
utilization of available human resources.
CHAPTER FIVE
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION
ARTICLE 18
Member States	 shall	 accord passenger and cargo
transportation belonging to citizens of other Member
States, when transiting or entering its territory, the same
treatment they accord to the means of passenger and cargo
transportation belonging to their own citizens, including
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exemption from all duties and taxes, whatsoever. However,
local means of transportation are excluded.
ARTICLE 19
1. Member States shall cooperate in the fields of land and
sea transportation, and communications. They shall also
coordinate and establish infrastructure projects such
as seaports, airports, water and power stations and
roads, with a view to realizing joint economic
development and the linking of their economic
activities with each other.
2. The contracting states shall coordinate aviation and air
transport policies among them and promote all areas of
joint action at various levels.
ARTICLE 20
Member States shall allow steamers, ships and boats and
their cargoes, belonging to any Member States freely to use
the various port facilities and grant them the same
treatment and privileges granted to their own in docking or
calling at the ports as concerns fees, pilotage and docking
services, freight, loading and unloading, maintenance,
repair, storage of goods and other similar services.
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CHAPTER SIX
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION
ARTICLE 21
Member States shall seek to unify investment rules and
regulations in order to achieve a joint investment policy
aimed at directing their domestic and foreign investments
towards serving their interest, and realizing their
peoples' aspirations for development and progress.
ARTICLE 22
Member States shall seek to coordinate their financial,
monetary and banking policies and enhance cooperation
between monetary agencies and central banks, including the
endeavour to establish a joint currency in order to further
their desired economic. [sic]
ARTICLE 23
Member States shall seek to coordinate their external
policies in the sphere of international and regional
development aid.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CLOSING PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 24
In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the
procedures resulting therefrom, consideration shall be
given to differences in the levels of development as
between Member States and the local development priorities
of each. Any Member States may be temporarily exempted from
applying such provisions of this Agreement as may be
necessitated by temporary local situations in that state or
specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be
for a specific period and shall be decided by the Supreme
Council for the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of
the Gulf.
ARTICLE 25
No Member State shall grant any non-member state any
preferential privilege exceeding that granted herein.
ARTICLE 26
a. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after
its approval by the Supreme Council.
b. This Agreement may be amended by consent of the Supreme
Council.
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ARTICLE 27
In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of
Member States, execution of the provisions of this
Agreement shall prevail.
ARTICLE 28
Provisions herein shall supercede any similar provisions
contained in bilateral agreements. Drawn up at Riyadh on 15
Muharram 1402, corresponding to 11 November 1982.
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